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FOREWORD 
 
Due to the complexity of conflicts, the human dimension in peacekeeping and stabiliza-
tion operations has increased its significance. At the same time understanding of human 
dimension has not improved at the same rate. The lessons learnt from different missions 
differ from country to country and from mission to mission. Before this study, very 
little Finnish or international research exists on the human terrain of a conflict. 
The purpose of this study is to explore the human dimension of the tactical land 
operating environment (battlespace) in stabilization operations and thereby interpret the 
tactical reality of deployed ground troops.  
This study gives a new perspective and significant information understanding of 
the actors and situation in operating environment which usually is more than compli-
cated.  
 On behalf of department of tactics and operational art, I would like to thank 
Teemu Nurmela for providing new scientific information to the broad field of military 
sciences. 
 
Santahamina 25.1.2010 
 
Colonel     
     Pekka Järvi 
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THE SOCIAL BATTLESPACE OF STABILIZATION  
OPERATIONS – ACTION AMONGST THE PEOPLE  
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The purpose statement – discovering the tactical reality  
 
Traditional Finnish “blue helmet” missions have been undertaken in situations where 
the parties have already consented to building peace. After the so-called revolution of 
U.N. peacekeeping, this kind of consent has been hard to find.1 The Finnish military 
terminology has shifted accordingly from peacekeeping (PK) to peace support opera-
tions (PSO) and military crisis management (sotilaallinen kriisinhallinta). The terms 
“stabilization operations” or “stability operations” are not used in official texts to de-
scribe a certain phase or type of operations.2 Yet under the UN Chapter VII mandate, 
such operations have been common since IFOR in 1995. Finland has chosen not to take 
part in actual warfighting, but rather to contribute follow-on forces to the land compo-
nent.3 Operations such as IFOR, SFOR, KFOR and recently ISAF have profoundly 
changed our operational environment. No longer is there a strong emphasis on post-
conflict normalization. A recognized need for earlier action mandates a change in our 
approach.  
 
This thesis will show the complexity of the tactical4 level when undertaking stabiliza-
tion operations. A military intervention is often a robust and violent event whose legal 
framework is based on the law of armed conflict. When the campaign finally reaches 
the point of normalization, the juridical base must shift its basis to the rule of law.5 Sta-
bilization, which lies between the two ends of the spectrum, does not neatly fall within 
                                                 
1 Connaughton (2001), pp. 41-52. Durch (2006), pp. 1-30. They refer to profound changes in peacekeep-
ing after the end of the Cold War. Operations in ex-Yugoslavia, Somali, Rwanda and East-Timor showed 
that the traditional “blue helmet” operations had reached their limits. 
2 Author’s observation based on the development of the NORDCAPS UN Tactical Manual of 1996 and 
the NORDCAPS PSO Tactical Manuals of 2002 and 2007, as well as the Defense “White Papers” of 
2004 and 2009. Although “crisis management” is the overall term, the training establishment in Pori Bri-
gade (Kriisinhallintakeskus) is translated to English as the “PSO Training Center”. The term PSO is clear-
ly taken from NATO terminology. 
3 Author’s conclusion based on the Finnish Defense Forces website. Ongoing and past operations are 
listed at http://www.mil.fi/rauhanturvaaja/operaatiot/. Accessed 24 May 2009. 
4 The terms “strategic”, “operational” and “tactical” are used in accordance with NATO terminology 
(AAP-6). 
5 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Principles and Guidelines (2008). See also Rosén – Parkkari 
(2004), p. 1-40, http://www.icrc.org/eng and http://www.un.org/law/. 
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one judicial model or the other. We may call this grey area between warfighting and 
peacekeeping peace support, nation building or counterinsurgency, but these terms will 
remain hollow. Such terms quickly lose their meaning especially for those deployed on 
the ground. Thus, the operational reality consists of concrete aspects such as the man-
date, the mission, memorandums of understanding (MOU), the status of forces agree-
ment (SOFA) and rules of engagement (ROE).6 The tactical reality, however, incorpo-
rates varying levels of intensity and a multitude of actors and contexts. To visualize all 
this, the reader must have a working knowledge of how things really work during opera-
tions. Therefore, it is important to note that this paper is written for the experienced au-
dience. 
 
At the beginning of this research, there existed very little Finnish or international re-
search on the human terrain of a conflict. This deficiency was particularly acute at the 
tactical level.7 There are of course countless publications describing modern conflict, 
especially since the beginning of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. These books and 
articles usually focus on the strategic or operational levels of conflict, but seem to avoid 
the complexity, diversity, diffusion and lethality at the tactical level. Because most 
modern operations take place amongst populations, the stabilization phase has become 
the decisive step of a campaign. As a result, the ground component has become the de-
cisive operational element. In the middle of reconstruction and nation-building activi-
ties, our ground forces are facing a plethora of asymmetric threats. The need for ground 
troops may even be greater in the stabilization phase of a conflict than during the pre-
ceding intervention phase. This underlines the need for both a high quantity and quality 
of ground troops.8  
 
This preface has highlighted the changing tactical environment of Finnish troops and 
the complexity of stabilization operations. The purpose of this study is to explore the 
human dimension of the tactical land operating environment (battlespace) in stabiliza-
tion operations and thereby interpret the tactical reality of deployed ground troops. Al-
though this study is specific to Finland, the research results and conclusions should be 
applicable for a wider audience. The author has worked to combine existing information 
in a new way in order to generate further discussion and research. 
 
This publication is based on the general staff officer course thesis written by the author 
during the 2008-2009 academic year for the Department of Tactics of the Finnish Na-
                                                 
6 NORDCAPS PSO Training Manual (2007), pp. 36–38. 
7 The U.S. Army has developed a Human Terrain System program based on experiences from Iraq and 
Afghanistan. At the beginning of this research process, research reports on this topic were not publicly 
available. A search conducted on 31 May 2008 with the words “human terrain” produced only 5 relevant 
results out of the 20 matching documents on the U.S. Defense Technical Information Center’s database 
(STINET), available online at http://stinet.dtic.mil/. On 16 August 2009, the same search produced 675 
hits. The website had changed to http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/. The conclusion is that the significance of this 
subject has been noted and that a lot of similar research has been done during the timeline of this study. 
The Human Terrain System utilizes experts of anthropology, sociology, political science, languages and 
regional studies at the brigade level and above with a national “reachback” channel for further informa-
tion. The aim is to help military commanders understand the societies and environments they operate in. 
See also the U.S. Army Website of Human Terrain System at 
http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/default.htm and Kipp - Grau - Prinslow - Smith (2006).  
8 See CDEF (2007): FT-01, pp. 10-14. See also Smith (2007) and Desportes (2007A). 
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tional Defense University. Investigations in the tactical operational environment contin-
ued intensively after the course as the author’s first assignment was to be the operations 
officer for PSOs at Pori Brigade – the Finnish national command post for all our de-
ployed land forces. This book can be considered an improved edition of the thesis, as 
some improvements have been made based on feedback from colleagues and further 
analysis of the major issues. These differences are not specifically highlighted, but a 
careful reader is likely to spot a few changes. The author hopes that publishing this im-
proved edition will allow for broader distribution of the findings among the professional 
military audience both within Finland and abroad.      
 
1.2 The quest for pre-understanding 
 
John W. Creswell states that a researcher should first ponder whether a topic can and 
should be studied.9 In this study, the question of can was difficult to answer. Because of 
ongoing operations, there were so many books, research papers and articles published 
during the writing timeline that the author faced constant pressure to add new elements 
and re-think others. In this area, the author’s military experience and education helped 
identify important sources quickly. On the other hand, studying the human dimension 
required a multidisciplinary effort oriented primarily towards cultural anthropology and 
sociology. These subjects were almost completely foreign to the author when starting 
this project in the summer of 2007. Since the author’s competence in this sector does 
not include any formal academic studies, the choices and interpretations are subject to 
criticism.    
 
The question of should has already been partially answered in the earlier purpose state-
ment. This thesis aims to contribute something new to the existing literature. The reac-
tions of fellow officers, both Finnish and foreign, have been positive and encouraging 
from the beginning. Furthermore, the research subject dovetailed well with the author’s 
simultaneous studies at the French Joint Staff College (Collège Interarmées de Défense, 
CID) as well as with expectations of future career possibilities within the Finnish De-
fense Forces.10 During the research process, the author wrote an article for CID’s jour-
nal “La Tribune” and published a monograph as a part of his scholarly activities at the 
CID. These parallel writing processes helped to bring the most relevant matters for this 
thesis into focus.  
 
As a result of the questions of can and should, pre-understanding of the research subject 
was largely based on existing literature. The selection of sources was made after study-
ing the results of different search engines, which included 1) The National Defense 
University (https://taisto.linneanet.fi/)11, 2) Google (http://www.google.com/) and 3) 
                                                 
9 Creswell (2003), pp. 27–48. Identifying a researchable topic is also well covered by Hirsjärvi (1997), 
pp. 98-113. 
10 Creswell (2003), pp. 28-29. Creswell sees that these factors need to be weighed before proceeding with 
a major research work. 
11 This service is available in Finnish, Swedish and English. The use of actual library functions requires a 
clearance from the National Defense University library. This study was supported by another search en-
gine in the research database of the Finnish Defense Forces intranet (only available for the Finnish mili-
tary).  
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The Amazon internet bookshop (http://www.amazon.com/). Using key words such as 
“peace support operation”, “peace operation”, “stabilization”, “peace enforcement”, 
“counterinsurgency”, “nation building” - and their Finnish translations - a list of count-
less of books and articles was produced. This was an ongoing process from autumn 
2006 until spring 2009. It first served the purpose of the Senior Staff Officer Course and 
later, the author used it for this General Staff Officer Course thesis.12 After selecting the 
most applicable sources, the second step was to sift through their references in order to 
produce the most robust body of research possible.13 The following method was used to 
select the most pertinent sources: 
 
- Was the publication written after 11 September 2001? 
- Does the publication cover the tactical operating environment or the human ter-
rain of either stabilization, peace support or counterinsurgency operations? 
- Has the publication been referred to by other selected sources? 
 
The author’s studies at the French Joint Staff College provided an opportunity to con-
firm the relevancy and the currency of the sources used. Many of the key sources of this 
research were either used directly in teaching or were referred to by the visiting lectur-
ers. These lecturers included General David Petraeus and General James Mattis. Major 
General Vincent Desportes, the author of La Guerre Probable, was the director of the 
CID during the 2008-2009 academic year. He underlined the importance of studying 
and understanding modern conflict and he encouraged officers to express their thoughts 
in writing. With the opportunity to discuss the topic and receive feedback from French 
and international fellow student officers and school cadre, one could not imagine better 
conditions for research work oriented towards multinational stabilization operations.14  
 
1.3 Organization of this paper 
 
Chapters 1 and 2 will outline the overall research problem and introduce the reader to 
the research process and the methods used in the various phases. In Chapter 3, we shall 
define stabilization and its overall contexts. The reader will be acquainted with various 
definitions of stabilization-related terms and concepts. As Jari Rantapelkonen has 
pointed out, almost all the countries and organizations use different doctrinal ap-
proaches and place emphasis on different terms.15 The reader should therefore pay at-
tention to the choices made and understand that the actual research process is largely 
                                                 
12 Author’s comment: Senior Staff Officer Course = esiupseerikurssi, General Staff Officer Course = 
yleisesikuntaupseerikurssi. 
13 Creswell (2003), pp. 27–48. Creswell provides guidelines on how to use databases and how to build a 
“literature map” around the research topic. See also Flick (2006), pp. 57-64.  
14 The 16th class of the CID, “Promotion Maréchal Foch”, included 342 students out of which 112 were 
foreigners representing 74 different nationalities. The operational experience amongst the students was 
considerable and professional discussion took place in everyday life, in the classrooms and during free 
time. This informal, undocumented interaction was very significant to this research process. 
15 Rantapelkonen (2000), pp. 35–58, 87–96 and 169-170. Jari Rantapelkonen has studied the concepts of 
conflict and conflict management. His research focuses on the conflicts of Former Yugoslavia of the 
1990s and analyzes official concepts of different states (United Kingdom, Finland, Russia, and United 
States) and security organizations (EU, NATO, OSCE, WEU).  
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dependent upon these choices. As usually occurs with qualitative research, the initial 
definitions have evolved into new topics throughout the research and new perspectives 
and dimensions have been discovered.16  
 
Chapter 4 is the core of this research work as it provides the tools for operationalizing 
the research problems. It introduces the concept of battlespace and specifically explores 
its human dimension. The social aspects of the human dimension are analyzed through 
the theoretical lens of Jürgen Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action. The conclu-
sion of this chapter introduces a new perspective for analyzing and categorizing the tac-
tical reality in stabilization operations.  
 
In Chapter 5, we will discover Afghanistan as a conflict environment. It provides a 
quick reference for those readers not familiar with the recent history and current condi-
tions of the country. Chapter 6 represents the analysis portion of this paper. The “base-
line” context is about the Finnish troops in Afghanistan and attempts to reflect the pre-
sent style of Finnish stabilization operations. It is followed by a presentation of two “ri-
val contexts”, those of French and British operations in Afghanistan. The findings of the 
case study are compared with the theoretical parts examined in the earlier chapters.  
 
Chapter 7 concludes the study by bringing together the research results and providing 
further insight by means of discussion and internal evaluation. A list of sources and the 
annexes are found at the end of the research report 
 
                                                 
16 Creswell (2003), pp. 142-147.  
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2 THE PARADIGM SHIFT AND MODERN OPERATIONS 
 
 
- General Sir Rupert Smith17 
 
The Cold War could have been characterized as nuclear-centric and ideologically bi-
polar. The relatively clear paradigms of war of that era did not tumble down along with 
the Berlin Wall, but they continued to affect military and security policy environments 
long after. Doctrines, organizational structures, weapons systems and national identities 
were not easily adapted even if the contexts and situations changed rapidly. Raitasalo 
and Sipilä mention eight major discourses affecting this still ongoing shift of paradigms: 
1) revolution in military affairs (RMA), 2) information warfare, 3) nuclear weapons, 4) 
professionalization of armed forces, 5) privatization of warfare, 6) new wars, 7) crisis 
management and 8) the war against terror.18 The end of the Cold War can also be seen 
as an end to traditional peacekeeping.19 Warfighting and peace operations seem to be 
blurred, as war nowadays is seldom declared and military force is used in varying con-
texts and situations. We tend to speak of “operations” rather than “wars” so as to avoid 
the political flipsides affiliated with the latter term.  
 
There are three different schools that try to explain warfare of the 21st Century. The first 
school represents a transformational approach focusing on the technical revolution in 
military affairs (RMA), effects based approach on operations (EBAO) and network cen-
tric warfare (NCW). The second school provides a more traditional approach to inter-
state warfare and insists on maintaining traditional warfighting capabilities. The third 
school focuses on a “war amongst the people”; the leading thinkers of this group in-
cluded Generals Rupert Smith and Vincent Desportes.20 These semantic debates are 
necessary, as the paradigm of war seems to be changing. For this thesis in particular, the 
lengthy post-intervention phase is particularly interesting. Without taking sides in the 
overall debate, we will examine the approaches on stabilization according to the above 
mentioned third school of military thought. This is an ontological choice, which also 
gives a general framework for the thesis. This choice focuses the scope in the stabiliza-
tion phase and provides a background for exploring tactical action.  
 
                                                 
17 Smith (2007), p. 19. 
18 Raitasalo – Sipilä (ed.) (2008), pp. 1-10. 
19 Connaughton (2001), pp. 41-52 and Durch (2006), pp. 1-30. 
20 Coutau-Bégarie, Hervé: Strategy lecture at the CID, 21 November 2008. Coutau-Bégarie was the pro-
fessor of strategy at the CID for the 16th class. In Finland, Janne Malkki has reflected on the works of 
Mary Kaldor, Martin von Creveld, Kalevi J. Holsti, William S. Lind and Rupert Smith. He does not see a 
division similar to that noted by Couteau-Bégarie, but divides conflicts between “old wars” of interstate 
nature and “new wars” involving multinational effort in crisis management, non-state actors and global-
ized effects. See Malkki, Janne: Uudet sodat, an article in Raitasalo – Sipilä (ed.) (2008), pp. 89-98.  
”We fight amongst the people, a fact amplified literally and figuratively by the central role of 
the media: we fight in every living room in the world as well as on the streets and fields of a 
conflict zone.”  
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2.1 War amongst the people 
 
Let us assume that stabilization operations are a follow-up phase for a legitimized inter-
national military intervention aimed at ending an ongoing conflict. Nils Marius Rekke-
dal’s study of the modern art of war poses four classic questions: “what is war?”, “how 
can wars be won?”, “how can we best prepare for war?” and “how can wars be pre-
vented?” He then adds a relatively new question: “how can conflicts or wars be termi-
nated?”21 A quick military victory in the intervention phase does not guarantee an end to 
the conflict. Conflicts, whether conventional, unconventional or a mixture of the two, 
may even change as the result of third-party intervention. Current trends include fight-
ing non-state asymmetric enemies, operating in multinational coalitions and an increas-
ing emphasis on civil-military cooperation. There is a need for a “comprehensive ap-
proach” instead of a pure military solution.22 This leads us to the first proposition guid-
ing this thesis: Military action alone does not guarantee successful stabilization opera-
tions. 
 
Conventional “large wars” are becoming a rarity as the number of “low intensity con-
flicts” (LIC) remains high. A decisive factor in a LIC is the legitimacy assigned by the 
local population to the forces in theater. Without it, the conflict cannot be won.23 Aus-
tralian doctrine questions the use of such intensity scales stating that “the intensity level 
of an operation now describes how often forces encounter high lethality, not whether 
they encounter it”. The Australians prefer to characterize the modern conflict environ-
ment in terms such as complexity, diversity, diffusion and lethality.  
 
Furthermore, they see conflict as “a human, societal activity rather than a technical or 
engineering problem” and label the land environment as “human-centric”.24 This can be 
interpreted in two ways: first, it means that the human terrain is the key terrain and sec-
ond, that high troop quality is an essential requirement. 
                                                 
21 Rekkedal (2006), pp. 17-23. Rekkedal, a Norwegian, is a professor of War Studies at the Swedish War 
College, Försvarshögskolan. See http://www.fhs.se/en/. The translation of the fourth edition (2006) of 
Rekkedal’s book is currently used in teaching throughout the Finnish National Defense University.  
22 Rekkedal (2006), pp. 541-567. 
23 Rekkedal (2006), pp. 116–118 and 188-189. LICs are characterized by decentralization, continuous 
operations, minimizing own casualties and causing daily – even if minor in scale - casualties to the en-
emy. This action is aimed at bringing the enemy’s resistance down by causing psychological and moral 
setbacks. Rekkedal sees that this type of LIC is difficult to comprehend in the context of “Western” para-
digms of war and peace. A constructive approach to these conflicts is only possible if the boundary be-
tween military and civilian activities is dissolved and the means and ends of conventional military forces 
are redefined. As western societies are based on the separation of the military and the civilian compo-
nents, this approach is problematic indeed. 
24 Complex Warfighting (2004), pp. 4-12. Complexity refers to complex physical, human and informa-
tional terrains and difficulties in maintaining a “visible” battlespace. Diversity of actors and differences in 
“defeat thresholds” is a major cause of asymmetry. Western forces typically have a high tactical defeat 
threshold but strategically they are vulnerable in terms of public opinion, political will and casualty aver-
sion. Adversaries, conversely, tend to be easily beaten in single engagements, but they often have a rela-
tively high strategic defeat threshold. Diffusion of conflict breaks traditional patterns, as tactical events 
may have direct strategic consequences. Non-state actors, virtual theatres, media impact, combatant and 
non-combatant identification problems, disaggregated battlespace and finally war-style operations in 
peacetime do not fit our conceptual boundaries of war. An increase in lethality means that each individual 
engagement may end in mass casualties with implications at the strategic level.  
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- General Charles Krulak, U.S. Marine Corps, 1996.25 
 
The American term “Three-Block War” refers to a full spectrum of military operations 
ranging from humanitarian assistance and counterinsurgency to combat operations. The 
key message behind this term was that a modern tactical reality now simultaneously 
involved both kinetic and non-kinetic action. Later, the Australians condensed this to 
occurrences on the same city block at the same time. When combat occurs, troops “will 
encounter more lethal enemies, with less warning, in close combat, in complex terrain”. 
They claim that unless troops master close combat, the required non-combat functions 
cannot be executed peacefully.26 This rather technical viewpoint guides our second 
proposition: Stabilization forces need to master both combat and non-combat functions. 
 
Rupert Smith states that war, as we knew it, no longer exists. He concludes that a new 
paradigm of “war amongst the people” has replaced the old paradigm of industrial war. 
Smith points out a difference between employing force and merely deploying forces. 
Even with local military success, the original problems will not be solved with military 
solutions. In this sense, there has been no utility of force.27 We should also understand 
that the campaign for “hearts and minds” is no longer an activity that only supports op-
erations, but the overall objective.28 While describing modern conflict in general and 
Bosnia in particular, Smith’s conclusions on the primacy of political means over mili-
tary power and the importance of the local level are in fact repetitions of certain classic 
counterinsurgency (COIN) concepts.29    
 
Military engagements can now take place anywhere, and civilians in the battlefield are 
at once targets, objectives to be won and potential opposing forces. In fact, Smith states 
that the people are the battlefield. A guerilla fighter or an insurgent needs the populace 
for concealment and for sustainment. He can also target civilians because their will is 
the ultimate objective. The will and the opinion of the people will decide elections, in-
fluence politicians and affect the use of force, both locally and internationally. The me-
dia are used to make the world population at large aware of the conflict. The matters are 
                                                 
25 Krulak (1997). 
26 Complex Warfighting (2004), p. 7.  
27 Smith (2007), pp. 3-20. General Smith’s book was published in 2007 and it is based on his experiences 
and observations of conflicts from low to high intensity, around the world. He sets the stage by studying 
the history of warfare from Napoleonic battles to present, in a style similar to that of Sir B.H. Liddell-Hart 
in his grand classic Strategy. Smith backs up his thesis with a case study on Bosnia organized according 
to his six trends. Although Smith works mostly from the strategic viewpoint, his study shows trends simi-
lar to those of Rekkedal (2006). The differences between these two are those of a theorist (Rekkedal) vs. a 
practitioner (Smith).  
28 Smith (2007), pp. 272–280. 
29 See for example Galula (1964), pp. 60-67. Galula’s book is a counterinsurgency classic of the French 
colonial wars era and is frequently quoted in modern COIN books, including the U.S. Army FM 3-24 
(2006). 
”In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees 
– providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be holding two warring 
tribes apart – conducting peace-keeping operations. Finally, they will be fighting a highly 
lethal mid-intensity battle. All on the same day, all within three city blocks. It will be what we 
call the three-block war.” 
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discussed in public while views and opinions are formed in private, semi-public and 
public spheres. Therefore, according to Smith, operations take place amongst the people 
in a wider sense as well, through the media. This means that information is the “cur-
rency” on which the war amongst the people is waged.30 
 
Vincent Desportes follows Smith’s ideas but digs deeper into the tactical level. Whereas 
Smith stated that war no longer exists, Desportes sees that war itself has not changed, 
though the circumstances of warfighting are different. He demonstrates that operations 
take place amongst the people (au sein des populations) in urban environments and that 
the ground component has become more important than before. He also presents a con-
tinuum of operations where the stabilization phase has become decisive. The most likely 
war, now and in the future, will involve irregular warfare with irregular adversaries.31 
Desportes believes there is a need for unified action of different actors to solve the chal-
lenges of stabilization. A military force may at best only contain irregular adversaries, 
and it will require political means to defeat them. Intelligence, especially human intelli-
gence (HUMINT), and small-unit tactics are the cornerstones of “the likely war”. He 
recognizes the need to think globally and act locally with an emphasis on communica-
tion. There is a need to communicate within the force, with the local populations and 
with the global audience. Military action is also a strong way to communicate as “acts, 
even the smallest ones, speak louder than words.32 This confirms our third proposition: 
Stabilization operations are human-centric. 
 
2.2 Irregular Warfare and the irregular adversary 
 
Participation in stabilization operations requires the capacity to deal with various forms 
of insurgent movements and terrorist groups that have established themselves as a local 
power. Stabilization operations are normally associated with failed or failing states and 
irregular warfare. This modern “hybrid” irregular warfare consists of various forms of 
insurgency, ‘small wars’, guerilla warfare, low intensity conflicts and some elements of 
modern international terrorism. The result is more complex than traditional counterin-
surgency or information warfare.33 During the fight against different adversaries, one 
has to secure and stabilize the populations, win the approval of the local audiences and 
reconstruct the failed state.34 Irregular warfare is also referred to by both Smith and 
Desportes when they explain war amongst the people. As Rekkedal connects the stabili-
                                                 
30 Smith (2007), pp. 3-20, 280–291 and 377–385. 
31 Desportes (2007A), pp. 43-65. Author’s comment: Desportes’ book La guerre probable does not clear-
ly distinguish his own opinions from others, as footnotes are used scarcely. Yet he analyzes modern war-
fare in a detailed manner and each chapter offers a comprehensive synthesis on the subject matter. The 
book is invaluable for the French, as most relevant publications are in English. A review of this book in 
English by Judah Grunstein is available online at http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/91-
grunstein.pdf with a link to the interview with Desportes. Before becoming the director of the CID in 
2008, Major General Desportes led the French Army doctrine center (Centre de doctrine et d’emploi des 
forces, CDEF) in 2005-2008. The French Army manual FT-01 published by CDEF in 2007 concurs with 
Desportes’ ideas.  
32 Desportes (2007A), pp. 43-65, 131-135.  
33 Rekkedal’s Power Point presentation on Hybrid and Compound Warfare is available online at: 
http://www.mpkk.fi/en/presentation/Symposium%20of%20Military%20Sciences/  
34 McCuen (2008), pp. 107-113. 
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zation of failed states with the framework of irregular warfare, we should state our 
fourth proposition: Stabilization operations take place in a tactical environment of exist-
ing irregular warfare or its aftermath. 
 
The U.S. Department of Defense has examined modern conflicts in the light of the most 
recent American experiences. In their joint doctrine, they have replaced the term Low 
Intensity Conflict (LIC) with the term Irregular Warfare (IW). Irregular warfare is a 
form of armed conflict and a form of warfare that encompasses a range of operations 
and activities just short of major combat operations (MCO). The document states that 
people, not platforms or advanced technology, will be the key for success in IW. This 
calls for understanding of “social dynamics of tribal politics, social networks, religious 
influences and cultural mores”. When dealing with this sort of warfare, it is essential to 
address non-state actors and armed groups.35 The contrast between conventional warfare 
and irregular warfare is illustrated in Figure 2-1. 
 
 
Figure 2-1. The contrast of conventional and irregular warfare. (Source: IW JOC (2007), p. 8) 
 
According to the Americans, there is friction between the levels of war as the IW is con-
textually different at each level. At each level, the goal of influencing the government is 
attained by interacting with the local population. IW should therefore be seen as a po-
litical struggle to influence the population and win the support of the population, using 
                                                 
35 Irregular Warfare (IW) – Joint Operating Concept (JOC) (2007), pp. 1-16. A non-state actor is defined 
as “a group or organization that is not within the formal structure of the government of any state, not 
limited by any state boundary, and operates beyond the control of any state and without loyalty to any 
state”. An armed group is defined as “a group that employs force to achieve its objectives; is not within 
the formal military structure of any state, alliance of states, or intergovernmental organization; and is not 
under the control of the state(s) in which it operates”. 
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both violent and non-violent methods involved.36 On the operational level, the Force 
HQ struggles to reach normalization and attain its strategic objectives. The combination 
of the so-called strategic corporal37 and the media may, however, bypass the opera-
tional level and insert individual engagements within a strategic context. On the tactical 
level, the commanders and their units will execute different kinds of actions in order to 
provide a safe and secure environment and to fulfill their mission. At the same time, 
they have to co-habitate with, assist and support the local society. This may be de-
scribed as an “intricate web of actions”, especially on the lowest tactical levels.38 As the 
primacy of tactical land environment is established, the friction between the levels of 
warfare is of special interest. We will again express this with a proposition to test to 
what extent this friction exists: Tactical reality on the ground may conflict with the op-
erational level mission statement in stabilization operations. 
 
The French doctrine states that military action against an irregular adversary is only 
useful if it supports the overall objective of dislocating the enemy. Adversaries may be 
irregular throughout the conflict (as in Afghanistan 2001 onwards), but regular adver-
saries may also transform into irregular ones after a shift from the major combat opera-
tions phase into stabilization (as in Iraq after 2003). Irregular adversaries may be very 
different in their motivations, ends and means.39 Guerillas are predominantly indigenous 
troops fighting in enemy-held, hostile or denied territory. Insurgents try to overthrow a 
constituted government and therefore have a specific motivation and a desired end state. 
Terrorists use or threaten to use calculated, unlawful violence to pursue their goals.40 
The Australian list of possible adversaries is longer: “The conflict environment has al-
ways included terrorists, rural guerrillas, bandits, tribal fighters and mercenaries. But 
today it also includes drug traffickers, multinational corporations, private military 
companies, unarmed protesters, environmental groups, computer hackers, rioters, mili-
tias, people smugglers, pirates, religious sects, urban guerrillas, media and diplomatic 
alliances.”41  
 
                                                 
36 Irregular Warfare (IW) – Joint Operating Concept (JOC) (2007), p. 5-9. As seen in Figure 2-1, the 
strategic level focus is to control and influence the relevant population. At the operational level, the focus 
may be on indirect approaches for planning operations and campaigns. On the tactical level, the focus is 
on tactics, techniques and procedures, which have to be applied differently than in a conventional opera-
tion.  
37 Author’s comment: Strategic corporal refers to a small unit leader or an individual soldier, regardless 
of his/her rank, whose decision and action on the ground is transmitted to global audiences by media 
resulting in significant national or international consequences. Well-known examples are the behavior of 
individual American prison guards at Abu Graib, Iraq, and the killings of civilians in the aftermath of an 
IED attack against an American unit at Haditha, Iraq. 
38 CDEF (2007): FT-01, pp. 20-22. 
39 PIA 00-180, pp. 5-10.  
40 JP 1-02, pp. 233, 267 and 544. The International Humanitarian Law defines also these groups from a 
legal perspective. See Rosén – Parkkari (2004). 
41 Complex Warfighting (2004), pp. 4-12. 
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2.2.1  Warlords and Warriors  
 
In 1999, Ralph Peters predicted that in the future, Western military would be facing a 
new “warrior class” rather than soldiers. He categorizes these warriors into five classes, 
all of whom – in hindsight – have been present in ongoing conflicts in Africa, Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  
1) “Losers”. This type takes advantage of the situation as weapons offer them pow-
er and a lifestyle they otherwise would never attain. Coming from the under-
class, they would have no stake, no education and no future in peacetime. The 
end of fighting for them means the end of good times.  
2) “Foot soldiers”. As the conflict has disrupted schools, employment, families and 
other structures of the society, youngsters without orientation are drawn to the 
warrior trade. The longer the conflict lasts, the harder it will be for them to re-
turn to normal life. This class may include children soldiers. 
3) “Opportunists”. Not constrained by moral issues, these entrepreneurs take full 
advantage of the situation for personal gain, influence and security. They may 
form alliances, change sides and cross ethnic boundaries to reach their goals. 
This group includes the so-called “warlords”, who may rule cities, regions or en-
tire countries in the absence of legitimate power. 
4) “Patriots”. Driven by religion, ethnic issues, nationalism or by personal motiva-
tion (such as traumatic events or personal losses), these warriors are heroes for 
their own kind. Their level of influence is dependent upon their character, con-
text and the level of motivation. In the right circumstances, they may be reinte-
grated to society. 
5) “Mercenaries”. This group mostly consists of failed, marginalized or unem-
ployed military men, who provide the nucleus of internationally available gun-
men. They have the background to provide other warriors with the needed mili-
tary skills. Depending on their charisma and leadership, they may also rise to the 
warlord status. There is also a branch of more or less legitimate mercenaries em-
ployed by Western corporations.42 
 
Braden Hisey has studied peace building in warlord situations using Sierra Leone as a 
case study. He claims that warlord situations develop analogically to the structures of 
failing states (see Figure 2-2). In the final steps of the process, warlords gain access to 
the state’s resources and thus consider any attempt to intervene unwelcome. The war-
lord’s main interest is to sustain the instability by which he thrives, and not necessarily 
to win a war. The intervening power should therefore have enough force and authority 
to contain a warlord’s operations and assets and to force him to a negotiation table. Hi-
sey considers that those who intervene in the conflict should transform the belligerents 
from warlords into politicians. Disarming and demobilizing warlords and their warriors 
is only an intermediate step.43  
 
                                                 
42 Peters (1999), pp. 32-47. 
43 Hisey (2002), pp. 13-15 and 65-72.  
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Figure 2-2. Development of “warlordism” in failed or failing states. (Source: Hisey (2002), p. 15)  
 
Stabilization operations are likely to take place in a failed or a failing state and, by con-
sequence, in a warlord situation. The economical aspects of war, such as the exploita-
tion of existing natural resources, should be closely examined, as they may constitute a 
reason to continue the conflict. The beneficiaries may be local as well as foreign, and 
corruption may be widespread.44 On the tactical level, our troops are likely to encounter 
a “warrior class” that represents a real authority as guns represent power and wealth. 
Our observations indicate that “warriors” have different motivations to engage or resist 
our troops. Some are afraid of losing their local or regional power or a profitable busi-
ness. Some have ideological or personal reasons, while others are just trying to make a 
living. For example in Fallujah, Iraq, local guerillas hired ordinary people to conduct 
attacks against coalition troops. An observer was paid $50, IED installation went for 
$100 and the actual perpetrators of the attack got $200.45 This leads to our sixth propo-
sition: Warlords and warriors with local and personal interests are the adversaries at the 
lower tactical levels.  
 
2.2.2 The Accidental Guerilla  
 
Based on our study so far, the stabilization force is likely to encounter a variety of 
armed actors on the ground. These actors are not necessarily our enemies, unless our 
troops happen to get in their way. Ultimately, some become our enemies, as they engage 
us directly or fight against the supported host-nation’s security forces. This leads to two 
traditional models of response from the intervening force. In the counter-terrorist model, 
the action would be “enemy-centric” i.e. the intervening force assumes that it will solve 
                                                 
44 Interview with Professor Liisa Laakso, 15 January 2008. 
45 West (2005), p. 30. 
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the problem by destroying terrorist networks. In the counter-insurgency model, the ap-
proach is “population-centric”, based on the belief that protecting the population and 
obtaining its consent will isolate and ultimately exhaust the insurgents. These often-
prolonged conflicts may produce what David Kilcullen calls the “Accidental Guer-
illa”.46  
 
“The local fighter is therefore often an accidental guerilla – fighting us 
because we are in his space, not because he wishes to invade ours. He fol-
lows folk-ways of tribal warfare that are mediated by traditional cultural 
norms, values and perceptual lenses; he is engaged (from his point of 
view) in “resistance” rather than “insurgency” and fights principally to 
be left alone. Whether or not he is manipulated by propaganda, advised or 
equipped by outside experts, or armed by an external sponsor, when he 
fights in his hometown or local hills in defense of traditional identity, he is 
a formidable opponent.”47    
 
“The Accidental Guerilla Syndrome” involves a minor element of hardliner terrorists or 
insurgents setting up a foothold in a local community. The process then advances in 
four successive phases where the catalyst for locals allying with hardliners is, in fact, 
the actions of the intervening outside force. Eventually, the population starts to reject 
and fight the intervening foreigners, as they are seen as an occupation force. When de-
scribing this effect, Kilcullen uses a medical analogy in which “the body rejects the in-
trusion of a foreign object, even one that serves an ultimately beneficial purpose.”48 A 
stabilization force often operates in the rejection phase, as the intervention force already 
has triggered the process of creating accidental guerillas.  
 
1) INFECTION – The hardliners establish a presence in a remote, ungoverned or 
conflict-stricken area. Local relationships and support systems are reinforced by 
shared business interests, intermarriage and the start of initial operations, such as 
recruiting and training. Possible resistance is thwarted with violence and intimi-
dation.   
2) CONTAGION – The acquired safe haven is used to spread violence and ideol-
ogy to other parts of the country. In some cases, this may include regional or 
global operations by terrorist activity or “virtually” through propaganda and me-
dia influence. 
3) INTERVENTION – Outside forces intervene to deal with the threat and to dis-
rupt safe havens. This may come in several forms, as the interveners may be lo-
cal, regional or from a wider international community. An intervention of “for-
eigners” may range from a low-profile approach to a strong and persistent pres-
ence. This will cause a reaction amongst the locals who may close ranks against 
the external threat. High profile, violent and foreign-based action tends to in-
crease support for the hardliners. Those who were once “strangers” may now be 
seen as locals or at least as defenders of locals.     
                                                 
46 Kilcullen (2009), pp. xiv-xv.  
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. (2009), pp. 30-38.  
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4) REJECTION – The local population reacts negatively, rejecting outside inter-
vention and allies with the hardliners. This may happen because the locals op-
pose outside interference and feel that local tribal or community interests are 
threatened or because they are alienated by the heavy-handed actions of the in-
terveners.49  
 
Based on his experiences in Iraq, General Chiarelli divides the local population in three 
groups: anti-coalition forces, coalition supporters and “fence-sitters”. The last group is 
watching to see how the situation develops and waiting to decide whom to support. 
They are the bulk of the populace and considered by Chiarelli as the operational center 
of gravity.50 General Mattis, also experienced in Iraq, emphasizes the importance of 
winning over the “fence-sitters” when diminishing local support for insurgency. He dis-
tinguishes a group of “irreconcilables”, who would become targets for direct kinetic 
action, as these people cannot be convinced to change sides.51 These observations are 
roughly in accord with the recent U.S. military publication, the FM 3-24.2 (2009), Tac-
tics in Counterinsurgency, which labels the passive supporters as “the mass base”.52 The 
potential accidental guerillas are oriented amongst the “fence-sitters” - a group whose 
hearts and minds are contested by coalition forces and “irreconcilable” hardliners. Our 
seventh proposition: The accidental guerilla syndrome is generated as a function of time 
and according to the chosen modus operandi of the intervener.  
 
 
Figure 2-3. Organizational elements of an insurgency (Source: FM 3-24.2 (2009), p. 2-3.) 
 
                                                 
49 Kilcullen (2009), Author’s comment: Kilcullen’s uses al Qaeda in his example, but a more generalized 
approach to “hardliners” was better suited to this thesis. 
50 Chiarelli - Michaelis (2005), pp. 5-7. 
51 FM 3-24 (2006), p. 4-7.  
52 FM 3-24.2 (2009), pp. 2-2…2-15.   
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2.3 The scientific stance of this thesis 
 
This second part of Chapter 2 introduces the reader to the hermeneutical research proc-
ess as well as to the methodology used. The conclusions and generalizations of the writ-
ten report are naturally a result of certain choices made along the way.53 Uwe Flick de-
scribes the relationship between a qualitative research and its objects: “…the object un-
der study is the determining factor for choosing a method and not the other way around. 
Objects are not reduced to single variables but are studied in their complexity and en-
tirety in their everyday context.”54  The ability to follow this process is important in 
terms of reliability and validity. It is also critical in order to understand the approach.55 
The paper has been composed with professional military officers in mind, although the 
fact remains that the thesis committee has been a key audience. This research report 
does not include a separate literature review, as it appeared more practical to discuss the 
existing material directly and in their relevant contexts.56   
 
2.3.1 Philosophy of science and the theoretical context  
 
In terms of the research background, recognizing the philosophical stance and the con-
sequent claims is essential.57 As we have already identified the object of study, we must 
now pinpoint the necessary ontological, epistemological, logical and teleological no-
tions behind it. Rauno Kuusisto sees a qualitative research process as the development 
of a subjective truth documented and organized according to the traditions of the given 
scientific discipline.58 We will see that a purely military approach is not sufficient to 
cover our research subject. Hence, a multidisciplinary approach that includes at least 
sociological and anthropological aspects is required. Interestingly enough, this observa-
tion is parallel to the nature of stabilization operations themselves. Nevertheless, as this 
thesis is prepared for the Department of Tactics, a tactical viewpoint will be the main 
focus throughout the report. 
                                                 
53 Hirsjärvi – Remes- Sajavaara (2005), pp. 114-122. The foundation of any research consists of analyz-
ing the research problem properly and accurately, choosing a suitable philosophical stance, selecting 
applicable research methods and understanding the theoretical context. See also Creswell (2003), pp. 4-
23. 
54 Flick, Uwe (2006), pp. 14-15.  
55 Yin (2003), pp. 33–39. In an ideal situation, the whole study should be repeatable by another investiga-
tor using only the research report and the research database. Using the same case, the investigator should 
arrive at the same findings and conclusions.  
56 Yin (2003), pp. 141–165. Author’s comment: The reader should understand that this research report 
summarizes the author’s conclusion. A separate research databank maintained by the author is available 
for those interested in specific details or for the verification purposes of the supervisors. It includes sev-
eral early drafts of the report, which is proof of a hermeneutical process leading to this final stage. As 
research questions have been re-evaluated along the way, the whole research strategy has been continu-
ously adjusted and the draft report redesigned accordingly. The databank also includes data and findings 
from the previous research completed in 2006-2007. 
57 Creswell (2003), pp. 4-13. 
58 Kuusisto, Rauno: Tieteenfilosofia - ajattelun kehys. An article in Huttunen – Metteri (2008), pp. 21–33. 
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The Western idea of warfighting comprises three levels of war: strategic, operational 
and tactical levels.59 The word “tactics” refers to the planning, preparation, execution 
and leading of battles. Equally, “operational art” refers to the principles and skills re-
quired to plan, prepare and conduct a series of battles.  This level of war connects the 
tactical level with the strategic aims and objectives of a war or a campaign. Tactics, 
operational art and strategy are subsets or different planes of the art of war from the 
viewpoint of military science. In Finland, the combination of tactics and operational art 
is considered not as a fundamental military science, but a collective one. It may com-
bine elements of military history, military technology, military pedagogy, military psy-
chology and military sociology. This complicated description is clarified by Pasi Kes-
seli when he states, “the art of war is a science when researched and studied, and an art 
when practiced”. Theory and practice should therefore be closely linked and developing 
new scientific data requires a multidisciplinary approach.60  
 
Rauno Kuusisto explains hermeneutics as a doctrine of interpretation. It requires a firm 
base of knowledge to build on, a well-defined angle and finally a pre-understanding of 
the whole research process. The subjectivity of the investigator has to be recognized as 
he develops an interpretation of the phenomenon under study according to the so-called 
hermeneutical spiral. The end-state involves reaching a satisfactory level of abstraction 
in order to increase our knowledge.61 This concurs with the purpose statement of this 
research, as its aim is to present an interpretation of the human dimension of the battle-
space in stabilization operations. The goal is not to quantify or to model this kind of an 
environment, or to provide a field manual or a toolbox for suggested courses of action. 
This thesis has been written in a hermeneutical manner. Further supporting the herme-
neutical approach is the lengthiness of the research process with two distinct starting 
points; the first study was launched in 2006 and the second stage began in the summer 
of 2007.  
 
Ontologically the subject is two-fold, because the concepts of battlespace and stabiliza-
tion operations have to be reviewed as phenomena.62 Stabilization operations are 
viewed from the angle of the post-intervention phase of operations, i.e. the phase after 
the major combat operations phase. The mission spectrum is seen according to specific 
manuals describing this phase of operations. The grounding assumption is that opera-
tions are legitimate and authorized by the international community. Battlespace is seen 
as a conceptual operating environment that does not necessarily include combat action - 
even if the name includes the word “battle”. On the other hand, operations within a bat-
tlespace may or may not include combat in many different variations, intensities and 
                                                 
59 Rekkedal (2006), pp. 23-28. The NATO terminology concurs with this - see AAP-6 (2006), NATO 
Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French). 
60 Kesseli, Pasi: Operaatiotaito ja taktiikka tieteenalana, an article in Huttunen – Metteri (2008), pp. 8–
14. Colonel Kesseli is the professor of the Department of Tactics at the Finnish National Defence Univer-
sity. See also Rekkedal (2006), pp. 36-38. Author’s comment: From the standpoint of the art of war, de-
fining a paradigm in order to explain modern warfare goes well beyond the level of this thesis. Certain 
factors have been recognized and interpreted by scientists such as Nils-Marius Rekkedal and Hervé Cou-
tau-Bégarie. Their publications are based on scientific research and both of them have acknowledged that 
irregular warfare has been evolving towards “war amongst the people”. Kesseli’s requirement for a prac-
tical counterweight has been achieved by studying the works of Rupert Smith and Vincent Desportes.   
61 Kuusisto, Rauno: Tieteenfilosofia - ajattelun kehys. An article in Huttunen – Metteri (2008), pp. 22-26. 
62 Hirsjärvi - Remes - Sajavaara (2005), pp. 120–130. 
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levels. The “social” battlespace for a tactical land unit is a new approach developed in 
Chapter 4. It changes our classic terrain-oriented and enemy-oriented views in favor of a 
human-centric mindset.   
 
2.3.2 Pre-understanding and consequent propositions 
 
The purpose of this research and its overall context has been introduced in Chapter 1. 
The background of the overall problematic was described earlier in this chapter. After 
this short study on war amongst the people and irregular warfare, it is possible to say 
that there is a pre-understanding of the research subject.63 Epistemologically, one has to 
recognize the objectivity hazards that relate to the author’s own experiences in peace 
support operations and exercises.64 To understand social environments, events and ac-
tivities and their relationship to written texts as versions of the world, we have to recog-
nize a process called mimesis. According to Uwe Flick, this process helps a researcher 
set up an epistemological background when using texts as empirical material.65 Juha 
Varto, too, underlines the differences between the lifeworlds of the interpreter of a text 
and its author, and emphasizes that the selections made in the research process are al-
ways personal.66  
 
The pre-understanding of this study is therefore largely dependent on the lifeworld of 
the author. Interpretations made in the mimetic process of reading texts are always per-
sonal and temporally influenced. As a result, choices made in the selection of sources 
may have great impact on this pre-understanding.67 For that purpose, the methods of 
choosing sources were presented in Chapter 1 in order to separate the researcher and the 
                                                 
63 Varto (1992), pp. 55-72. Pre-understanding is a term of hermeneutics. In a hermeneutical interpretation 
process, the researcher approaches a subject based on his own pre-understanding. Based on his interpreta-
tions, the researcher develops his prior knowledge of the subject. Each new approach to the subject will 
develop this understanding a little further. The so-called hermeneutical cycle is therefore never complete, 
as each step of the research process brings the researcher closer to the subject and deepens his self-
understanding.   
64 See Hirsjärvi - Remes - Sajavaara (2005), pp. 120–130 and Varto (1992), pp. 26-27. All the elements of 
qualitative research take place in a lifeworld, in which the researcher also exists and acts. Although this is 
more relevant to ethnographic and social studies, it still applies here, as a pure setting of natural scientific 
research is not possible. Author’s comment: The author has served in KFOR, Kosovo (1999-2000) and in 
EUFOR, Bosnia-Herzegovina (2005-2006). He also has experience in Nordic peace support exercises and 
NATO crisis response exercises 1998-2005 in the framework of the Finnish Rapid Deployment Force. 
65 Flick (2006), pp. 82–93. According to Flick, texts can be used as empirical material in qualitative re-
search to provide essential data, interpretations and also to present and communicate findings. Texts are 
therefore the basic material of qualitative research. The process of mimesis has also been referred in terms 
of constructing knowledge in general. It is also called “world making in the text”. 
66 Varto (1992), pp. 55–72. According to Varto, interpretation must always lead to understanding. Under-
standing is relative, as lifeworlds of interpreters as well as time and purpose of the study will always be 
different. 
67 The author recognizes that this study has not been designed and conducted within the year of the Gen-
eral Staff Officer Studies (yleisesikuntaupseerikurssi). Instead, it is a continuum of his research started 
during the preceding Senior Staff Officer Course (esiupseerikurssi). In the background, there is also a 
career-long study of modern conflict in the form of operational experience, reading books and discussing 
with colleagues. It is also likely to be affected by Finnish military thought in regard to peace support 
operations and tactics, techniques and procedures. Studies at the French Joint Staff College (CID) have 
provided new possibilities, such as reading French publications not yet translated into Finnish or English.  
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research subject and to facilitate the reader’s own interpretations. Recognizing the haz-
ards involved when drawing conclusions, the case study has been selected from an op-
eration with which the author does not have personal experience. It has been in the best 
interest of the author to seek objectivity with these measures taken.  
 
 
 
Figure 2-4. The process of mimesis. (Flick (2006), p. 88) 
 
To summarize, Chapters 1 and 2 set up the overall framework for this study. By looking 
closely into modern conflict, we can imagine the dangers of limiting our views based on 
strategic missions and political terms, as tactical reality does not necessarily correspond 
to these high-level “arrows on a map”. As a conclusion of this basic research, we have 
declared seven propositions68 to further analyze our pre-understanding and to establish 
criteria for the case study environment: 
(1) Military action alone does not guarantee successful stabilization opera-
tions. 
(2) Stabilization forces need to master both combat and non-combat func-
tions. 
(3) Stabilization operations are human-centric. 
(4) Stabilization operations take place in a tactical environment of existing 
irregular warfare or its aftermath. 
(5) Tactical reality on the ground may conflict with the operational level 
mission statement in stabilization operations. 
(6) Warlords and warriors with local and personal interests are the adversar-
ies at the lower tactical levels.  
(7) The accidental guerilla syndrome is generated as a function of time and 
the chosen modus operandi of the intervener.  
 
 
                                                 
68 Yin (2003), pp. 21-22. According to Yin, propositions guide the study towards important issues, and 
thus support and pave the way towards answers to the main research problems or questions.  
EXPERIENCE 
CONSTRUCTION  
(TEXT) 
INTERPRETATION 
mimesis 1 
mimesis 2 mimesis 3 
mimesis 1 = a pre-understanding of human action 
mimesis 2 = processing experiences of social environments into texts 
mimesis 3 = the interpretation of texts according to one’s own lifeworld 
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2.4 The research problem and the qualitative approach 
 
The overall research problem is expressed by the title of this thesis. It calls for a human-
centric approach instead of classic terrain or enemy oriented approaches. Presuming that 
the local societies in crisis are the raison d’être of a given stabilization operation, the 
human dimension is far more important – and complex – than it would be on a classic 
traditional battlefield. The main research problem therefore revolves around a possible 
new approach – the “social” battlespace of stabilization operations.  
 
Jussi Metteri agrees that qualitative methods should prevail when studying operational 
art and tactics.69 According to Juha Varto, the object of a qualitative research is usually 
human and the lifeworld of humans. A lifeworld consists of meanings, and qualitative 
research of the lifeworld therefore observes it as a world of meanings. Meanings appear 
as human actions, goal setting, planning, administrative structures, community activities 
etc.70 This fits well with the subject involving soldiers in the complex operational envi-
ronment of a contemporary stabilization operation. The use of qualitative methods usu-
ally generalizes findings when compared with quantitative and mixed methods. As any 
efforts to quantify the tactical action or human terrain of an operational area would re-
quire access to confidential documents and statistics, quantitative or even mixed ap-
proaches seemed unsuitable.  
 
An effort to describe and interpret the human dimension of battlespace results in an ex-
planatory research problem. Possible research strategies would have included experi-
ments, histories, archival analysis, surveys and case studies. Robert K. Yin suggests that 
when the major research questions include “why” or “how,” and when the investigation 
is focused on contemporary events over which the investigator has no control, a case 
study becomes the most suitable research strategy.71 Mika Huttunen has viewed case 
study methods in the context of operational art and tactics research. He agrees with Yin 
that the case study is more of an approach or a strategy than just a method.72 The time 
and resources available made it possible to study only a single operational environment, 
Afghanistan, with three different tactical contexts as cases.73  
 
2.4.1 The research questions  
 
The central research question is “How do human structures and social interactions 
affect the tactical level land operations of the stabilization force”?  
                                                 
69 Metteri, Jussi: Laadullinen tutkimus, an article in Huttunen – Metteri (2008), pp. 37-38. 
70 Varto, Juha (1992), pp. 23-25. See also Hirsjärvi - Remes - Sajavaara (2005), p. 155. 
71 Yin (2003), pp. 3-9, Creswell (2003), pp. 13-23 and Hirsjärvi - Remes – Sajavaara (2005), pp. 125-130. 
72 Huttunen, Mika: Tapaustutkimus operaatiotaidossa ja taktiikassa, an article in Huttunen – Metteri 
(2008), pp. 127-134. There are, however, obvious limitations when studying contemporary military op-
erations, as sources for evidence collection are usually limited. 
73 Yin (2003), pp. 39-53. Author’s comment: Another way of doing a multiple-case investigation would 
involve studying several different operations, e.g. Kosovo, Chad and Afghanistan, separately in order to 
pinpoint differences. Nevertheless, as this thesis will show, it is possible to find different cases within a 
single operation. This underlines the contradiction between the operational and tactical levels. 
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This central question reflects the duality of the human dimension – structures and ac-
tions. To reach an answer, this pivotal issue must be broken down into several sub-
problems. The supporting sub-questions are: 
1) How can stabilization operations be defined? 
2) How can the concept of battlespace be applied in the context of stabilization op-
erations? 
- What is the relevance of social action in relation to the overall tactical 
action? 
3) What kind of land operating environment exists in an actual operation?   
- What human structures or social systems exist at the tactical level? 
- What kind of interaction exists between the force and other actors? 
 
2.4.2 The frame of thesis and the scope of study 
 
This explanatory, qualitative research aims to describe the human dimension of battle-
space in stabilization operations. The overall timeframe for the study is post-9/11 (al 
Qaeda attacks in the USA and the following Global War on Terror), after which stabili-
zation operations have taken on some specific nuances.74 The stop line for evidence 
collection was July 2009 to maximize exploitable time, as operations unfold and de-
velop constantly. Logically, the research results will only apply to this framed context. 
The theoretical background, the framework of stabilization operations, the process of 
operationalizing the thesis and finally the preliminary results are measured within the 
practical dimension of a case study. 
 
The selected case study is nominally the stabilization phase of post-9/11 operations in 
Afghanistan. To separate the intervention and stabilization phases in Afghanistan is dif-
ficult indeed. A fair choice for a start line of the stabilization phase is 20 December 
2001, when ISAF I was mandated by the UN Security Council Resolution 1386. A bet-
ter milestone is 05 October 2006, when the Stage 5 (Eastern Afghanistan) expansion 
was implemented and ISAF took responsibility for the whole country.75 The wide spec-
trum of ongoing operations in Afghanistan is not a negative issue, but – rather paradoxi-
cally – it provides a far better “battle lab” than a traditional and static Chapter VI peace-
keeping mission would. In this sense, Afghanistan as a whole presents us with a critical 
case on the operational level of war, when considering its influence on post-9/11 doc-
trine. Furthermore, the varying tactical conditions allow a multiple-case study to be 
conducted within the same operational environment. This latter option was pursued, as 
will be highlighted later on. The purpose of the case study is to provide a test bench to 
confirm, to challenge or to extend the theoretical parts of this study.76  
 
                                                 
74 Author’s comment: Samuel P. Huntington has written about the clash of civilizations. David Kilcullen 
has taken this further in the post-9/11 environment labeling current conflicts as “global counterinsur-
gency” - a defensive war against a worldwide Islamist Jihad. See Huntington (1996) and Kilcullen 
(2004A and 2004B).  
75 ISAF website, http://www.nato.int/ISAF/topics/expansion/index.html. Printed 01 January 2009. 
76 Yin (2003), p. 40. 
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This thesis centers on the lower tactical level of operations.77 The “tactical level” is 
where battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish the military 
tasks assigned to the units. It includes the Regional Commands of ISAF and their sub-
units, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and certain maneuver units. “Opera-
tional level” refers to the level at which the campaign and major operations are planned 
and executed. It is understood to include the ISAF HQ and its joint operational area. 
“Strategic level” refers to the multinational political framework behind the given opera-
tion. “Strategic consequences” therefore have something to do with the set political 
and/or military aims for the operation, the consensus of the alliance or other interna-
tional actions that affect national or multinational decision-making.78  
 
 
The AO of an ISAF  
Regional Command  
PRT / BATTLEGROUP 
- Area of Operations 
- Forward Support Base 
- National Support, “Rear”  
Conceptual 
Battlespace 
SCOPE 
PRT
 
Figure 2-5. The scope of the thesis. The selected scope is presented with terminological refer-
ences to the case study. The context is the AO of a Regional Command of ISAF, where the 
battlespace of a PRT or a battalion-sized maneuver unit is the point of interest. This picture 
roughly corresponds to the conceptual battlespace presented in the FM 3-0 (2001), see Figure 
4-1. 
 
                                                 
77 FM 3-0 (2008), pp. 6-1 to 6-4. The U.S. Army further divides the tactical level into three subcategories: 
1) battles, 2) engagements and 3) small-unit and crew actions. Tactical actions may produce strategic or 
operational effects. This field manual establishes that “a battle consists of a set of related engagements 
that lasts longer and involves larger forces than an engagement”. Further, it defines an engagement as “a 
tactical conflict, usually between opposing, lower echelons maneuver forces. Engagements are typically 
conducted at brigade level and below. They are usually short, executed in terms of minutes, hours, or 
days.” See also Kesseli, Pasi: Operaatiotaito ja taktiikka tieteenalana, an article Huttunen and Metteri 
(2008), pp. 13–14. The use of these levels is always relative as the objectives and results of the actions of 
tactical units might be operational or even strategic. Finland uses the term “combat technical level” (tais-
telutekninen taso) for the levels corresponding to companies and below. 
78 These terms are used according to the NATO AAP-6 (2006). See also Rekkedal (2006), pp. 26–27. 
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To simplify the research problem, the scope of the study is that of a deployed task force 
or a battlegroup79. A Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) is also considered the 
equivalent of such a unit, as not all the troop contributors have deployed battalion sized 
maneuver units. The framework is provided by the area of operations of an ISAF Re-
gional Command. The author’s pre-understanding of such a tactical operating environ-
ment is shown in Figure 2-5. The study is limited to ground operations within the area 
of operations of a PRT. These operations may include the use of rotary-wing aircraft or 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), but the operations of the actual ISAF or other coali-
tion air or maritime components are excluded.  
 
2.5 Methodology 
 
According to Juha Varto, one must be able to clearly indicate the following when re-
searching a relatively new subject: 
1) how the research subject is constructed, 
2) how it can be recognized, 
3) how it can be observed and researched thematically and 
4) how this research stands ethically.80  
 
The framework of the human dimension of battlespace was established by observing 
and analyzing stabilization operations and the concept of battlespace. As mentioned 
earlier, these definitions are dependent on the ontological selections made earlier. The 
definition of “stabilization operations” required the use of a thematic coding method 
based on some of the principle doctrines.81 As Finland does not use this terminology, 
the study was launched from the French doctrine onwards. This choice affected the 
whole thesis. The definition of battlespace required an equally analytical approach with 
thematic coding as the selected method. The study was started from Anglo-Saxon defi-
nitions of battlespace and these views were combined with other publications that de-
scribe the modern conflict environment.  
 
Source triangulation was used to study the structures of human terrain. In this research 
phase, thematic coding helped serve to categorize different groups or actors and in com-
paring their status. The first outcome was a list of different groups (i.e. structures). The 
methods used were: 
1) A legal approach based on international humanitarian law, i.e. which groups are 
recognized by the humanitarian law. 
2) A doctrinal approach using different manuals and guidebooks, official military 
publications. 
3) A practical approach with experience-based documents and publications. 
                                                 
79 Author’s comment: Both terms refer to a reinforced combat arms (infantry, armor or cavalry) battalion. 
Task Force (TF) is the variant used by the U.S. Army and Battlegroup (BG) is more of a British origin. 
European Union Battlegroups are built around a combat arms battalion with combat support, combat 
service support and other attachments. In French, the expression is Groupement Tactique Interarmes 
(GTIA).  
80 Varto (1992), p. 37. 
81 Flick (2006), pp. 307-312. 
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The case study was used to confirm these results and to provide evidence of the signifi-
cance of social action between the stabilization force and the other actors. This research 
report reflects the research process shown in Figure 2-6. The exact case study design 
and methods are explained in Chapter 5 and the related annexes.  
 
 
 
Figure 2-6.  The research process. 
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3 STABILIZATION OPERATIONS 
 
 
- LTC David Galula, 196482 
 
The following study of field manuals and doctrinal publications will demonstrate the 
relevance of the term “stabilization operations”. It will also show that the term “stabili-
zation” actually articulates the desired end-state of any international intervention regard-
less of its overall context. As stabilization is not a Finnish term, we will begin by exam-
ining French doctrine, in which stabilization has been labeled as the decisive phase. 
Other examples presented in this chapter concur with the French view. All of the exam-
ples reflect post-2001 experiences and therefore give an adequate framework for this 
thesis.  
 
3.1 The French emphasis on stabilization 
 
According to recent French military publications, there is a continuum of three phases 
for Western involvement in modern conflicts: intervention, stabilization and normaliza-
tion. Of these, the stabilization phase has proven the most demanding.83 Figure 3-1 de-
monstrates the flow of these phases in relation to intensity and time. During the inter-
vention phase, it is necessary to “win the battle”. This phase usually includes a substan-
tial amount of enforcement. The intermediate objective at the end of the intervention 
phase is often easily defined and almost purely military. The subsequent stabilization 
phase is supposed to end in a transfer of authority from the international military force 
to the international civil administration. “Building the peace” is the final, strategic ob-
jective of the campaign. Finally, the normalization phase includes a transfer of authority 
to the local civil administration.84 In real life, however, these transfers are not likely to 
happen instantly in a single handover-takeover ceremony. More likely, the power bal-
ance shifts gradually and is dependent on a variety of factors including key leader per-
sonalities and politics. Therefore, the use of fading colors instead of strictly dividing 
phase lines in Figure 3-1 gives a more realistic vision than the FT-01 text does. 
 
                                                 
82 Galula (1964), pp. 66 and 50-55. LTC Galula (died in 1967) was a French officer who had fought in 
World War II and later served in China, Greece, Indochina and Algeria. Galula has listed four laws for 
counterinsurgency operations: 1) The support of population is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as it 
is for the insurgent. 2) Support is gained through an active minority. 3) Support from the population is 
conditional. 4) Intensity of efforts and vastness of means are essential.   
83 FT-01 (2007), pp. 10-14; PIA 00-150, pp. 13-15 and Desportes (2007A), pp. 66–71. Stabilization is 
labeled as the “decisive phase”. 
84 PIA 00-150 (2008), p. 15. 
”At some point in the counterinsurgency process, the static unit that took part in large-scale 
military operations in their area will find themselves confronted with a huge variety of non-
military tasks which have to be performed in order to get the support of the local population, 
and which can be performed only by military personnel, because of the shortage of reliable 
civilian political and administrative personnel.”  
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Figure 3-1. The three phases according to the French doctrine. (Source: FT-01 (2007), p. 13). 
 
The bombings in Kosovo in 1999 did not resolve the conflict. Similarly, military tri-
umphs of the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan 2001-2002 and in Iraq 2003 did not re-
solve those conflicts. In all of these theatres, the Western countries were still conducting 
military operations at the time this paper was being written. Hence, the intermediate 
objective of “winning the battle” seems to be easily mistaken as the desired end state of 
the whole campaign. Although the intervention phase remains the most essential job for 
the military, a lengthy stabilization phase seems to be unavoidable. In this sense, when 
labeling stabilization as the decisive phase, the French seem to be on the right track. In 
spite of that, we may question how to define the desired end state of “normality” or the 
process of “normalization” in each operational environment. Furthermore - does our 
normality correspond to their normality? For example, it seems that unfortunately, war 
is more normal than democracy in Afghanistan. Despite these reservations towards the 
French concept, we will continue to examine other examples of stabilization. Analyzing 
the end state of normalization has its own logic and therefore falls outside the scope this 
study.  
 
3.2 The Nordic concept of PSOs 
 
The co-operation of the Nordic countries has long traditions and its roots go back to the 
early 1960s. In 1997, the Nordic concept was transformed from UN peacekeeping to 
include all types of military PSOs. This development is reflected in the history of 
NORDCAPS tactical manuals, which are used as a reference by all the Nordic coun-
tries. The manual has been developed and revised based on Nordic PSO lessons learned. 
The Nordic UN Tactical Manual of 1996 was still a child of the peacekeeping era, whe-
reas the NORDCAPS PSO Tactical Manual 2002 reflected the experiences from the 
Former Yugoslavia and especially from NATO-led operations. The 4th edition of the 
manual was published in 2007 after “drastic” [word used in the manual] evolution of 
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crises and related PSOs since the 3rd edition of 2002. Its aim is to provide a handbook 
for tactical level staffs and personnel involved in PSOs.85   
 
 
Figure 3-2. “NORDIC” PSOs. (Source: NORDCAPS PSO Tactical Manual (2007), p. 25) 
 
All the Nordic operations are based on the legitimacy given by the UN. Today, how-
ever, most operations are led by NATO. Although homogenous at a first glance, the 
Nordic countries are in fact quite diverse. Denmark, Norway and Iceland are full mem-
bers of NATO, whereas Finland and Sweden have opted to remain in the framework of 
the Partnership for Peace (PfP). On the other hand, Iceland and Norway are not EU 
members.86 Perhaps with a more aggressive stance than others, Denmark has partici-
pated in combat operations in South Afghanistan. Norway has also taken part in OEF 
operations in Afghanistan and stabilization operations in Iraq. However, when looked at 
in terms of doctrine, the countries appear quite similar. Figure 3-2 shows the vastness of 
the Nordic PSO context. With full or partial membership in NATO and participation in 
EU Battlegroups and the NATO Response Force (NRF), it is clear that NATO doctrine 
plays an important role for the Nordic armies. Based on the experiences of last two dec-
ades, we may state that the Nordic countries prefer to participate in the post-intervention 
phases of operations and that they remain attentive to the legitimacy given by the UN.87  
 
 
 
                                                 
85 NORDCAPS PSO Tactical Manual, Volume 1 (2007), pp. 8-16. See also the NORDCAPS UN Tactical 
Manual (1996) and the NORDCAPS PSO Tactical Manual (2002). 
86 NORDCAPS PSO Tactical Manual, Volume 1 (2007), p. 17. 
87 Author’s own conclusion. This statement is based on Nordic participation in operations in the Balkans, 
in the Middle East, in Africa and in Iraq and Afghanistan since 1990s.  
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3.3 The international organizations (UN, EU, NATO) 
 
To widen the perspective of military manuals, it was necessary to search for NATO, UN 
and EU manuals. On the website of the United Nations, the only available documents 
lacked the detail of the NORDCAPS manual. The most relevant document for this study 
is the 2008 version of Principles and Guidelines of UN Peacekeeping Operations (The 
Capstone Document), which provided insight for the UN PKO as a whole.88 From the 
UN standpoint, military peace operations can be split roughly into two parts: peacekeep-
ing (Chapter VI of the UN Charter) and peace enforcement (Chapter VII).89  
 
 
Figure 3-3. Multidimensional UN Peacekeeping Operations. (Source: UNPKO (2008), p. 23)  
 
The United Nations presents stabilization as a phase in the “Core Business of Multidi-
mensional UN Peacekeeping Operations” (Figure 3-3). The UN peacekeeping opera-
tions are divided in two categories that reflect the different shades of gray of modern 
conflict management. Firstly, “traditional peacekeeping” comprises observation, the 
supervision of a cease-fire and the interposition of forces. More demanding peacekeep-
ing is called “multi-dimensional”, with more emphasis in law enforcement support and 
co-operation between different actors.90 Peace enforcement is strictly seen as a separate 
activity, during which the UN usually delegates the mandate to an international organi-
zation (such as NATO) or to a coalition of willing nations.91 Therefore, the UN itself 
does not do initial interventions, but all the variants of UN operations are possible for 
the so-called stabilization phase. 
 
Looking at the EU side, the planners of EU Battlegroups encourage contributing nations 
to rely on NATO standards and see the development of the NRF and EUBGs as an ana-
                                                 
88 This study was done using the website of the UN DPKO, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/dpko.shtml. The pages of the PK Best Practices 
(http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/) contain many useful documents and links for a researcher. The 
document mentioned seems to be largely based on the analysis of the so-called Brahimi Report (2000).   
89 UN “Capstone Doctrine” (2008), pp. 13-25.  Chapter VII based mandates have become more common 
in recent years, although UN PKO have traditionally been associated with Chapter VI. 
90 UN “Capstone Doctrine” (2008), pp. 17-25.  The normative framework of UN peacekeeping operations 
is based on the UN Charter, human rights, international humanitarian law (also known as “the law of war” 
and “the law of armed conflict”, and UN Security Council mandates (i.e. resolutions). The mandates 
include mission-specific tasks, the concept of operation and the Rules of Engagement (ROE). 
91 The Brahimi Report (2000), p. 9-12. 
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logous process.92 Hence, the only comparable manuals with the NORDCAPS PSO 
Training Manual were those of NATO.93  NATO terminology does not include a spe-
cific term for stabilization operations.94 The most relevant manuals are ATP-3.2 Land 
Operations, AJP-3.4 Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (NA5CRO) and AJP-
3.4.1 Peace Support Operations.95 These NATO manuals provide a good overview of 
NATO’s operational concepts and the overall tactical operating environment. As the 
AJP-3.4.1 is a pure PSO manual, the AJP-3.4 contains the so-called NA5CRO tasks, 
which are close to EU’s so-called Petersberg tasks.96 Both the PSOs and the NA5CROs 
are possible contexts for the stabilization phase. In terms of doctrine, the EU and the 
NATO are highly similar.  
 
3.4 The British Comprehensive Approach 
 
According to the British doctrine, the comprehensive approach combines the three ele-
ments of power (diplomatic, military and economic) to execute national strategy. The 
human dimension of the operational environment in PSOs is one of the reasons the Brit-
ish launched this concept. The human dimension includes a “Complex of Actors” with 
governments, international organizations (IOs), non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) as well as private and commercial actors.97 At the tactical level, the command-
ers engage directly with their adversaries, armed factions and civil populations. In Kos-
ovo, the tactical level had been incapable of operating with this level of complexity, and 
as a result, civil-military action was assigned to the operational level. Later experiences 
showed a certain compression of the levels of war as the strategic level authorities 
wanted to directly influence actions at the small-unit level.98 Consequently, the highest 
tactical levels (component commands) and the operational level had become intermedi-
ate and almost bypassed levels. The British after action analysis showed that a compre-
hensive approach is only executable from the strategic level, “top-down”.   
 
This approach is currently fielded with the concept of the “Stabilisation Unit”. By 
means of cooperation of different ministries, other British agencies and consultants, this 
unit acts in post-conflict contexts. The goal is to protect the civilians and the institu-
tions, to prevent violence, to promote the political process towards stability and to pre-
pare for a long-term engagement. Most stabilization operations are launched by the UN 
                                                 
92 Lindström (2007), pp. 24–25. See also Ryter (2001). 
93 Author’s comment: It was not possible to use these NATO manuals in detail because they are all classi-
fied as NATO or NATO/PFP Unclassified documents. Finland considers NATO UNCLASSIFIED as 
restricted material (TLL IV Viranomaiskäyttö). As this research report is public and unrestricted, none of 
this information may be quoted. The reader should note, however, that the author has good knowledge of 
the NATO manuals referred to in this thesis. This knowledge has influenced the selections made during 
the research process.  
94 AAP-6 (2006). 
95 These were mentioned in the presentation of Major Kovanen (FIN) regarding the development of inter-
operability of the EUBGs on 26 September 2006. On page 28, Kovanen presents these three manuals as 
key sources. http://www.mil.fi/paaesikunta/materiaaliosasto/liitteet/hankepaivat2006/07_Kovanen.pdf 
96 NATO Handbook (2006), pp. 43-50 and NORDCAPS PSO Tactical Manual, Volume 1 (2007), pp. 21–
23. 
97 JDN 4/05 (2006), pp. 1-1…1-5. 
98 JDN 4/05 (2006) and JWP 3-50 (2004). 
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after a cease-fire. There is also a method called “Hot Stabilisation” that takes place in a 
high-risk situation such as Iraq or Afghanistan. It is typically run by regional organiza-
tions or by coalitions.99 In this way, stabilization can be seen as a national project at the 
strategic level in an international context. 
 
Concerning the military portion, the British operations are divided in three phases of 
“Intervene, Regenerate and Sustain” similar to the French phasing referenced in Figure 
3-1.  The respective force postures are “Enforcement, Stabilisation, and Transition”.100 
The action of this military component of the “Comprehensive Campaign Plan” is run 
according to the principles of operational art. The four key functions protecting the 
friendly center of gravity (CoG) and attacking adversary’s CoG are “Shape, At-
tack/Build, Protect, Exploit”.101 Stabilization is therefore a category of action rather than 
a distinctive phase. This force posture has more of “building” than “attacking”, but all 
four key functions exist in any case. This approach is similar to the American concept 
of “Full Spectrum Operations”, which will be discussed in the next section. 
 
3.5 The American approach to stabilization 
 
Although the American approach in Afghanistan is not a part of the case study, their 
doctrine is worth studying.  No other country has more experience in managing large 
nation-building operations today. We should perhaps also note that six out of the last 
seven major U.S.-led interventions have taken place in Muslim countries. This means 
that the U.S. Army has more experience operating in Muslim societies than any other 
Western military during the last two decades.102 The U.S. Army is capable of producing 
field manuals relatively quickly and has extensive resources available for drafting such 
manuals.103 The level of experience combined with a high-quality and timely manual 
production makes the U.S. Army’s visions relevant for our study of stabilization in gen-
eral, and the case study of Afghanistan in particular. In the USA, a Department of De-
fense directive in November 2005 put stability operations on an equal status with offen-
sive and defensive operations. Stability operations are therefore a category of tasks in 
the concept of Full Spectrum Operations, rather than a phase of operations.104  
 
The reference for these operations is the Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations 
(2008). It introduces a comprehensive approach to stability operations in accordance 
with other U.S. government actors. Military forces play a supporting role for other ac-
                                                 
99 Website of the  Stabilisation Unit, http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/. Accessed 31 December 2008. 
100 JDN 4/05 (2006) and JWP 3-50 (2004). 
101 JWP 3-50 (2004), pp. 4-1…4-6. 
102 Dobbins et al. (2007), summary, page xviii. The countries mentioned were Kuwait, Somalia, Haiti, 
Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq; Haiti was the only exception to this rule. 
103 This is the author’s own conclusion, which is based on a career-long study of U.S. field manuals and 
comparing them with similar manuals from Finland and other countries. 
104 See FM 3-0, Operations (2008). Commanders have to use the right mixture of offensive, defensive and 
stability action and adapt them to the operational environment and the situation. Stability operations are 
defined in FM 3-07 (2008), p. Glossary-9, as “An overarching term encompassing various military mis-
sions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of 
national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental 
services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”  
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tivities, primarily contributing to the overall effort by providing a safe and secure envi-
ronment. They are therefore enablers of other instruments of power, either domestically 
within the USA or internationally.105 With this construct, the military component of a 
given stabilization operation truly has to plan and operate along with other actors. In 
fact, pure military operations will never exist, as the nature of the mission always con-
tains political aspects and broader, non-military goals.106 
 
FM 3-07 emphasizes unity of effort instead of unity of command. This means that as a 
result of cooperation and coordination, different actors are able to conduct unified ac-
tion even if they are not under the same leadership. This comprehensive approach inte-
grates the efforts of the U.S. national actors, IGOs, NGOs, multinational partners and 
private sector entities “to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal”. On the other 
hand, NGOs and some other actors participate in this unified action at their own discre-
tion and according to their own goals, which may be different than the nation’s. The 
process of conflict transformation is at the core of stability operations, where violent 
conflict is converted into a process of constructive and positive changes.107  
 
 
Figure 3-4. The three phases of stability operations correspond with the status of the host-
nation, presumably a failed state. Failed states are defined as “nations unable or unwilling to 
meet the basic needs and aspirations of their people”. (Source: FM 3-07 (2008), introduction 
and p. 2-13). 
 
The American joint doctrine for peace operations treats peacekeeping, peace enforce-
ment and nation building separately. Peace enforcement is an intervention where the use 
of force is not limited to self-defense, but may be used to enter the area of operations or 
to forcefully separate the belligerents. These operations include a phase of stabilization 
closely linked with enforcement and transition.108 Figure 3-4 has many similarities with 
                                                 
105 FM 3-07 (2008), introduction pp. vi-vii.  Stability operations are therefore aimed at stabilizing the 
conflict in order to allow for a transition to a civilian authority under the rule of law. Until that point, 
military forces “establish or restore basic civil functions and protect them until a civil authority or the 
host nation is capable of providing these services for the local populace”. Operations are likely to be 
lengthy and the forces need to strike a balance between long-term and short-term gains 
106 FM 3-07 (2008), p. 1-3. 
107 FM 3-07 (2008), pp. 1-3…1-9. 
108 JP 3-07.3 (2007), pp. 53-56. The Americans use the term “peace operations” instead of “peace support 
operations” used by NATO. 
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the French idea of stabilization seen in Figure 3-1. The relationship of offensive, defen-
sive and stability operations is the leading idea behind the American doctrine. There-
fore, the phase of stabilization is dominated by stability tasks, though it does not ex-
clude offensive and defensive operations. This corresponds to the ideas of French mili-
tary thinkers, who describe stabilization with moments of varying amounts of intensity 
and violence. Stability operations may thus be seen as a phase, but more accurately as a 
non-violent component of a full spectrum of military action. 
 
3.6 Classic counterinsurgency theories 
 
Because of ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the participating countries have 
started to re-develop and re-visit the theory and practice of counterinsurgency (COIN) 
and “small wars”. They have once again studied the texts of Mao Zedong, Lawrence, 
Callwell, Kitson, Galula and Trinquier. Early counterinsurgency studies began in the 
late 19th century and early 20th century and they were largely based on the colonial 
campaigns of the Great Britain and the USA against insurgent opponents. The second 
“surge” of counterinsurgency operations was just after the World War II and during the 
Cold War, during the period of a global communist revolutionary movement and de-
colonization. Western countries re-learned this trade in Indochina and Algeria (the 
French), in Malaya, Rhodesia, Northern Ireland and Aden (the British) and in Vietnam 
(the Americans), to mention some of the most important examples. The third “surge” 
can be seen as the fight against terrorism and Islamist insurgencies after the events of 
9/11 in the USA. The most notable operations have taken place in Afghanistan and in 
Iraq.109 This new wave of COIN has also been called a “global counterinsurgency”, as 
some have begun to refer to an ongoing global Islamist insurgency.110 
 
Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian have studied several cases of intervention-based 
counterinsurgency in order to explain the origins of the latest American field manual on 
COIN. These examples include American, British, French and Israeli campaigns from 
the 20th Century until today.111 The most important lesson to be learned from this collec-
tion of experiences is that tactical brilliance alone does not bring success unless the po-
litical and social contexts of the conflict are considered. Approaches such as “search and 
destroy” or other tactics involving the excessive use of force simply do not work. In-
stead, it is necessary to isolate the enemy from the population and then protect the popu-
lation with a mindset of “clear and hold” in order to establish the conditions for success. 
The COIN need for intelligence is different from conventional warfighting. Human in-
telligence capabilities, language skills and cultural awareness are essential. In addition 
to these needs of quality, troop quantity is also needed to dominate urban environments 
and to limit the enemy’s liberty of action. Unfortunately, what may work in one area at 
a given time does not necessarily work later or in another area. One has to always adjust 
                                                 
109 Marston – Malkasian (2008), p. 13–18.  
110 See for example Kilcullen (2004B) and Huntington (1996). 
111 See Marston – Malkasian (2008). The manual referred to is the FM 3-24 (2006). For French experi-
ences, see Galula (1964) and Trinquier (1964). 
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and adapt to the situation bearing in mind that military force can only provide the initial 
conditions for real progress.112  
 
 
Figure 3-5.  McCormick’s “Mystic Diamond” (Source: Basilici - Simmons (2004), p. 33). 
 
Roger McCormick has presented a macro-model for explaining insurgent and state 
(counterinsurgent) strategies (see Figure 3-5). The five strategies from both sides are 
aimed at influencing the populations and the international community, as well as un-
dermining and disrupting the other party’s activities. According to Basilici and Sim-
mons, the advantage of this model is that it is not staged; instead, the five strategies are 
executed simultaneously. The model can be applied equally at the local, provincial or 
national levels.113 McCormick’s “Mystic Diamond” offers a simple way to visualize the 
direct and indirect approaches possible for both sides in counterinsurgency. Apparently 
similar considerations concern stabilization operations in general, as this model reveals 
the need for kinetic and non-kinetic action concerning each of the five lines of opera-
tions. It also helps to identify the required battlespace effects.   
 
                                                 
112 These ideas of Marston and Malkasian are very close to the ideas of General Rupert Smith. In fact, we 
could state that these authors, with these case studies, have fully described the “war amongst the people”. 
113 Basilici - Simmons (2004), pp. 30-34. Dr. McCormick is teaching at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate 
School. He is a former RAND analyst and continues to advise the U.S. Department of Defense on irregu-
lar warfare topics. 
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Figure 3-6.  Aspects of counterinsurgency operations (Source: FM 3-24.2, p. 3-18) 
 
The American field manual FM 3-24 and its tactical level counterpart, FM 3-24.2, give 
a framework for modern counterinsurgency operations. They introduce the principles of 
COIN founded solidly on historical vignettes. These principles are legitimacy, unity of 
effort, primacy of political factors, understanding the environment, intelligence-driven 
operations, isolating the insurgents from their support, security under the rule of law and 
being prepared for a long-term commitment. The operations themselves include kinetic 
operations – offensive and defensive – and non-kinetic stability operations. In counter-
insurgency full spectrum operations, these elements are combined in varying propor-
tions. In fact, three consecutive phases of “clear”, “hold” and “build” can be separated 
(see Figure 3-6).114 A counterinsurgency campaign could be perceived to contain these 
three phases. This division, once again, is not far from the French idea of intervention - 
stabilization - normalization. In the intervention/clear phase, offensive operations may 
take precedence over the others. In the stabilization/hold phase, defensive tasks are do-
minant while stability tasks increase. Finally, in the normalization/build phase, the role 
of the military consists predominantly of stability tasks.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
After reviewing some Western concepts and approaches on stabilization, we are able to 
draw conclusions on the nature of these operations. Of course, these conclusions remain 
purely theoretical because they are based on doctrines and manuals. Yet these sources 
reflect the lessons learned both from actual operations and from historical ones. The 
tradition of writing experiences down as manuals date back to C.E. Callwell’s “Small 
Wars” of 1896 and the U.S. Marine Corps’ “Small Wars Manual” of 1940.115 The paral-
lel study of stabilization and counterinsurgency concepts reveals that war amongst the 
people has been a reality for a long time. It is characterized by irregular adversaries and 
the intervention of a third party. Our analysis of these operations leads to at least three 
conclusions.  
 
                                                 
114 FM 3-24, pp. 1-19…1-20 and FM 3-24.2 (2009), pp. 3-17…3-22. 
115 Marston – Malkasian (2008), pp. 13-18 and Nagl (2005), pp. 50-51, 191-208. Military culture, heritage 
and traditions also play an important role in writing manuals and putting the principles of these manuals 
into practice. The countries with a tradition of small colonial wars and conflicts have not forgotten these 
lessons even though they may have temporarily engaged in conventional warfare. On the contrary, the 
Americans - who have been more focused on developing technological superiority on the modern battle-
field with concepts like RMA and EBAO - have had more difficulties adapting to COIN or stabilization 
operations. The British and the French, as former colonial powers, find stabilization, peacekeeping or 
COIN much more familiar.  
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First, stabilization is a phase of operations when foreign military intervene in an exist-
ing conflict. This phase, which falls between the initial intervention and the subsequent 
normalization phase, involves transforming a “hot” conflict into peaceful development. 
It is therefore characterized by civil-military cooperation, moments of varying intensity 
and a long duration. The adversaries are primarily irregular and normally there are sev-
eral sources of opposition. Depending on the overall political approach, peace may be 
enforced with neutral but robust means. The selected course of action may also be more 
oriented toward destroying the criminal or terrorist networks. This phase may exist in 
UN, NATO or EU campaigns as well as in any campaigns undertaken by nations alone 
or as a coalition.  
 
Second, stability operations are a non-kinetic component of full spectrum operations. 
Globally speaking, these tasks include all the military functions outside of defensive and 
offensive operations: civil-military cooperation, humanitarian assistance, presence or 
framework operations, public order and policing, information operations, human intelli-
gence, etc.116 These operations are, without exception, undertaken amongst the popula-
tions. A particularity of modern operations is that these stability tasks are omnipresent 
in all the phases of any campaign. It is practically impossible to conceive of modern 
operations without a stability element. This applies to all aspects of the tactical level, 
down to the smallest unit level. At this level, troops can and will be affected by the 
aforementioned phenomenon of the “intricate web of actions”.  
 
Third, the full spectrum (offensive, defensive, stability) operations of the tactical level 
constitute the military part of the comprehensive approach. This approach, if well or-
ganized, integrates military and civilian actors in either a national or a multinational 
context. The British and American examples highlight the importance of strategic level 
planning and “top-down” execution. We should leave a question mark here, since there 
is a difference between troop deployment and employment. In the stabilization phase, 
the troops are already deployed and their tactical reality has changed since the first 
phase. Are the inputs from higher headquarters truly apt for solving the problems at the 
tactical level? Can the balance between offensive, defensive and stability tasks really be 
reached by strategic directives and operational level mission statements or is it in fact 
based on the real tactical situation? This thesis hypothesizes that there is a conflict be-
tween top-down inputs and bottom-level realities. Solving this dilemma appears to be a 
key issue of true stabilization.  
 
We could question the logic of dividing modern military operations in distinct phases. 
More importantly, we should focus on the outcome. The strategic objective serves as a 
bull’s-eye for all the lines of operations. However, if this end state has not been properly 
defined, there has been no utility in the use of military force, as Rupert Smith has 
pointed out. Based on the study so far, we may define the end state of a stabilization 
phase with two key phrases: 
- A safe and secure environment is the expected end state of the stabilization 
phase, which allows for a shift towards the normalization phase.  
- The stabilization phase includes a transfer of authority from the international 
military to the international civilian authorities. 
                                                 
116 See for example FM 3-07 (2008), FM 3-24 (2006) and JWP 3-50 (2004) for stability tasks.  
  
48
 
The withdrawal of international forces can be seen as an indicator of successful stabili-
zation and normalization. But how is normality defined and what is normalization in 
this sense? Has war not been “normal” in countries such as Lebanon, Somalia and Af-
ghanistan for decades? Continuous violence is a sign of a failed state or a warlord state. 
The “failed state index” of the Fund for Peace in 2008 lists 35 countries as failed 
states.117 Nation building in such conditions is a demanding task and the level of friction 
working against a transformation process is considerable. In military terms, the limited 
opportunity to use firepower usually dislocates the maritime component and severely 
limits the use of the air component. The stabilization problem then becomes mostly 
land-oriented, making the land and the Special Forces components stand as supported 
commands, with naval and air components playing a supporting role. 
 
Finally, we shall make an observation on stabilization from the Finnish perspective. As 
the Finnish term of “crisis management” can be split into military and civilian compo-
nents, it does appear to be a close relative of the ever-more-popular comprehensive ap-
proach. Nowadays, the Finnish military speaks of “crisis management operations” (krii-
sinhallintaoperaatiot) but still calls an individual soldier on operations a “peacekeeper” 
(rauhanturvaaja). The transfer from UN peacekeeping into a wider “Nordic” PSO con-
cept is still very much visible in this terminology. As it considers intervention opera-
tions politically unacceptable, Finland should perhaps underline the difference between 
stabilization and normalization operations. Distinguishing between these two operations 
may seem irrelevant, as the deployed contingent composition is always adjusted on a 
case-by-case basis according to the situation and national resources available. Yet a 
doctrinal scale of the three phases might help to decide on participation; identify the 
right troops-to-task list; configure the weapons, vehicles and equipment inventory, and 
ultimately, to establish the right mindset for those deployed.    
                                                 
117 The Fund for Peace website, retrieved on 04 January 2009. 
http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=292&Itemid=452,  
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4 OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE THESIS 
 
 
- Major General Peter W. Chiarelli, Baghdad, 2004–2005118 
 
4.1 The Concept of Battlespace 
 
Battlespace can be seen as a three-dimensional space including the ground level, the 
airspace and the electro-magnetic spectrum with a temporal dimension.119 At a glance, a 
ground unit’s battlespace could be considered synonymous to its area of operations 
(AO). As a commander must always look beyond his AO; he must study the adjacent 
area of interest (AOI) and his area of influence to understand the operational environ-
ment in its complexity.120 Introduced in the 2001 edition of U.S. Army Field Manual 
FM 3-0 Operations, battlespace is a conceptual term focused on the area of operations 
of a certain unit. Although the U.S. Army has rejected the term of battlespace in the 
rewritten FM 3-0 of 2008, the U.S. joint terminology still uses it.121 A more detailed 
definition is given by the American JP 1-02: 
 
“The environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood to suc-
cessfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. 
This includes the air, land, sea, space, and the included enemy and friend-
ly forces; facilities; weather; terrain; the electromagnetic spectrum; and 
the information environment within the operational areas and areas of in-
terest.” 122 
 
The FM 3-0 Operations (2001) describes battlespace as a very wide and abstract unity 
and it emphasizes the ability to conduct full spectrum operations within it. These opera-
tions, as already explained in this thesis, vary between assistance to civilian authorities 
and warfighting. Battlespace is seen as conceptual and it is not supposed to be assigned 
by the higher commander. Therefore, it is not synonymous with the area of operation. 
Because the battlespace is conceptual, commanders conduct operations only within that 
                                                 
118 Chiarelli - Michaelis (2005), p. 5. 
119 Huttunen (2005), pp. 59–61. The research of Mika Huttunen provided the starting point for the re-
search of the concept of battlespace in 2006. 
120 See AAP-6 (2006) for terminology. 
121 FM 3-0 Operations (2008), p. D-6, Table D-3: Rescinded Army definitions. See also JP 1-02 (2008) 
and FM 3-0 (2001). Besides the USA, the word battlespace is used in British and French military termi-
nology and it produces more than 700 000 hits on Google. Despite the fact that neither the NORDCAPS 
PSO Training Manual nor the NATO manuals recognize this concept as such, it is  a useful tool for ana-
lyzing the operational environment 
122 Joint Publication JP 1-02, p. 64. 
”In accurately defining the contextual and cultural population of the task force battlespace, it 
became rapidly apparent that we needed to develop a keen understanding of demographics 
as well as the cultural intricacies that drive the Iraqi population..”  
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portion of the battlespace that is situated within their AO.123 This manual considers the 
visualization of battlespace a key process in operational planning:  
“Upon receipt of a mission, commanders consider their battlespace and 
conduct a mission analysis that results in their initial vision, which they 
continually confirm or modify. Commanders use the factors of METT-
TC, elements of operational design, staff estimates, input from other 
commanders, and their experience and judgment to develop their vi-
sion.”124 
 
Figure 4-1. Battlespace components adapted from FM 3-0 Operations (2001).  
 
In picture 4-1, we see a conceptual yet terrain-oriented drawing of battlespace. Battle-
space components include the area of operations, the area of influence, the area of inter-
est, a force projection base and the home station. These components are encompassed 
by the information environment.  The area of influence is an area in which a “com-
mander can directly influence operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally 
under the commander’s command or control”. A unit’s AO should not be substantially 
larger than its area of influence. The area of interest is “an area of concern to the com-
mander, including the area of influence and areas adjacent to it. It extends into enemy 
territory, to the objectives of current or planned operations”. The information environ-
ment contains “…information activities that collect, process, and disseminate informa-
tion, …space-based systems that provide data and information to Army forces, …the 
                                                 
123 FM 3-0, Operations (2001), Chapter 4. 
124 FM 3-0, Operations (2001), Chapter 5. METT-TC stands for Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, 
Troops and support available, Time available and Civil considerations.   
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information activities that affect their operation and the capabilities of their own and 
opposing C2 and information systems.”125 
 
The battlespace of Figure 4-1 is, in fact, a conceptual snapshot at a given time of a cer-
tain unit’s operational sphere. It seems to be territorially oriented as it is centered on a 
geographically defined AO.126 FM 3-0 (2001) states clearly that the circles describing 
different battlespace components and drawn around this AO are overlapping. One 
should note that according to the definition of battlespace, the information environment 
is actually limited to the area of interest although it is graphically shown as a wider 
component. The force projection base and the home base are obviously seen only from 
the viewpoint of the operational unit placed within the AO portion of the picture. The 
support units stationed in those bases would have similar but not identical battlespaces 
when viewed from their perspective. We should observe that human terrain is not in-
cluded in Figure 4-1, and the definition of battlespace does not include other humans, 
only the enemy and friendly forces. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the latest version of the FM 3-0 (2008) has rejected the term bat-
tlespace. Instead, it introduces a process of “understanding the operational environ-
ment”. This includes the following factors: political, military, economic and social as-
pects; information; infrastructure; the physical environment and time (PPMESI-PT). 
Understanding the operational environment is critical for the commander to visualize 
the end state, and the nature and design of the operation. This is done according to the 
METT-TC analysis and it remains practically unchanged since the 2001 version of the 
manual.127 Yet the newer version emphasizes civil considerations more strongly and 
mentions that the area of interest in stability operations “may be much larger than that 
associated with offensive and defensive operations”. In addition, the operational envi-
ronment encompasses a wider variety of factors than the previous manual’s concept of 
battlespace did.  
 
FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency (2006) explains the term operational environment as a sum 
of the AO and the related AOI. In this field manual, special attention is given to the flu-
idity of the human and informational aspects: “AOs may be relatively static, but people 
and information flow through AOs continuously”. It highlights five points in defining an 
AOI in a counterinsurgency operation: 
- Family, tribal, ethnic, religious, or other links that go beyond the AO; 
- Communication links to other regions; 
- Economic links to other regions; 
- Media influence on the local populace, U.S. public, and multinational 
partners; 
- External financial, moral, and logistic support for the enemy.128 
 
                                                 
125 FM 3-0, Operations (2001), Chapter 4. 
126 Interview with Professor Timo Kaartinen, 08 Jan 2008. Kaartinen criticized this approach for being 
more centered on the terrain than on humans.   
127 FM 3-0, Operations (2008), Chapters 1 and 5. 
128 FM 3-24 (2006), pp. 3-2 and 3-3. See also FM 3-24.2 (2009), pp. 1-3…1-16, for more detailed infor-
mation on operational and mission variables and civil considerations. 
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As the last edition of the U.S. joint doctrine still uses the term battlespace, the term bat-
tlespace may be considered valid.129 As seen in the U.S. Army’s field manuals, the con-
cept of operational environment (battlespace) forms a basis of understanding and visual-
izing the very foundations of operations. The manuals reviewed are meant for the opera-
tional or the highest tactical level (land component command). The U.S. Army’s field 
manual FM 3-90, Tactics (2001), mentions battlespace as a key element of the overall 
operational framework.130 The concept of battlespace thus provides an acceptable start-
ing point for a deeper study of the tactical operating environment of a land unit. How-
ever, for the purposes of operationalizing our research problem, this concept needs to be 
further analyzed and developed. 
 
4.2 Challenging the concept 
 
Many new doctrines and concepts support the idea that human terrain should be consid-
ered a significant portion of the battlespace. For example, a relatively new doctrinal 
paper from the Australian Army, Complex Warfighting, expresses this clearly. It under-
lines the complexity of battlespace and emphasizes that the army must be capable of 
multidimensional maneuvers in a multidimensional conflict environment. The Austra-
lians divide the battlespace in three terrains: complex physical terrain, complex human 
terrain and complex informational terrain.131 The PPMESI-PT (political, military, eco-
nomic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment and time) factors intro-
duced in the American FM 3-0 (2008) are well aligned with this view.132  
 
In their work Understanding Information Age Warfare (2001), Alberts et al. describe 
the significance of information in military operations by the means of three domains 
(see Figure 4-2). The Physical Domain stands for “the reality” or the ground truth, 
where military action takes place. In the physical domain, there are objects and events 
that exist in the environments of ground, sea, air and space. The Information Domain is 
“where information lives”. It is the domain where information, data and knowledge are 
created, manipulated and shared. The contents of this domain may or may not precisely 
reflect the reality. All the information we can access passes the information domain 
within the limits of our individual interaction capabilities, with the exception of direct 
observation (using one’s senses). In addition, the social interaction of human beings 
takes place in the information domain by means of speech and discussion, telephone 
calls, e-mails and/or video conferences. Information technology sets the limits and pos-
sibilities of this domain.133 This definition takes the idea of an information environment 
a step further in Figure 4-1. 
 
                                                 
129 JP 1-02.  
130 FM 3-90 (2001), p. 2-3. 
131 Complex Warfighting (2004), p. 1-12.  
132 FM 3-0, Operations (2008), Chapter 1. 
133 Alberts – Garstka - Hayes - Signori (2001), pp. 10–29. 
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Figure 4-2. The domains, adapted from Alberts et al. (2001) 
 
The Cognitive Domain is “the minds of participants”. It includes perceptions, aware-
ness, understanding, beliefs and values. It is where the decisions are made, based on 
sense making.  This domain is also the residence of intangibles such as leadership, mo-
rale, unit cohesion, level of training and experience, situational awareness and public 
opinion. All the contents of the cognitive domain pass through the filter of human per-
ception. This filter consists of the individual’s worldview, personal knowledge, experi-
ence, training, values, intelligence, personal style and perceptual capabilities. Every 
filter of human perception is therefore unique, as are the individual cognitions.134 The 
concept of battlespace presented in Figure 4-1 fails to recognize this domain. 
 
According to Alberts et al, there is only one “true” world - the physical domain. This 
translates into data, information and knowledge via the systems of direct or indirect ob-
servation and the logic of the information domain. Knowledge can be loaded into the 
cognitive domain by at least four different paths: 1) previous education, training or ex-
perience, 2) direct experience with the physical domain, 3) interaction with other hu-
mans and 4) interaction with the information domain.135 The terms of data, information 
and knowledge can be clarified with the simplified model of information hierarchy pre-
sented by Rauno Kuusisto (table 4-3). 
 
                                                 
134 Alberts – Garstka - Hayes - Signori (2001), pp. 10–29. 
135 Ibid. 
 
COGNITIVE 
DOMAIN 
 
PHYSICAL 
DOMAIN 
 
INFORMATION 
DOMAIN 
Direct  
ObservationData, 
Information
Human 
Perception 
Cognitive ”sub-domains” 
(Individual Minds) 
Information Systems 
Documented Knowledge Individual Capabilities 
and Characteristics 
Awareness, Understanding, 
Assessment, Decisions 
The Reality 
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Level of 
Information 
Definition Process (examples) 
Knowledge Analyzed, proportioned, understood and 
explained combination of generalized in-
formation 
Reasoning 
Justifying 
Uncertainty management 
Information Facts attached to context Alignment 
Correlation 
Association 
Extrapolation 
Data Facts without contexts Pre-processing 
Filtering 
Indexing 
Table 4-3. Information hierarchy according to Kuusisto. (Source: Kuusisto (2004), p. 39, table 
4). 
 
Earlier in this work, we divided the battlespace into three terrains: physical, human and 
informational. We may easily visualize the physical and informational terrains in Figure 
4-2, but the human terrain is much harder to grasp. Alberts et al. have positioned human 
minds in the cognitive domain, but their bodies are “targets” in the physical domain. 
Yet the interaction of humans takes place in the information domain. In conclusion, we 
could enlarge the idea of human terrain into a “human dimension” that overlaps all three 
domains distinctively with its human qualities. A key issue to be noted is the flow of 
information by means of direct and indirect observations. Both means connect at what is 
called the filter of human perception. Together with the cognitive domain, this concep-
tual filter affects the interpretations of information and presents a challenge for informa-
tion sharing. We may summarize from this that every human being observes the same 
“real world” with different “lenses” and reflects his findings based on his own cogni-
tion.  
 
4.3 Battlespace dimensions 
 
In conclusion, it is evident that both the terrain-oriented model (Figure 4-1) of battle-
space and the approaches involving different “terrains” or “domains” are inadequate to 
describe the complexity of battlespace. Using the word “dimension” will produce a 
more generic expression when analyzing the key contents of the battlespace. To provide 
a rough model that combines the elements of the earlier discussion, we may state that 
battlespace has four major dimensions: physical, human, informational and temporal.136 
We will now examine this reorganized model more closely. 
                                                 
136 Nurmela (2007), pp. 24–26. 
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Figure 4-4. The conceptual model of a unit’s battlespace and its dimensions. (Source: Nurmela 
(2007), p. 25, Figure 8). The information dimension has a different color, as its contents never 
fully correspond to the physical and human dimensions. 
 
Based on the analysis, the author offers a refined definition of battlespace based on the 
American JP 1-02, but further developed to include the four-dimensional approach: 
 
“A unit’s battlespace includes the physical, human, information and tem-
poral dimensions. All have impact on the units operations. They are also 
influenced by the unit’s actions particularly in reference of time. These 
factors must be understood and taken into account in order to successfully 
apply combat power, protect the force, and complete the mission.” 
 
4.3.1 The Physical Dimension 
 
The physical dimension is defined as the objective (real) world excluding human be-
ings. It forms the background for any social action between human beings. It is there-
fore both an enabling and a restricting factor. Urbanization is now a worldwide trend as 
is overpopulation. Unemployment, crime, poverty, famine, diseases and urban decay 
alone are problem enough. Destroyed or damaged infrastructure has a direct impact on 
peoples’ lives. Modern conflicts involve ethnic violence and they split societies and 
even small communities. As a result, the administrative as well as the physical struc-
tures of a town (e.g. Mitrovica in Kosovo) or even a state (e.g. Bosnia-Herzegovina) are 
affected by ethnic division. People live in the existing physical dimension, adapt to 
changes in it, and finally shape and transform it as is needed.  
 
 
 
Physical dimension 
- three-dimensional physical terrain, airspace and waters, flora 
and fauna, weather and climate, objects, buildings and infra-
structure (excluding humans) 
Human dimension 
- humans as individuals and social systems 
- includes the cognitive domain 
Information dimension 
- data and information about the physical and 
human dimensions 
- information systems and prior knowledge 
Battlespace = the factors of the three 
dimensions affecting the units operations or 
influenced by the unit’s actions at a given 
time 
  
56
 
 
Figure 4-5. The Physical Dimension. (Source: Puolustusvoimat, 
http://www.mil.fi/rauhanturvaaja/) 
 
An Australian Army study indicates that more than 75 % of the world’s population is 
living in complex physical terrain. This terrain includes urbanized areas, littoral regions, 
crop cultivation zones, swamps, estuaries, jungles and mountains. Such terrain typically 
comprises “a mosaic of open spaces” that act as maneuver corridors and compartments, 
as well as kill zones. There are also patches of restricted terrain that prevent movement 
and resist observation. In the complex physical terrain, the ability to detect the enemy 
from a standoff range is less likely than in predominantly open terrain. This means that 
the likelihood of close quarters combat is greater and that the methods of early warning 
based on indirect or direct observation are limited.137 According to Nurmela’s research 
on Finnish officers with PSO experience, units have to operate within the full range of 
the physical dimension and in all conditions. Because the tasks and missions are human-
oriented, urban areas of different types are inevitable. While not as densely populated, 
other complex terrains, such as forests, jungles and mountains cannot be avoided, either. 
                                                 
137 Complex Warfighting (2004), pp. 4-12. “A force’s ISTAR threshold is the level of enemy activity it can 
detect in a given environment.” The more complex the environment is, the more threats will remain unno-
ticed. In complex conditions, a force must therefore be prepared to operate at or below the ISTAR thresh-
old. See also FM 3-0 (2008), Chapter 1, where the complexity and the likelihood of close combat are also 
emphasized as a part of the operational environment. 
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Predominantly open areas are used primarily for movement and observation.138 In a 
conflict area, the physical dimension itself contains several threats.139 
 
Military field manuals provide the basics for categorizing and analyzing an urban envi-
ronment. A good example is the U.S. Army Field Manual FM 3-06, Urban Operations 
(2003), which describes an urban environment as a complex “system of systems” con-
sisting of the physical terrain, the society and the infrastructure linking these two. One 
aspect of this complexity is the multidimensionality of the urban terrain. A second as-
pect is the pattern of dependent neighboring urban areas and their connecting lines of 
communication. Thirdly, one needs to recognize street patterns and functional areas of 
each urban area. FM 3-06 divides these areas into the core area (downtown or central 
business district), industrial area, outlying high-rise areas, ribbon areas and residential 
areas (Figure 4-6). The fourth aspect is the society, which will be viewed in detail later. 
Lastly, the urban infrastructure contains both physical and human components. Infra-
structure includes communications and information, energy, economics and commerce, 
transportation and distribution, as well as administration and human services.140 
 
 
Figure 4-6. An urban model (Source: FM 3-06 (2003), Chapter 2, Figure 2-5). 
 
 
                                                 
138 Nurmela (2007), pp. 34-38. From the viewpoint of a stabilization force, it would be desirable to divide 
the physical dimension in two parts: the base areas and the areas outside the bases. The bases are neces-
sary for the soldiers to stand down from a “stress mode” and to rest, refit and debrief. Outside the base 
areas, the soldiers need to stay focused and alert even if the task only involves transport to a holiday 
flight. This division is seldom possible, as the bases may also come under rocket or mortar attacks and 
face other threats.  
139 Nurmela (2007), pp. 34-38 and 47-49. Unexploded ordnance, mines, booby-traps, improvised explo-
sive devices (IEDs), toxic or radioactive material and other CBRN hazards were mentioned by Finnish 
officers. A classic “rule-of-thumb” in PSOs is never to leave a tarmac road in order to avoid the threat of 
landmines. This ideal - described by the slogan “stay on the road” - was found useless by the Finns, as the 
nature of missions and the local conditions have made it impossible to follow. Additional dangers - either 
direct or indirect – may be caused by damaged or destroyed infrastructure and even by weather. The is-
sues of force protection have to be carefully balanced with the possible gains of a given task especially 
when operating in a complex environment and under difficult conditions.  
140 FM 3-06, Urban Operations (2003), Chapter 2. 
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Figure 4-7. The Multiple-Nuclei Model (Source: DiMarco (2004), p. 9, Figure 3). 
 
Modern conflict areas tend to be “third-world” oriented and predominantly Islamic.141 
Man-made terrain reflects the cultural traditions of these countries especially in urban 
centers. Louis A. DiMarco has studied Middle Eastern city design from the viewpoint of 
urban operations. According to DiMarco, every Middle Eastern city is actually a mix of 
several cities overlaying one other and centered on the traditional city of Islamic heri-
tage. Although no single model can thoroughly explain the complexity, he presents 
three theoretic models for such a city: 
- The Islamic City Model is based on the premise that Islam was the do-
minant factor in regional urban design as Islam is primarily an urban re-
ligion. The tenets involved are informality (as a lack of central city plan-
ning) and privacy (inwardly focused building styles). This model reflects 
the prevailing influence of religion. 
- The Zeigler Model reflects the growth of the city outwards from the tra-
ditional “Citadel/Kasbah”. The city has “interlocking zones patterned in 
time”, the old city, the new city, the modern city and the urban expansion 
zone. This model demonstrates the growth of a city over time as the cen-
ters of social activity, housing, commercial activity and transportation 
move outwards from the old city center. 
                                                 
141 See for example Durch (2006), Kilcullen (2004A and 2004B) and Jokinen – Kullberg (2006). 
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- The Multiple-Nuclei Model is centered on mosques. The center nucleus 
of the city is the old colonial city with its mosque and the central busi-
ness district. The city expands by a progressive integration of other seg-
regated nodes. These are usually inhabited by a particular social class 
and are mosque-centered. This model underlines the importance of the 
old city and its central religious position.142 
 
The International Humanitarian Law gives certain buildings, objects and environments a 
special status and these may not be targeted or used for military purposes.143 Yet, ir-
regular adversaries do not always follow these rules as their tactics may purposefully 
include the use of schools, religious buildings, hospitals and other protected facilities as 
sanctuaries or weapons caches. This presents our forces with a dilemma. There is hesita-
tion to engage as the target is “illegal” and collateral damage may easily occur. On the 
other hand, not engaging the enemy means that the force must retreat from the scene to 
avoid friendly casualties. Playing this card gives our adversaries an advantage as they 
profit from a conceptual gap of the Western forces, thus creating true asymmetry. This 
is really a maneuverist approach in itself, even if it is not accepted by the international 
community.    
 
4.3.2 The Human Dimension 
 
The human dimension includes human beings as physical objects, but also incorporates 
the cultural and social aspects of the given geographical area. In a conflict area, there 
are several local, regional, national and international actors. This mixture of actors from 
different nations and cultures increases the complexity enormously. As the human di-
mension is the main issue of this study, we will need some conceptual cornerstones to 
build on. To begin with, we will need to define related key terms and concepts from the 
viewpoint of military operations. The questions related to culture are primarily anthro-
pological or sociological.144 However, considering the scope of this study, a practical 
approach focusing on the military applications of these sciences is more relevant than a 
purely theoretical one. Therefore, available related military sources are used rather than 
general anthropological or sociological sources.  
 
The human terrain includes the people of the current battlespace as individuals, groups 
and social systems. The NORDCAPS PSO Tactical Manual lists several actors who 
might interact with a stabilization force. These include but are not limited to: 
- the multinational force and its subunits, 
- the local administration and authorities,  
                                                 
142 DiMarco (2004), pp. 1-15. According to DiMarco, Middle East is one of the most urbanized regions in 
the world, and the urbanization is continuing at an “unprecedented rate”. 
143 Rosén - Parkkari (2004), pp. 211-253.  
144 According to the Random House College Dictionary (1984), anthropology is ”the science that deals 
with the origins, physical and cultural development, racial characteristics and social customs and beliefs 
of mankind”. Sociology is “the science or study of the origin, development, organization and functioning 
of human society; the science of fundamental laws of social relations, institutions etc.” The interviews 
with Professor Timo Kaartinen on 08 January 2008 and Professor Liisa Laakso on 15 January 2008 
helped to establish the boundaries for the thesis. 
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- the local populations and refugees/IDPs, 
- the former warring factions and other armed groups, 
- international, national and non-governmental organizations, 
- actors of civil crisis management such as the international police and 
- members of the media.145 
 
 
Figure 4-8. The Human Dimension. (Source: Puolustusvoimat, 
http://www.mil.fi/rauhanturvaaja/) 
 
Rosén and Parkkari analyze the complexity of parties and individual persons in armed 
conflict as recognized by the international humanitarian law (IHL). Combatants, non-
combatants, illegal combatants, mercenaries, terrorists and persons with a special pro-
tective status are all defined by several international conventions and articles.146 Kari 
Takamaa simplifies the problem stating that there are only combatants and civilians, and 
no such thing as a “third group” exists in between.147 It should be noted that this legal 
classification of human terrain is very “Western” and therefore not necessarily agreed 
upon or accepted by other cultures or civilizations.148 Our adversaries may exploit this 
by wearing civilian clothes to conceal their approach and escape, and to gain protection 
                                                 
145 NORDCAPS PSO Tactical Manual (2007). 
146 See Rosén – Parkkari (2004). See also United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Principles and 
Guidelines (2008), p. 14-16. The normative framework of United Nations peacekeeping operations is 
based on the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Humanitarian 
Law (IHL) and UN Security Council Mandates. 
147 Takamaa, Kari T.: Taistelukenttä, toimintaympäristö ja sodan oikeussäännöt, an article in Raitasalo – 
Sipilä (2008), pp. 230-245. 
148 See Huntington (1996). 
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from civilian crowds. Again, our troops face the dilemma of obeying the rules and 
avoiding collateral damage while seeking to engage the enemy to avoid friendly casual-
ties. A true problem also exists with the current privatization of armed conflict i.e. the 
use of private military or security companies (PMC/PSC). The IHL seems to be out-
dated considering current trends, and national legislation offer different solutions on 
their status. The status of prisoners of war has been damaged by episodes like Abu 
Ghraib or Guantanamo. Although the IHL remains the legal backbone of our operations, 
we might conclude – contrary to Takamaa – that the line between a combatant and a 
civilian is blurred, and there is in fact a large gray area beyond our control.  
 
William D. Wunderle has presented a conceptual model to understand the importance of 
culture in military operations. According to Wunderle, “Culture might be considered the 
“human terrain” of warfare, and it is a key terrain.” He defines culture as a “shared set 
of traditions, belief systems and behaviors”. It is shaped by many factors including his-
tory, religion, ethnic identity, language and nationality. Cultural awareness is the ability 
to recognize and understand these factors. In the military context, Wunderle defines 
cultural awareness as “cognizance of cultural terrain for military operations and the 
connections between culture and warfighting”. He develops a three-part model to un-
derstand culture and to develop cultural awareness: cultural influences, variations and 
manifestations.149 These stages presented in Table 4-9 are helpful when analyzing the 
term culture further. 
 
Cultural Influences 
(Background) 
Cultural Variations 
(Common ways) 
Cultural Manifestations 
(Concrete display) 
- cultural heritage or his-
tory 
- social organization 
- traditions 
- language 
- religion 
Behaviors: 
- languages, customs, dress, 
religion 
- personal space 
- context sensitivity 
Values: 
- individualism vs. collectivism 
- power distance 
- formality vs. informality 
- uncertainty avoidance 
- relationship vs. deal focus 
- long-term vs. short-term orien-
tation 
- time orientation 
Cognition: 
- reasoning styles 
- perception and attribution 
- planning style 
- view of authority 
- negotiation style 
- willingness to compromise 
- risk avoidance 
- time for decision-making 
etc. 
Table 4-9. Taxonomy of cultural awareness. (Adapted from Wunderle (2006), p. 9-19). 
 
Elbridge and Neboshynsky have studied human terrain from the viewpoint of social 
systems analysis. They have observed that there are several ways of using the term hu-
                                                 
149 Wunderle (2006), pp. 9-19. Author’s comment: FM 3-24.2 (2009), pp. 1-18…1-26, uses almost an 
identical presentation of cultural awareness. It presents the term of 3C (Cross-Cultural Competency) 
which means “general cultural knowledge, skills and attributes”.  
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man terrain, since it has not been defined by official U.S. military terminology. They 
conclude that the term can be split in two parts: a trait originating from an individual 
human or a group of humans tied to a geographic location. Therefore, they define hu-
man terrain as “the aggregate of socio-cultural traits present at a specific temporal, 
geo-spatial point”. They claim that human terrain requires a foundation of cultural 
awareness and refer to the research of Wunderle. However, when seen in a spatial con-
text, they reverse this claim: cultural awareness may be associated with a specific place, 
but human terrain must be related to a specific geographic location.150  
 
According to Elbridge and Neboshynsky, the same geographical urban location can be 
seen in different layers, both physical and cognitive. Human interaction with the physi-
cal world includes different activities and interactions that take place in geographic lo-
cations. As a result, an individual can be understood to have a (spatial) physical status, a 
family status, a social status and an ethnic status. Based on their studies on geographi-
cally oriented social theories, they claim that if individual or group actions are quanti-
fied and associated with geospatial locations, predictive patterns may be found. In the 
“anchor point theory model”, each human develops spatial knowledge and habits in-
cluding anchor points (home, work, shopping) and routes between them. In the “master 
status theory”, an individual changes his/her behavioral mode depending on his/her cur-
rent location. Models like these have been utilized by law enforcement, governments, 
politicians and consumer corporations of the Western world, but military applications 
have lagged behind to date. Elbridge and Neboshynsky refer this as “mapping the social 
dimension”.151   
 
U.S. Army field manuals recommend several methods for analyzing the human terrain. 
These methods come with memory aids, such as the METT-TC, which has been dis-
cussed earlier. FM 3-0 (2008) and especially FM 3-24 (2006) open the letter “C” further 
and bring it towards the tactical level. Civil considerations comprise six characteristics 
expressed by the abbreviation ASCOPE (Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, 
People and Events). Of these six, the FM 3-24 underlines the importance of understand-
ing the people. It presents a tool of socio-cultural analysis including the following key 
factors: society, social structure, culture, language, interests, power and authority. Social 
structures form a key element of the intelligence preparation of battlespace (IPB). These 
social structures include groups, networks, institutions, organizations, roles, statuses, 
and social norms.152 
 
Based on these observations, it seems that the human dimension consists of three do-
mains. The human terrain refers to the physical domain or the objective (real) world, if 
thought in terms used by Alberts et al. (see Figure 4-2). On the other hand, the cultural 
domain represents the cognitive part of the human dimension, thus resembling the cog-
nitive domain of Alberts et al., and reflecting the taxonomy of cultural awareness pre-
sented by Wunderle. Finally, the social domain stands for all the action and interaction 
                                                 
150 Eldridge – Neboshynsky (2008), pp. 18–24. 
151 Ibid., pp. 25–31. 
152 FM 3-0 (2008), Chapter 5 and FM 3-24 (2006), Chapter 3 and Appendix B. The latter describes cul-
ture as follows: “Social structure can be thought of as a skeleton, with culture being the muscle on the 
bones. The two are mutually dependent and reinforcing.” See also FM 3-24.2 (2009), pp. 1-18…1-26, for 
a more detailed account on cultural factors. 
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THE SOCIAL DOMAIN (action) 
THE CULTURAL DOMAIN (cognitive) 
THE HUMAN TERRAIN (physical) 
between individual human beings and groups of humans. Consequently, it is closely 
connected with the information dimension of the battlespace. This layer-based model 
and its definitions will be used in this research report from this point onwards.  
 
Figure 4-10. The layer-based model of the human dimension of battlespace. 
 
Concerning interaction, there is a need to distinguish the cooperation within the multi-
national force from other elements. Even when the possible language and cultural barri-
ers are considered, the problem is more likely to concern tactics and interoperability, 
which is an issue of its own. Therefore, the inner working of the force is not the focus of 
this thesis. In addition, the interaction of the force with the other actors may be roughly 
split in two categories: armed actors and civilian actors. Dealing with armed and crimi-
nal actors is more likely to be very formal and delicate and will include communication 
challenges and conflicting interests. For other actors, like the NGOs, there is also a need 
to identify the interests and the stakes involved.153 
 
4.3.3 The Information Dimension 
 
The information dimension contains data, information and knowledge from all the di-
mensions, as explained in Pictures 4-2 and 4-4. Some of it is readily available as data-
bases, information storages or documented knowledge. Some of it is produced by dif-
ferent sensors and shared in different information systems. Some of it is contributed by 
human beings as they share their cognitive capital or their direct observations from the 
physical (real) world. In fact, all means of communication take place in the information 
domain. Therefore, the information dimension is closely linked with the social (action) 
domain of the human dimension. We will focus on this aspect of the information do-
main and bypass many of the technical aspects, such as the characteristics of the electro-
magnetic spectrum. Thus, we are limiting this part of the study to the question of 
“what”, rather than asking a whole battery of questions such as “why” and “how”. This 
choice reflects the tactical standpoint of this thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
153 Interview with Professor Liisa Laakso, 15 January 2008. 
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Figure 4-11. The Information Dimension. (Source: Puolustusvoimat, 
http://www.mil.fi/rauhanturvaaja/) 
 
As the interaction between humans - and by association, between groups of humans is 
of special interest in this research, it is worth analyzing these relationships based on of 
Rauno Kuusisto’s ideas. He has presented an idea of relationships between structures, 
action and information. According to Kuusisto, social systems and their relationships 
are complex. To interpret the left hand side of Figure 4-12, we can imagine a single so-
cial system such as an infantry battalion (structure) operating in its AO (action) and 
therefore producing information. This battalion is receiving and processing information 
through its individual perceptual filter. The filter (eq. tactics, techniques and procedures, 
staff capabilities, available sensors etc.) specifies the amount, quality and contents of 
the information available. On the right hand side, we can visualize the relationship be-
tween different social systems (structures) and their interaction. We can see that system 
A is directly interacting with systems B, C and D, and that A’s information on E and F 
is available only indirectly via other actors. Between each system, another perceptual 
and unique filter specifies the quality of their relationship.154  
 
                                                 
154 Nurmela (2007), pp. 19–20. Author’s comment: Nurmela interviewed Rauno Kuusisto on 16 March 
2007 and during this encounter, Kuusisto illustrated his concept as represented in Figure 4-12. 
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Figure 4-12. The system of structures, action and information according to Rauno Kuusisto. 
 
The flow of information is easiest and most active in urban centers. In towns and cities, 
you may find the best mobile telephone, landline, wireless internet and television cover-
age. In addition recognized media actors, illegal radio stations, “underground” newspa-
pers, leaflets, advertisements and posters are effective means of spreading information 
in an urban environment. Internet and mobile connections offer a cheap, flexible and 
effective way to command, control, coordinate and report.155 In tribal societies, how-
ever, conversations, meetings and rumors from trusted sources and family members 
may be the principal source of information. This leaves little space for success of West-
ern style information operations, as all the outsiders are subject to great skepticism.156 In 
the Islamic world, it is critical to recognize the significance of the religious community. 
Besides being places of worship, mosques have social, educational, leisure and informa-
tional functions. The neighborhood of a mosque becomes crucial in terms of the infor-
mation and human dimensions especially during times of prayer.157 
 
 
Figure 4-13. The levels of action below the strategic level, as adapted from Lund et al. (Source 
Kuusisto – Rantapelkonen (ed.) (2005), p. 138.) 
 
Lund, Mikkola, Kuusisto & Kuusisto have examined different levels, functionalities and 
information needs of a military organization.  They split the activities into four levels: 
                                                 
155 Kilcullen (2004A), p. 8. 
156 Barno (2006). 
157 Nurmela (2007), p. 46. 
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operating, tactical, operational and strategic levels. The operating activity stands for 
individual action while the superior levels comprise planning, organizational and con-
trolling functions.158 The presentation in Figure 4-13 seems applicable to a tactical unit 
with its subunits. Battlespace information should generally be more “visible” in areas 
where the operating activities take place. Information may be obtained from either di-
rect or indirect observation and it is analyzed through the conceptual filters of each 
structure. This idea of battlespace and threat visibility will be developed further in Sec-
tion 4.4. 
 
An important part of the information dimension is managing data, information and 
knowledge within a tactical unit. This requires an effective means of internal communi-
cation and information sharing as well as the exploitation of computer and other infor-
mation systems. Observations made by small units and individual soldiers should be 
able to be confirmed and corroborated with the whole unit in the information dimen-
sion. The same applies to the data and information feed of different sensors. Crucial 
factors are the relevance, timeliness and assurance of information.159 This leads us to 
consider the availability of information in a temporal dimension, as well as the subjec-
tive visibility of the battlespace to each actor.  
 
4.3.4 The Temporal Dimension 
 
Time is both the most neutral and the most unforgiving tactical factor. In this study, we 
will observe the temporal dimension only from the physicists’ approach, leaving phi-
losophical questions and metaphysical mysteries aside. It is nonetheless worth noting 
that the other three dimensions of battlespace interact differently with time. The natural 
changes of the physical dimension are usually slow – unless they are constructively or 
destructively modified by humans. The attributes of the human dimension range from 
Western hectic urban life to the slow-paced rural communities of the developing coun-
tries. The information dimension reacts quickly or slowly depending on the technical 
solutions employed. Time is therefore closely related to both action and information. 
 
Speed and tempo have become key elements of operational art in (classic) maneuver 
warfare. To achieve superior tempo, one has to master the OODA-loop (Observation, 
Orientation, Decision, Action). To be successful, one must be able to cycle through this 
process faster and more efficiently than the opponent.160 It is necessary to pay particular 
attention to the cultural features presented as a part of the “Orient” phase (Figure 4-14) 
as they correspond closely to the concept of lifeworld161. High tempo is not a purpose in 
and of itself, but rather a means to prevent the enemy from adapting to the situation. 
Besides speed, the quality of the observation and orientation phases is crucial for suc-
cess. The relative lengths of each phase are questionable and the OODA-sketch does not 
                                                 
158 Lund, Olli-Pekka – Mikkola, Tatu – Kuusisto, Rauno – Kuusisto, Tuija in Kuusisto – Rantapelkonen 
(ed.) (2005), pp. 134–148. 
159 Understanding Information Age Warfare, s. 95–117. 
160 Rekkedal (2006), pp. 507–515. The OODA-loop was developed in the 1970s by an American fighter 
pilot, Colonel John Boyd, as a way to analyze factors leading to victory or loss.  
161 The concept of lifeworld is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.5. 
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offer a perfect model to master time. The capacity to decide and act in uncertainty – in 
the “fog of war” – is necessary for any military leader.162 To analyze the temporal di-
mension in detail, we will study four temporal characteristics relevant to military opera-
tions: duration, frequency, sequence and opportunity.163  
 
Figure 4-14. John Boyd’s concept of OODA-loop. (Source: Ullman (2007))  
 
Duration is closely linked to the objectives of an operation. The more distant the objec-
tives are, physically or conceptually, the lengthier the process of “getting from here to 
there” will be. A tactical level commander usually does not have much control over the 
duration of his overall deployment, as it is based on national objectives and plans. Indi-
vidual engagements, tasks, battles and operations all have their particular duration, 
which may be difficult to anticipate. Lengthy operations with multiple actors increase 
friction, which in turn makes operations more difficult and lengthy. Proper training and 
planning reduce friction and therefore shorten the duration of actions. By taking risks, a 
commander may try to reduce the “typical duration” of a specified action, just as a car 
driver can decide to overtake slower cars or ignore speed limits in order to get home 
earlier.  
 
Frequency or tempo describes how fast and how often things happen. All actions have a 
“normal” or expected frequency. As this is a subjective issue, the frequency changes of 
certain events have different consequences in different contexts. Once the events, such 
as attacks, take place in high tempo, the rhythm first becomes difficult to bear and later 
unacceptable or even impossible to live with. On the other hand, a very slow tempo may 
have similar effects, because military units plan, train and operate according to an ex-
pected frequency. Maintaining a high level of force protection in a low-threat or no-
threat environment is difficult. Guerilla or terrorist tactics combining low frequency and 
long duration do not reflect the Western expectations of high frequency action and pre-
                                                 
162 See Desportes (2007B). 
163 Leonhard (1994B), pp. 10-11, 53-134. See also Yakovleff (2007), pp. 134-154. The four following 
paragraphs describing the characteristics of the temporal dimension are compiled from these two sources. 
Yakovleff’s observations are almost identical to Leonhard’s, as the latter is the former’s main reference. 
Also Rekkedal (2006) refers to Leonhard’s book. 
  
68
set duration. Frequency and duration can also be combined to create higher levels of 
attrition.  
 
Sequence means the order of events. The classic example of mastering sequential per-
ception in chess is very inadequate as the operational environment is much more com-
plex than a two-sided board game. Various events must be synchronized to achieve the 
desired effects, as different operating systems have different time scales. Well-
sequenced or even simultaneous effects usually contribute to success. Perceiving and 
predicting events and their consequences (branches and sequels) is the key to obtaining 
and maintaining the initiative. However, the success or failure of tactical actions may 
often be impossible to evaluate until subsequent events have unfolded. Each event has a 
relative value that is dependent on future developments. Therefore, a successful tactical 
commander tries to control and anticipate the order of events for all of the actors in-
volved – not merely his own actions. The importance of preparations cannot be underes-
timated and preparation, too, can be seen as a sequence.  
 
An opportunity is a time-sensitive decision point. It occurs at a certain time and only 
lasts for a given duration. To exploit an opportunity, one must be able to decide and act 
within the given framework of time. This translates into a compromise between quality 
and timeliness of an action. The first problem regards being in a position to recognize 
an opportunity. The next question is about who has the authority to approve the action 
and who has the resources to act within the window of opportunity. This is an organiza-
tional and a cultural matter within any military system. To properly apply objective-
oriented tactics, both the resources and the authorization need to be allocated and dele-
gated before the action takes place. 
 
4.4 The visibility of battlespace 
 
The first challenge concerning visibility involves understanding the difference between 
the area of interest (AOI) and the concept of battlespace. First, we should expand the 
AOI to include all the dimensions of battlespace instead of just concentrating on the 
enemy and terrain. This “Enhanced” Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace obvi-
ously approaches the environment according to the information needs of the unit. Sec-
ond, we should think about the consequences of actions in a sequential manner. Thus, 
we need to evaluate the causal effects of our actions in both the short and long term. 
This approach might reveal new concerns not discovered in a classic IPB process. It is 
likely that a more accurate understanding of the battlespace will be found during 
wargaming, the action itself or as a result of subsequent events. From a unit’s point of 
view, battlespace is more interactive than the AOI, as discovered by Medby and Glenn: 
 
”The battlespace normally includes the AO and may include all or part of 
the AOI. Significantly, the battlespace also includes the areas or groups 
that can be influenced by events occurring within the AO. Its effects are 
therefore in a sense the reverse of those of concern when defining the AOI 
— which includes areas and other entities that can affect operations with-
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in the AO. The key to distinguishing between the AOI and the battlespace 
is thus one of direction of cause and effect.”164 
 
Let us now focus on the second practical challenge; the visibility and invisibility of the 
battlespace at any given time. First, we must realize that we have probably not been able 
to recognize the battlespace components correctly and we are therefore observing and 
orientating ourselves incorrectly or inadequately. Second, the known battlespace may be 
partially obscured or invisible to us because we do not have the resources to observe it 
or our methods are insufficient. Third, the information might not be available to us 
when needed for reasons outside of our control.  
 
 
Figure 4-15. Visible and invisible battlespace as adapted from Bunker (1996). 
 
The visibility of targets and threats is affected by opposite vectors of stealth masking 
and data fusion. If stealth is greater than data fusion, a target or a threat will remain in 
the invisible battlespace.165 The principle is shown in Figure 4-15. Mastering the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum is the key in the detection, location, recognition, identification 
and tracking of targets. In this sense, data fusion allows us to deal with different threats 
- whether human, physical or informational. Yet the human dimension and especially its 
cognitive domain remain hidden if we rely solely on technical sources.166 An important 
part of modern sensor fusion is therefore human intelligence (HUMINT). An example 
of a capable intelligence sensor fusion is a so-called ISTAR-unit (Intelligence, Surveil-
lance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance).167  
 
The problem of recognizing threats and “seeing” the battlespace is different in each di-
mension of battlespace. Regarding the physical dimension, the lack of accurate maps – 
and especially mine maps - is often a serious issue. A GPS device itself provides little 
                                                 
164 Medby – Glenn (2002), p. 48. 
165 Bunker (1996). 
166 Nurmela (2007), pp. 51–54. See also Kosola – Solante (2003), pp. 187-195.  
167 STAE 2020 (2004), pp. 57-68. ISTAR-system includes Open Sources Intelligence (OSINT), Signal 
Intelligence (SIGINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MA-
SINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Counter Intelligence (CI). See also Välimäki (1999), pp. 
132–137.  
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comfort if combined with inaccurate large-scale maps, minefields displaced by weather 
and conditions in which no roads are available. Small units such as patrols or convoys 
depend almost entirely on direct observation. Their “micro-battlespaces” are therefore 
equal to the range and capacity of their human senses and their technical aids. With 
modern technology, situational awareness can be improved by different data displays 
and individual radios. Tactical operation centers may share information with their sub-
units, while the higher commanders may follow the current situation based on reports, 
digital photos and video feed. This leads to a risk of relying solely on indirect observa-
tion instead of doing a hands-on assessment of the battlespace.168  
 
The human dimension is even more complex to conceive. The first difficulty lies in cor-
rectly identifying the actors. Background data such as a population register might not 
exist. Local workers and interpreters may come in handy as they offer some cultural 
expertise, but they themselves may pose a threat to operational security (OPSEC). Cer-
tain people might also have several “roles” as a peasant might be a guerilla by night. 
Tracking a human target may be relatively easy initially, but it becomes much harder if 
the individual enters a crowd. The first challenge is to anticipate the intentions of an 
individual. The second difficulty is the cultural and language barrier, especially in quick 
and stressful situations. Non-verbal communication may fail as easily as spoken lan-
guage. Using an optical sight of a rifle for observation, wearing sunglasses, waving with 
the left hand or simply applying common hand signals are a few examples of gestures 
that can be misinterpreted. The third challenge is to avoid fratricide between friendly 
forces and the co-operating indigenous forces.169  
 
Threats and targets of the information dimension are practically beyond the control of a 
tactical ground unit. News media may magnify local events and cause further troubles. 
They may even relay news of events outside the unit’s AOI and thus cause tension or 
even riots within the unit’s AO. A good example is the reactions of Muslim communi-
ties worldwide to the Mohammed cartoons in 2006.170 Rumors or even reasonably reli-
able information may be spread in by local people to mislead units or to test their reac-
tions. It would also be naïve to assume that adversaries or other actors do not possess 
sound SIGINT capabilities. Ultimately, even the troops might endanger OPSEC by writ-
ing blogs or publishing photos.171 The informational “reachback” to home country is 
also a very important consideration. An individual small-unit engagement gone bad 
might cause parliamentary debates in the given troop-contributing country. The French 
experienced this after a single fatal ambush in Uzbeen Valley, Afghanistan, on 18 Au-
gust 2008.172 
 
Let us now examine the battlespace of a hypothetical infantry battalion in stabilization 
operations. As the area of operations (AO) of a battalion is usually very large, the visi-
                                                 
168 Nurmela (2007), pp. 47–49.  
169 Ibid, pp. 49–51. 
170 Lindholm (2006). In Meymaneh, Afghanistan, this led to a full riot and an effort to overrun the PRT 
base.  
171 Nurmela (2007), pp. 45–46 and 51–52.  
172 Pons (2008), pp. 14–19. Author’s comment based on personal observations: The ten soldiers killed in 
action and several wounded resulted in a widespread public debate in the French media and among the 
French military. 
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bility of even this portion of battlespace is a challenge, let alone the AOI.173 The reach 
of organic weapons systems, the overall mobility and the capacity of ISTAR assets all 
limit the area of influence of any ground unit. The area of interest (AOI) should nor-
mally extend outside the AO and cover the possible contingency plans and the assigned 
“be prepared to” and “on order” type tasks. Some information requirements are rou-
tinely addressed to neighboring and supporting units and the higher headquarters. The 
battlespace, however, is not dependent solely on the unit’s interests. First, the unit has to 
consider the causal relationship of its actions and the possible consequences. These 
links are always human or informational, as the physical dimension does not really react 
to stability operations (unless there is an environmental or a CBRN concern). Second, 
the unit has to consider the possibility of indirect outside influences, which can spark a 
reaction to events beyond the AOI. Again, these interventions occur in the human or 
information dimensions.  
 
The following two illustrations attempt to graphically capture the problem of visible and 
invisible battlespace. The first picture has our imaginary battalion in a relatively static 
deployment and doing routine, framework operations. In the second picture, the same 
battalion has launched a focused, intelligence driven operation in the NW corner of its 
AO. Note how the AOI has changed according to the current posture. The “tunnel vi-
sion” effect can also be seen, as the AO outside the immediate area of concern has been 
left without coverage because of the surge in the NW corner. The changing shape of the 
battlespace (in red) demonstrates the significance and the unpredictable nature of the 
human and information dimensions. As the battlespace also has a temporal dimension, 
both pictures can be seen as conceptual snap shots at a given time. The home station 
(HS) and the area between it and the forward support base (FSB) remain outside the 
unit’s AOI in both pictures, because they are relatively irrelevant in terms of the imme-
diate ongoing tactical operations. They are, however, important pieces of the battlespace 
and should always be included. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
173 Nurmela (2007), p. 30-31. Nurmela offers three examples of the size of an AO. The Finnish Battalion 
of KFOR in Kosovo in 1999 was responsible of an area of 550 km2. The Nordic-Polish Brigade of SFOR 
in Bosnia in 1995 controlled an area of 75 x 150 km with three maneuver battalions. A Canadian battle-
group in West Kabul, Afghanistan, supervised an area of 167 km2 in 2003.   
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Figure 4-16. A battalion’s battlespace in framework operations.   
AO = Area of Operations   AOI = Area of Interest 
FSB = Forward Support Base  HS = Home Station  
 
 
 
Figure 4-17. A battalion’s battlespace in a focused operation.   
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4.5 Social action within the horizon of lifeworld 
 
So far, we have developed a model of battlespace as a whole. Hence, to advance from 
the terrain-oriented approach towards a human-centric one, we need to focus on the re-
lationship between the human and the informational dimensions. As a working hypothe-
sis, this “social” battlespace should correspond closely to the paradigm of “war amongst 
the people”. We have already identified the social domain of the human dimension as 
the domain of action. Human behavior becomes action if the actor attaches a subjective 
meaning to it. Logically, social action is a subset of action, when linked and dependent 
on the behavior of other people i.e. it is action meaningfully determined by the behavior 
of others. Not all our behavior has a specific meaning, as in everyday life we react to 
different stimuli and tend to repeat our daily routines. Some of our actions have a per-
sonal, subjective meaning, but this does not mean that they qualify as social actions.174 
  
Figure 4-18. The relationship of human behavior with its subsets, action and social action ac-
cording to Max Weber and adapted from the presentation of Jari Aro.  
 
4.5.1 The Theory of Communicative Action 
 
This thesis is based on the premise that actions by different actors generate information 
that each actor processes differently based on their perceptual filters.175 The action ele-
ment is studied from the point of view of the tactical ground unit in relation to the other 
human structures. A major portion of these actors are furnished by the local populace. 
Jürgen Habermas points out that the entire spectrum of social action should be taken 
                                                 
174 E-mail interview with Jari Aro 22 April 2009. Dr Aro is a Professor of Sociology at the University of 
Tampere. See also Aro (2009). The author also discussed Weber’s theories during a telephone interview 
with Kaisa Ketokivi on 20 April 2009. Ketokivi is a PhD candidate and a researcher in the Department of 
Sociology, University of Helsinki.  
175 See Kuusisto (2004). Kuusisto’s “information theory”, as presented in Figure 4-12, does not construct 
a solid formal theory on social action. As Kuusisto borrows Habermas’ thoughts on communicative action 
in his dissertation, the author decided to follow this line of thought. The author’s interview with Professor 
Timo Kaartinen on 08 January 2008 suggested that Habermas’ interests in public space and communica-
tive rationality could provide a reasonable background for theory construction. He also pointed out some 
criticism of Habermas in terms of differing ideas of “modernity” and the realistic attainability of an opti-
mal speech act.  
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into account when observing a society. He then presents the paradigm of lifeworld and 
its relationship with the paradigm of system, as these exist simultaneously. On one 
hand, society can be conceived as the lifeworld of a social group from the perspective of 
the acting subjects of that group. On the other hand, and from the perspective of a non-
involved observer, society can only be seen as a system of actions.176 If we recall the 
friction between the different levels of military action, the tactical level on the ground is 
likely to be more involved with local lifeworlds than the operational level, which in turn 
will be more focused on systems.  
 
Focusing on the ground, we are likely to find the worldviews incompatible i.e. due to 
the language barrier and a cultural mismatch. In short, the lifeworlds do not match. 
Rauno Kuusisto describes lifeworld as “the fixing point of an interactive event”. Life-
world acts as a background of mutual knowledge and as a horizon of mutual under-
standing. It takes into account the entire information flow as well as the social environ-
ment.177 According to Habermas, “cultural values do not count as universal; they are, 
as the name indicates, located within the horizon of the lifeworld of a specific group or 
culture”. He cautions against seeking rationality in terms of a single worldview – in our 
case, the occidental understanding of the world and our presupposition of modernity.178 
This interpretation offers no right and wrong, no “good guys” and “bad guys” – it mere-
ly highlights the likelihood of differences. 
 
Specifying the idea of worldviews, Habermas presents three different perceptual “sub-
worlds”: the subjective world (the totality of the experiences to which a single individ-
ual has privileged access), the social world (the totality of interpersonal relations that 
are recognized by its members as legitimate) and the objective world (the totality of 
facts that can be considered as true).179 These worldviews allow valid claims to be made 
on social action. In order to reach an understanding of interaction that is coordinated 
through speech acts, an actor must present at least three validity claims.  
- that the statement made is true (objective world => propositional truth);  
- that the speech act is appropriate for the existing normative context (so-
cial world => normative rightness); 
- that the manifest intention of the speaker is meant as he/she had ex-
pressed it (subjective world => subjective truthfulness).180 
 
                                                 
176 Habermas (1984), pp. 3-7 and (1987), pp. 117-118 and 320. According to Habermas, the institutional 
orders of lifeworld are divided into private and public spheres.  
177 Kuusisto (2004), pp. 69-70 and Habermas (1984), pp. 66–74. Habermas states that “subjects acting 
communicatively always come to an understanding in the horizon of lifeworld”. The more the cultural 
traditions rule social action, the less ideal the situation is for the participants themselves in terms of mak-
ing individual interpretations and contributions. As the lifeworld stores the interpretive work of preceding 
generations, the conceptualization of cultural tradition is of importance. 
178 Habermas (1984), pp. 42–53. 
179 Habermas (1984), pp. 52, 69–74. 
180 Habermas (1984), pp. 75–101. Besides speech acts, bodily movements, expressions or other gestures 
may be used by the actors in their efforts to communicate. Habermas states that “bodily movement is an 
element of action, but not an action”. This is because movement is only a means to obtain an end, as a 
movement of a hand can be a part of friendly greeting or a damaging karate blow. In any case, both actors 
are translating these movements and gestures based on their own lifeworlds and individual perception. 
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Figure 4-19. World-relations that the actors (A1 and A2) establish with their communicative 
action, when sharing the same lifeworld (as adapted from Habermas and Kuusisto).  
 
To position language and culture correctly in this model, Habermas states that commu-
nicative actors always move within the horizon of their lifeworld. Lifeworld is constitu-
tive for mutual understanding, if the actors share the same lifeworld (i.e. have similar 
cultural background and language skills, see Figure 4-19).181 If the lifeworld loses its 
power as a background framework, actors must then rely on their own interpretive per-
formances. When culture and language fail as resources for mutual understanding, there 
is a need for the “repair work of translators, interpreters and therapists”. Thus, ele-
ments of the lifeworld that fail as resources have to be identified as cultural facts that 
limit the scope of social action.182 
 
This model gives us a tool with which to analyze what can go wrong when our soldiers 
meet the local populations. In Figure 4-20, we see a problematic situation where two 
actors do not share a common lifeworld. They are still able to make direct observations 
regarding the social world or the objective world, yet they interpret these observations 
based on the background of their own lifeworlds. The margin of difference can be re-
ferred to as social distance183. This distance can be shortened if an interpreter is avail-
able. We should bear in mind that person C has his/her own subjective world and ob-
serves the situation accordingly. C may share the lifeworld of soldier A and thereby 
could communicate effectively with him, but only partially with the local B, because he 
has learned the language and parts of this culture through facts and norms but has not 
                                                 
181 Habermas (1987), pp. 120–127. The formal world-concepts (objective and social worlds as the com-
mon external world and subjective worlds of the actors as internal worlds) constitute a reference system 
for that about which mutual understanding is possible 
182 Habermas (1987), pp. 132–135. These assistants have to use the three world-concepts to replace the 
dysfunctional elements of the lifeworld. 
183 Ethington (1995). He analyzes social distance as psychological distance between two social groups 
and he introduces Emory Bogardus’ 7-step “social distance scale”.  See also Simmel (1950).  
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fully absorbed the lifeworld of B. The second possibility is that C has been recruited 
locally, and his lifeworld is likely to be closer to B’s, even if he does not belong to the 
same ethnic group. In the best circumstances, C qualifies as a cultural mediator – a lev-
el far superior to that of a traditional language assistant. 
 
 
Figure 4-20. Actors “Soldier A” and “Local B” fail to establish mutual understanding, as they are 
not sharing the same lifeworld (as adapted from Habermas). 
 
Habermas organizes social action into four different categories.184 Teleological or stra-
tegic action involves at least two goal-directed actors and it can be considered to corre-
spond to purposive rationality. The actors presuppose one world, the objective world, 
and each is oriented to his/her own success. As a result, they cooperate with others only 
to the degree necessary. This is likely to happen when an element of the stabilization 
force separates itself from the society and acts strictly according to its mission. An ex-
ample would be a crowd-control unit intervening only when needed and then returning 
to base after accomplishing its mission.  
 
Normatively regulated action refers to members of a social group who orient their ac-
tions toward common values. Individual actors may comply or violate the norms and 
thereby fulfill or fail to meet the generalized expectation of their behavior. It presup-
poses relations between an actor and two worlds: the objective world and the social 
world. A military unit that co-exists with the local society will ultimately deal with this 
issue. The normative context is likely to be that of the locals, and it will be very difficult 
to enforce other behaviors. Soldiers may be puzzled by the different sets of norms on 
and off the base.  
 
                                                 
184 Habermas (1984), p. 75–101. The following four paragraphs include the Habermasian definition fol-
lowed by an example made by the author.  
SUBJECTIVE 
WORLD 
OF  
“SOLDIER A” 
LIFEWORLD OF ”A” 
Culture ”A”, language ”A” Culture ”B”, language ”B” 
LIFEWORLD OF ”B” 
SUBJECTIVE 
WORLD 
OF  
“LOCAL B” 
 
OBJECTIVE
WORLD 
 
SOCIAL 
WORLD 
  
77 
Dramaturgical action refers to participants in interaction that constitute a public for one 
another. It is not limited to drama or the arts, but also applies to the stage where politi-
cians, police officers or just normal people act in different social situations. When pre-
senting a view on one’s self, the actor has to behave within his own subjective world 
while also presupposing the external world in general - though he/she does not exactly 
conform to the limits of the objective and social worlds. Units and individual leaders 
will have to learn this in order to pass “master messages”, win the “storytelling contest” 
and deal with different practical situations. They should be warned that the locals could 
also use similar methods. Playing with normative rightness and truthfulness might mean 
losing face – which is tantamount to forfeiting one’s honor in some cultures. 
 
Communicative action refers to two or more equal actors who establish interpersonal 
relations and seek to understand one another. It is superior to the other three models, 
where language is conceived as one-sided in different respects. An understanding is 
reached against the background of a culturally ingrained pre-understanding. It may be 
impossible to reach honest, open and mutual understanding when interacting with local 
populations, as lifeworlds and agendas often do not match. It may happen between indi-
viduals, but will require a considerable amount of time in order for the actors to develop 
the necessary mutual trust. 
 
The situation establishes an order for the action. Besides the real-life spatial-temporal 
distance of the situation, social distance is also a determining factor.185 The participants 
will observe and interpret the situation according to their own point of view. When 
these views differ, there is a risk that the situation could be reinterpreted, as no partici-
pant has the monopoly on correct interpretation. Realistically speaking, communication 
in everyday life is diffuse, fragile, continuously revised and only momentarily success-
ful – even if the actors shared a common lifeworld. While the actors may aim for under-
standing, they all pursue their own particular agendas.186 Different lifeworlds combined 
with varying amounts of information available will result in misunderstandings and mis-
takes, and lead to unintended consequences.  
 
This situational problematic combined with other factors of the human dimension in-
corporates several questions that need to be addressed before taking action. In this case, 
the action in question may range from kinetic to non-kinetic. Action may thus include 
using lethal force, as it is a very strong way of communicating. Planning one’s agenda 
for a tea session with local leaders is therefore not necessarily different from deciding 
whether to engage armed insurgents on sight. Leaders should therefore ask themselves: 
- What is the social distance between them and us? What level of inter-
preter or cultural mediators are available? 
- Are we reading the situation correctly and do we have all the information 
available? On what basis might they act and what do they know? 
- Who else is involved? What are the links and networks between them 
and the other actors? 
- Should we pursue our own agenda, or should we adapt and adjust to the 
situation in order to create action that is more communicative?  
                                                 
185 Kuusisto (2004), pp. 70-71. 
186 Habermas (1984), pp. 75–101.  
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- At what point do we use dramaturgical action? Can we continue this ac-
tion logically and persistently without failing the “validity checks”? 
- From the options available, which is the less harmful in the short term? 
Have we also properly analyzed the long-term consequences? 
- Is it necessary to act now? Does this situation represent an opportunity or 
should we wait?  
- Are our actions predictable in a positive way? Are we trustworthy? What 
risks does this predictability generate in terms of protecting our force?  
 
4.5.2 Soldiers and Strangers  
 
Troops deployed in a foreign country are always considered strangers by the local peo-
ple. Georg Simmel describes “a stranger” as a person who “comes today and stays to-
morrow” and is fixed within a particular spatial group. His position in this group is de-
termined by the fact that he has not belonged to it from the beginning and has imported 
qualities that are alien to the original group. In spite of this, the stranger becomes an 
organic member of the group with a special relationship of nearness, distance and ten-
sion not found in other relationships.187 Zygmunt Bauman describes “the stranger” as a 
third element between “them” and “us”. While “us” represents everything familial and 
safe, “them” is a scary and alien group to be avoided. Human action is thus about build-
ing frontiers between “them” and “us” to establish order in an otherwise insecure envi-
ronment. The stranger shakes up this setup by demonstrating that the world order ac-
cording to “us” is not the only option. Strangers point out the artificiality of established 
frontiers and show that it is possible to redraw or cross boundaries.188  
 
Lifeworld always remains in the background and forms an everyday, ever-present, tak-
en-for-granted unity consisting of three levels: the culture, the society and the personal. 
Culture represents the stock of knowledge; society stands for memberships in social 
groups and personal for individual competences. The processes that correspond to these 
structural components are cultural reproduction, social integration and socialization. On 
table 4-21, we can identify the relationship between these factors when maintaining the 
structural components of the lifeworld (+) and manifestations of crises when processes 
are disturbed (-).189  
 
With this table, we can follow the logic that is applicable to a “stranger” military unit 
amongst local populations. Successful integration may lead to a relationship that is too 
close and may even endanger the objectivity of the unit. Staying detached will lead to 
alienation and the loss of the “stranger” status. In the worst-case scenario, the unit will 
be marked with a “them” status, ultimately becoming intruders and enemies. This facili-
tates the “Accidental Guerilla Syndrome” discussed in Chapter 2. It is more likely that a 
unit will be somewhere in the middle of these two extremities. It is worth considering 
the effects of the integration process marked with (+) on the mission statement and tasks 
conducted by the unit. Successful co-existence is therefore likely to shorten the social 
                                                 
187 Simmel (1950), pp. 402-408. The Stranger. 
188 Bauman (1990), pp. 40-54.  
189 Habermas (1987), p. 135–145. 
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distance of any ordinary situation and therefore serve as booster for social action. Yet it 
may also create friction and inertia when undertaking kinetic/violent tasks within the 
familiar human terrain. This problematic is hardly seen when observing systems from a 
grand-tactical or an operational standpoint. However, it is plainly evident when dealing 
with lifeworlds on the lower tactical levels and especially in small unit action. 
 
 CULTURE SOCIETY PERSON Dimension of 
evaluation 
Cultural 
reproduction 
+ Valid knowl-
edge 
 
- Loss of meaning 
 
+ Legitimation 
 
 
- Withdrawal of 
legitimation 
+ Socialization 
patterns/educational 
goals 
- Crisis in orienta-
tion and education 
Rationality of 
knowledge 
Social 
integration 
+ Obligations 
 
 
- Unsettling of 
collective identity 
+ Legitimate in-
terpersonal rela-
tions 
- Anomie 
 
+ Social member-
ships 
 
- Alienation 
Solidarity of 
members 
 
Socialization + Accomplish-
ments 
- Rupture of tradi-
tion 
+ Motivations for 
normative actions 
- Withdrawal of 
motivation 
+ Personal identity 
 
- Psychopathologies 
Personal re-
sponsibility 
 
Table 4-21. Relationships of structural components of the lifeworld and related reproduction 
processes (as adapted from Habermas). 
 
4.5.3 Public and Private Spheres 
 
So far, we have discovered that small units are more affected by lifeworlds than sys-
tems. Looking at table 4-21, soldiers operating on the ground need to understand the 
culture, but they are more concerned with the practical implications of societies and 
different personal encounters. The physical dimension with the local human terrain 
forms the context of interactions. These may include public encounters on streets and 
marketplaces or more delicate situations, such as meetings in churches or mosques, or 
even in private homes. If we bear in mind that people may change their social role ac-
cording to the temporal and geo-spatial context, each encounter with the same person 
could be different depending on the time and place.   
 
Theoretically speaking, we may distinguish the sphere of public authority from the “au-
thentic public sphere”, which is in fact the domain of private people. Public authority 
includes the state, the police and the courts, which represent the public administration 
system. The “authentic public sphere” includes politics, media and a variety of public 
  
80
spaces as social platforms. These public spaces may include market places, coffee hous-
es, streets etc. It should be noted, however, that not all of the so-called “public build-
ings” are in fact open to the public. State institutions or government buildings do not 
usually have open access, so they should be considered part of the public authority. Pri-
vate sphere refers to homes and to family’s internal space. It may also include elements 
of the civil society in a narrower sense, thus consisting of some sorts of social labor and 
commodity exchange.190 
 
In practice, there are numerous different “public spaces” and “audiences” which do not 
necessarily correspond to the regions or territories controlled by authorities. The as-
sumption of Western-style government control may be too hasty. Tribal societies may 
be transnational and therefore not follow territorial logic. Virtual public spheres may 
engage global audiences.191 Religion is also a major factor when dealing with the con-
cepts of public and private spheres. In the West, democratization has pushed religion 
into the private sphere and separated the church from the state. Islamic societies func-
tion with a different logic and religion is not merely private: it is also an important part 
of the public sphere in many ways. Religion may also be the same as authority, as Sha-
ri’a can provide the legal norms locally or centrally and clerics may wield considerable 
power.192 
 
4.6 The “Social” Battlespace  
 
The small units on the ground have to co-exist and interact with local people and with 
multiple actors present in an international stabilization operation. This social action is a 
part of their work as they conduct a full spectrum of military tasks ranging from hu-
manitarian assistance to pure combat operations. The conclusion is that social action 
between the military force and other actors is a subcategory of the overall tactical ac-
tion. Therefore, in stabilization operations amongst the people, the traditional idea of 
battlespace has to be shifted towards a “social” battlespace. The orientation has to be 
human-centric rather than terrain- or enemy-centric. The problematic involved is two-
fold. First, one has to deploy the force on the ground based on good judgment generated 
by an enhanced IPB analysis. Secondly and more importantly, one has to employ the 
force efficiently while maintaining the ubiquitous “stranger” status and without trigger-
ing the “Accidental Guerilla Syndrome”. All this requires a profound understanding of 
the mechanics of the “social” battlespace. 
 
The human dimension constitutes the core of the “social” battlespace. The layer-based 
approach introduced in this thesis should help in recognizing the key factors involved. 
Mapping of the human terrain with the basic cultural influences establishes the base for 
further studies. Human terrain teams with databases and reachback links to national 
                                                 
190 Habermas (1989), pp. 1-5, 27-31. 
191 Interview with Professor Timo Kaartinen, 08 January 2008.  
192 Hefner (2001).  
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intelligence services will help when developing the picture.193 Recognizing the cultural 
variations and manifestations (see Table 4-9) is the next step and is essential when ana-
lyzing the differences between the private and public spheres. Employing the force 
properly greatly depends on the correct interpretation of this social domain as a whole. 
A qualitative analysis of the multinational force has to be equally taken into account, as 
the cultural awareness level and the particular social distance aspects of each unit 
should be considered before deploying and employing them.  
 
The physical dimension is both an enabler and a limitation to operations. At the tactical 
level, the traditional way for soldiers to consider the physical dimension is to estimate 
fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, cover and concealment.194 An 
urban environment makes this more difficult, as the terrain is three-dimensional and 
complex. It greatly affects the local social domain as the layouts of villages and towns 
provide varying platforms for the public and private spheres. Rural or mountain envi-
ronments offer far different challenges. The “ISTAR threshold” of different surround-
ings dictates greatly the relationship of visible and invisible battlespace as well as pos-
sible threats. Both kinetic and non-kinetic operations have to take into account the com-
bination of the physical and human dimensions - that is, consider the infrastructure. Fur-
thermore, the “anchor point” and “master status” theory models demonstrate that people 
can play different roles in different temporal and geo-spatial circumstances. Addition-
ally, certain behavioral patterns can be discovered based on this kind of analysis.  
 
The information dimension is where battlespace effects take place, as the tactical center 
of gravity in stabilization operations is likely to be the consent of populations. In es-
sence, this is why all operations should be considered primarily as information opera-
tions backed up by other means as necessary. Recognizing the capabilities of other ac-
tors will help when estimating the flow of data and information. The fact that modern 
technology provides commercial off-the-shelf – and most of all, affordable - global 
means of communication, the information dimension flow within the battlespace will 
usually become impossible to control. Technology can network actors that reside in 
different physical environments, but who still share the same lifeworld, idealism or 
cause. This may include relatives, friends, members of groups, supporters, compatriots, 
brothers in arms, etc. Ultimately, a virtual lifeworld may become more valued than a 
lifeworld oriented to the physical world. These aspects may shade the meaning of citi-
zenship, nationality, ethnicity and other social standings.  
 
Another observation should be made regarding the mass media. As the local and inter-
national mass media operate in the information domain, their audiences will be subject 
to cultural mismatch and misinterpretations. The audience195 may or may not share the 
lifeworld of the reporters, and therefore there is a need to check the “validity claims” by 
reconsidering the information. As the information flows mostly in one direction - when 
it comes to mass media - the formal world contexts of the information may also be 
                                                 
193 See the U.S. Army Website of Human Terrain System at 
http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/default.htm and Kipp - Grau - Prinslow - Smith (2006) for practical 
examples. 
194 FM 3-24 (2006), Appendix B. 
195 The word “audience” is used instead of “actor” because the people who constitute the audience in the 
days of mass media do not count as actors, unless the level of interactivity of a medium is real-time. 
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blurred. Though the same information is available it may be interpreted differently by 
different audiences. From the standpoint of the stabilization force, this should raise a 
few questions. Information may be understood differently outside the perimeter fence. 
Key messages transmitted as a part of information or even psychological operations 
campaigns should be “validity checked” by a test audience before it is released to the 
target audience.  
 
The temporal dimension affects information availability, the (social) situation and regu-
lates the causal logic of the battlespace. It causes great friction between tactical level 
execution and strategic level planning. The longer the units operate in the theater, the 
more they develop practical cultural awareness. Over time, their social distance from the 
local society should be reduced unless major setbacks occur. On the other hand, long 
deployments are always difficult to sustain and units may become fatigued under the 
cumulating stress. Unit rotations also limit operational tempo and create possible win-
dows of opportunity for adversaries. The credibility of the force may be at stake as 
many other actors deploy for longer periods and therefore develop a different level of 
cultural awareness and lifeworld compatibility. The pace of life of the local society 
should also be taken into account. For example, harvesting and special feasts may have 
a significant impact on daily practical life. 
 
This concludes our modeling of the “social” battlespace, which is a preliminary result of 
this study. Different human structures and interactions within and between them seem to 
have a central role in tactical level land operations for forces engaged in stabilization 
efforts. The key elements can be divided into four categories: 
- the actors and their lifeworlds; 
- the social distance between the force and the other actors; 
- the availability of information and the visibility of battlespace;  
- situations, their contexts and the potential consequences of actions. 
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5 CASE STUDY INTRODUCTION: THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF 
BATTLESPACE IN AFGHANISTAN 
 
 
- LTC Stuart Tootal, CO 3 Para in Helmand Province, 2006.196 
 
5.1 Case study design and methods 
 
Afghanistan, once again drawn to international attention after 11 September 2001, is an 
extremely complex country. Decades of irregular warfare have made Afghanistan into a 
leading battle laboratory for guerilla/counter-guerilla warfare, for insur-
gency/counterinsurgency operations as well as for terrorist/counter-terrorist action. The 
country is also a prime example of a multi-ethnic state with disputed borderlines set by 
“The Great Game” of the colonial era.197 Therefore, the international actors that inter-
vene in the country do so with a multitude of agendas and for reasons that vary greatly. 
Some countries regard it as a forward line of defense against terrorism or as the front 
line in the war against narcotics. Others view it as yet another stabilization and recon-
struction mission. Regardless, the fact is that as of 23 July 2009, there were 42 troop-
contributing countries in ISAF with an approximate total strength of 64 500 troops.198  
 
According to the ISAF website, operations in Afghanistan are officially in the stabiliza-
tion phase as of the writing of this thesis. The initial intervention was not carried out by 
ISAF, but by a coalition led by the USA following the events of 9/11. ISAF operations 
were launched and initially worked in parallel with U.S.-led “Operation Enduring 
Freedom” (OEF). It was not until the end of 2006 that the area of operations of ISAF 
was extended to cover the whole country.199 Interestingly, the fact that the intervention 
force is still there alongside the stabilization force adds a special nuance to this study. 
Therefore, a case study of the ISAF cannot be totally separated from OEF, as the divi-
sion of these two is not clearly defined. Determining the boundaries of the case was a 
particular challenge because of the geographic and demographic diversity of the country 
in conjunction with the long duration of the international presence.  
 
The selected cases represent neither a particular phase of the campaign nor a certain 
area of operations of ISAF. Both approaches would demand strict temporal and geo-
graphical boundaries to frame the actual investigation. This would have been possible 
using ethnography or participant observation methods, which in turn would have re-
                                                 
196 Lamb (2006). 
197 Jones (2008) and Marston – Malkasian (ed.) (2008). 
198 ISAF website, http://www.nato.int/isaf/ Accessed 01 March 2009.  
199 Ibid. 
“It’s very complex, it’s tribal, it’s narco-related, it has religious sensitivities and Taliban all 
mixed in and there are no clear-cut divisions between who is enemy and who is not.” 
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quired in-country experience from the author.200 A holistic, countrywide single-case 
approach would have been relatively easy to accomplish with literature sources alone. 
However, the lack of precision of this option would have been a major issue when con-
sidering the tactical scope of this study. As some regions and operational areas have 
received more publicity than others, a balanced and detailed approach connecting them 
all seemed difficult to do. The soundest choice was to reach a compromise between a 
limited single study and a larger holistic approach. This resulted in a multiple case study 
involving three cases: the baseline case (the Finnish troops in North Afghanistan) and 
two rival cases (the French and the British contexts). It was expected that these three 
contexts would differ, as the amount of combat operations was significantly different in 
each context studied.201  
 
- “Afghanistan is a very multicultural country. There are really many tri-
bes, religions and ways of living. It’s not possible to handle Afganistan 
as one piece.” (A Finnish respondent)202 
 
Afghanistan itself can be seen as a critical case, as it has affected Western doctrine, 
manuals and training profoundly. Although labeled as a multiple-case approach, this 
thesis could arguably be considered a single-case investigation as well, as there is sup-
posedly a common operational environment. This argument is only partially correct, 
however, as the tactical realities within the three contexts differ significantly. This con-
tradiction between a common operational environment and the tactical “ground truth” 
actually establishes this thesis as a multiple-case study. Temporally, the research spans 
from 2002 to 2009 and geographically it focuses on three areas of operations.203 The 
chosen contexts range from the relatively calm North Afghanistan to the warzone-like 
southern and eastern parts of the country. The approach emphasizes the first context, as 
the tactical operating environment of Finnish troops is the main interest. Other Nordic 
sources were used to compare the Finnish findings in order to identify any national bi-
ases. The two other contexts are labeled as “rival contexts”, and their purpose is to pro-
vide insight into the differences and similarities of the Finnish approach.204 
 
                                                 
200 Yin (2003), pp. 85-97. Author’s comment: A good example of such a method is in David Kilcullen’s 
book, The Accidental Guerilla (2009), where one of the case studies is from Kunar Province, Eastern 
Afghanistan.  
201 Predicting contrasting results for predictable reasons fits with the logic of a multiple-case study. See 
Yin (2003), pp. 39-53.  
202 Author’s comment: These excerpts from the e-mail interviews are used to provide practical experi-
ences and insight. The selection of these comments is based on the analysis described in Annex 6, but 
each quotation naturally serves the purpose of underlining certain facts as well as inspiring the reader. 
203 Yin (2003), pp. 39-53, 143-151. The choice of three contexts was largely based on the availability of 
interviewees. A temporal limitation was not possible due to the dispersed service periods of the respon-
dents. Another limiting factor was that most of them could not speak freely or in detail of their activities 
in Afghanistan. Therefore, their anonymity has been respected to the extent possible in order to obtain 
more information. The author also had to consider that a detailed compilation of publically available 
information together with interview data might turn out to be classified information.  
204 Huttunen, Mika: Tapaustutkimus operaatiotaidossa ja taktiikassa, an article in Huttunen – Metteri 
(2008), p. 127.  
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The sources used include literature, armed forces websites, articles and most impor-
tantly, questionnaire forms filled out by the respondents.205 Official Finnish non-
restricted documents were also available to the author. These may be considered reli-
able, although it is likely that they do not include the whole truth about threat evalua-
tions or exact accounts of dangerous events. Concerning France, many articles and 
books have been inspired by the fatal ambush in Uzbeen Valley on 18 August 2008. 
The 8ème RPIMa Battlegroup has received most of the attention, mainly because it was 
the first French ISAF unit to engage in actual combat operations. Some of the French 
texts seem to be aimed directly at criticizing French policy in Afghanistan. British op-
erations in Helmand have received extensive public coverage in the form of numerous 
articles and books. In particular, the operations of the 3rd Battalion the Parachute Regi-
ment (3 Para) Battlegroup and the 42 Commando Group of the Royal Marines have 
been covered in detail. Some of the reporters and authors were embedded with the units. 
Their motivation must therefore be considered as partially commercial. Sources used to 
describe the Afghan provinces under study are listed in Annex 5. 
 
CONTEXT 1 CONTEXT 2 CONTEXT 3
FIN
(+ SWE, NOR)
FRA UK
Unit of analysis 1: The actors of human terrain
Unit of analysis 2: The interaction between the force and the other actors
6+3 3 3
 
Figure 5-1. The picture shows the multiple-case study design with two units of analysis. The 
numbers of interviewees per context can be seen below. 
 
The two embedded units of analysis, the human terrain and the interaction between the 
tactical unit and other actors, are used to facilitate the comparison. Cross-case analysis 
as a method generalizes information appropriately to avoid producing restricted infor-
mation, which was a major concern for this report. Its downside is the risk of argumen-
tative interpretation, as a quantitative comparison was not possible with the sources 
used and the resources available.206 Although the selected cases do not represent the 
whole ISAF area of operations, conclusions are possible as the units of analysis are not 
sensitive to time and place. The overall frame is thus in the ISAF “stabilization style” 
tactical action within the Afghan populations and spanning the Regional Command lev-
el and below.  
                                                 
205 Yin (2003), pp. 85-97 and Huttunen, Mika: Tapaustutkimus operaatiotaidossa ja taktiikassa, an article 
in Huttunen – Metteri (2008), pp. 128-131. 
206 Yin (2003), pp.133-137. 
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This chapter will provide an overview of Afghanistan as a land operating environment. 
The human dimension of this tactical battlespace will be examined in detail according to 
its three “layers”: the human terrain, the cultural domain and the social domain. This 
case study introduction will help the reader grasp the background before the analysis of 
the following chapter. It also develops large-scale conclusions on ISAF and operations 
in Afghanistan in general. The method used in this analysis was adapted from the 
French operational planning process (La Méthode de Planification Opérationnelle, 
MPO) which in turn was derived from the NATO planning guide.207   
 
5.2 The land operating environment of the ISAF 
 
Afghanistan is a landlocked country at the crossroads of Central, Western and Southern 
Asia surrounded by its neighbors Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Pakistan 
and China (See the maps of Annex 2). The surface totals 647 500 km2, or about twice 
the area of Finland. The landscape is mountainous and almost 50% of the country lies at 
an average altitude of at least 2000 meters above sea level. The central highland ranges 
are mostly difficult and rough terrain consisting of high mountains and deep, narrow 
valleys. The Hindu Kush (translates as Hindu Killer) Mountains separate the northern 
plains from the southern regions. The heavily populated northern region is more suitable 
for agriculture and has a tradition of commerce that dates back to the Silk Route. The 
southern region consists of sandy deserts and semi-desert plains. It is scarcely popu-
lated, especially in the Southwestern areas. Most of the settlements are concentrated 
around rivers and streams, although water levels vary considerably according to the 
season and region.208   
 
The climate varies drastically according to the geographic location. Summers are hot 
and winters are cold in Afghanistan while some high mountains have snow cover for 
most of the year. Summer temperatures often peak over +40oC and wintertime night 
temperatures may drop below -15oC. Drought is a current problem and the scarce rains 
are short but heavy. In winters, the weather in the northern region is dominated by cold 
air masses that generate rains as well as snowy and extremely cold conditions on the 
high ground. Mountain roads usually cannot be used during the winters. In contrast, the 
southern region is affected by tropical air masses created by the Indian monsoon, which 
brings humidity and rain between July and September. Wind, drought, dust and heat 
combined to create severe operating conditions in the central and southern regions.209  
 
ISAF is not exactly a UN force, but rather a coalition of willing nations acting under a 
Chapter VII mandate of the UNSC. Commanded by NATO and enlarged in four con-
                                                 
207 PIA-05.401 (2008), pp. 30-37. The author has been using both planning tools during his studies in 
France and in Finland. The NATO planning guide GOP (Guidelines for Operational Planning) is NATO 
restricted (releasable to EU and PfP countries), and therefore cannot be used as a source here. 
208 Information combined from the following sources: Emadi (2005), pp. 1-26, Finnish ISAF handbook 
2/2008, pp. 8-13 and CIA World Factbook, Afghanistan (accessed 01 Nov 2008). There are various other 
definitions and ways to divide Afghanistan into geographical regions and the one presented here is only 
an overview. 
209 Ibid. 
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secutive stages from the original and small Kabul-oriented force, ISAF is legitimated by 
nine UNSC resolutions and a Military Technical Agreement.210 The ISAF command 
structure differs from the NATO Combined Joint Task Force concept, where the theater 
headquarters usually represents the operational level and the component commands 
(land, air, maritime) are the tactical level. ISAF cannot be broken down into component 
commands, but rather includes five Regional Commands (RC) and an Air Task Force 
(ATF).211 The operational level headquarters is in Brunssum, Belgium (Allied Joint 
Force Command Brunssum). The ISAF HQ represents the highest tactical level.212 Fig-
ure 5-2 displays the challenges when seeking unity of command or unity of effort within 
the Afghanistan theatre of operations.  
 
Figure 5-2. Command relationships in Afghanistan in 2008 from the American point of view. 
(Source: Hope (2008), p. 11) 
 
The increase of troop strength for the stabilization force has been slow but remarkable 
after the initial 5000 soldiers sent in 2002. Without counting the troops participating 
separately in OEF, ISAF troop strength has grown 108% in two and a half years (see 
Table 5-3). OEF forces do not consist only of dedicated American troops, but also in-
clude British, Canadian and French units with a double mission. The main effort of OEF 
is in the south and in the east, where these nations have based their troops. Most of the 
units also belong to ISAF, but support the Americans in their fight against terrorism 
within the framework of OEF.213 When troops are in contact with enemy forces and in 
need of air support, the air assets vectored in often belong to OEF.214 The difference 
                                                 
210 ISAF website, http://www.nato.int/isaf/ Accessed 01 March 2009. 
211 ISAF website, http://www.nato.int/ISAF/. See also the NATO website for CJTF structure at 
http://www.nato.int/shape/issues/ncs/ncsindex.htm,  Accessed 31 December 2008. 
212 http://www.jfcbs.nato.int/. Accessed 01 March 2009 
213 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom_orbat-01.htm. Accessed 01 March 2009. 
214 Connaughton (2008), pp. 27-28 and 381-382. 
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between the five regional commands is related to the quantity of maneuver units. RC(E) 
and RC(S) are not only composed of PRTs, but also have major maneuver units to sup-
ply the necessary combat power. The other regional commands only have a limited ma-
neuver capability.  
 
 05 October 2006 01 September 
2008 
23 July 2009 Change  
2006 => 2009 
RC(C) 4500 troops 6300 troops 6200 troops + 37,7 % 
RC(N) 2700 troops 4200 troops 5600 troops + 107,4 % 
RC(E) 10000 troops 15500 troops 19900 troops + 99,0 % 
RC(S) 9800 troops 19100 troops 29400 troops + 200,0 % 
RC(W) 1800 troops 2500 troops 3400 troops + 88,8 % 
ISAF 
total 
31 000 troops 
37 countries 
47 600 troops 
40 countries 
64 500 troops 
42 countries 
+ 108,1 % 
+ 5 countries 
Table 5-3. The increase in troop strengths and troop contributing nations between 05 October 
2006 and 23 July 2009 according to ISAF official figures. (Source: ISAF website, 
http://www.nato.int/.)  
 
PRTs are the heart of ISAF in terms of stabilization. They consist of both military and 
civilian personnel and their tasks revolve almost entirely around civil-military co-
operation (see Annex 3). On 05 October 2006, there were 24 PRTs, and 2 more were 
added later under RC(E).215 There are as many approaches and structures amongst PRTs 
as there are their lead nations. A common factor is the effort to achieve a comprehensive 
approach with the NGOs and different national agencies. The American PRT model 
traces back to 2002, when PRTs supported the counterinsurgency campaign of OEF. 
ISAF set up its first PRTs only in the more pacific areas. The main idea was to make a 
big impact while making only a minimal military footprint.216 This concept has been 
working relatively well except in the south and in the east, where PRTs and other actors 
need maneuver units to provide additional security. Curiously, the security problem 
corresponds geographically with dominantly Pashtun areas, the areas of influence of the 
Taliban and the opium poppy cultivation (see maps 4, 6 and 9 of Annex 2).  
 
A particular difficulty for ISAF is border control. In this arena, the Pakistani border 
poses a particular problem. The so-called Durand Line separates Afghanistan from Pa-
kistani areas of Balochistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the 
North-West Frontier Province. It also separates the Afghan Pashtuns from the Pashtuns 
living in Pakistan. The Pakistani Pashtuns reside primarily in the FATA, which is ad-
ministered de facto by the Pashtun tribal system and the Pashtunwali code. The Paki-
stani government has had severe difficulties in integrating the FATA with the rest of the 
country. The Durand Line zone has recently become a new trouble spot as a result of the 
                                                 
215 http://www.nato.int/. Run in practice by the lead nations, the PRTs come under OPCON of ISAF and 
TACON of their parent RCs. The only regional command not split into PRTs is the RC(C) around Kabul. 
Accessed 31 December 2008. 
216 Sellers (2007), pp. 8-15. 
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Taliban/al-Qaeda cross-border movement as well as the related military operations on 
both sides of the border. Earlier, the Mujahideen and the Western intelligence agencies 
exploited this area in their operations against the Soviet invasion in the 1980s.217 The 
issue of Pashtunistan, an autonomous or even independent area unifying all the Pasthun 
people, has raised hopes and debates on several occasions during the 20th century.218  
 
5.3 The human terrain 
 
The multi-ethnic population of Afghanistan is comprised of 32.7 million people (esti-
mation in 2008) and is growing slowly. Life expectancy at birth is only 44 years and the 
rate of infant mortality is very high. The majority of people are Muslims with some 
80% Sunnis and 19% Shias. The biggest ethnic groups include Pashtuns (42%), Tajiks 
(27%), Hazaras (9%) and Uzbeks (9%). There are two official languages, Afghan Per-
sian or Dari (50%) and Pashtu (35%), amongst more than 30 different spoken languages 
(the amount varies according to different sources). Tajiks and Hazaras are the primary 
Dari-speakers. Many Afghans speak two languages, but only 28% of people over 15 
years can read and write. Each ethnic community has its own history, culture and lan-
guage, although precise descriptions and data of these communities are difficult to es-
tablish.219  
 
- “Dari and Pashtu language structure is so different comparing e.g. Eng-
lish that it’s impossible to translate a sentence in very accurate way. 
There are not even some words what we are using. No wonder why we 
sometimes had hard moments in this beautiful country.” (A Finnish re-
spondent)  
 
The Pashtuns (also called Pushtuns, Pakhtuns or Pathans) are the largest ethnic group. 
They reside mainly in the southern and southeastern parts of the country with close 
links to Pakistan.220 The Pashtuns are split into several tribal groups, who speak differ-
ent dialects of the Pashtu language. They are mainly Sunni Muslims and follow a tribal 
                                                 
217 Mahmood (2005), pp. 2-5, 13-31 and 64-71. The Durand Line is the term for the border between Af-
ghanistan and Pakistan. It was originally drawn by the British Empire to separate Afghanistan from the 
British India. After the independence of Pakistan in 1947, the Afghan government rejected this border as 
it divided the Pashtun tribes on both sides. Pakistani government has refused to cede any territory and the 
line has remained as the international boundary between the two countries. It is also recognized as such 
by the international community. However, the border has not existed in practice because it is hardly con-
trollable due to the difficult terrain, and because the Pashtuns have traditionally exercised a freedom of 
cross-border movement and trade.    
218 Mahmood (2005), pp. 33-59. Pashtunistan is also an Afghan national argument to counter Pakistani’s 
influence in the area. The Afghans claim that the Durand Line expired at the end of its 100-year agree-
ment in 1993. Pakistan denies that this agreement ever had a timeline. However, the Pashtunistan issue 
should also be seen as an instrument of internal politics in Afghanistan. See also Connaughton (2008), pp. 
343-347. 
219 Emadi (2005), pp. 1-26 and Blood (2001), Part 2. 
220 Connaughton (2008), pp. 343-347. According to Connaughton, ”the heart of Taliban territory is 
around Quetta, while al-Qaeda is based in the far north of Pakistan’s North West Frontier” and ”many of 
the AFghans, who joined the Taliban are former students of Pakistani’s madrassas [religious schools]”.  
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code called Pashtunwali.221 This “way of the Pashtuns” is integral to their identity and 
forms the foundation of an honor-based society. A majority of Pashtuns consider that 
Pashtunwali and the Islamic law of Shari’a overlap but exist for different purposes. 
Shari’a is a moral code representing God’s will on earth, whereas Pashtunwali is a code 
of honor.222 The Pashtuns have always provided the hard-core resistance to invasions. 
The original Taliban of 1994 consisted mostly of Pashtuns and their areas have since 
2004 been the most violent areas. Their will to resist derives from commitment to Jihad 
and from the strong martial tradition of bitter rivalry, feuding and blood revenge.223 
These factors should not be taken lightly when facing an insurgency or when otherwise 
operating amongst the people.   
 
The Tajiks (the term Tajik means “non-Turk”) are the second largest ethnic group and 
have an Iranian and Mediterranean background. Besides Afghanistan, Tajiks reside in 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Russia and China. They live primarily in the north-
eastern and western parts of the country and extend into the central highlands. They are 
mostly Sunni Muslims and speak various Tajiki dialects of Dari. The Tajiks have little 
tribal affiliation and they instead identify themselves regionally, such as by the name of 
the valley they live in.  Many of them have been urbanized and Tajik populations domi-
nate the three major cities of Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif and Ghazni. Rural Tajiks tend to 
mountain farming and herding, but may join the industrial workforce outside the agri-
cultural season.224  
 
The Uzbeks inhabit the northern region and speak a Turkic dialect, Uzbeki. They are 
Sunni Muslims of Mongol and Turkic origins. They have a strict patriarchal social 
structure with a strong heritage of marital endogamy. Some Uzbeks refer to themselves 
by tribal affiliation, but some identify with their towns of origin. Uzbeks also live in 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Cohabitation with Tajiks and Turkmen exists, 
but antipathy to Pasthun is widespread. Uzbeks have been able to establish strong com-
munities in the northern region from the 16th century until recent events.225 
 
The Hazaras live in the central mountainous region known as Hazarajat. They are pre-
dominantly Shia Muslims and speak Persian dialects of Hazaragi. Hazaras are possibly 
a mixture of Eastern Turkic and Mongol origin and they have Mongolian-like features. 
Some Hazaras live in Iran and Pakistan as refugees or in the diaspora around the world. 
The Hazaras have been suppressed by ruling authorities throughout the history. They 
are predominantly mountain farmers although many have migrated to cities since the 
1960s. Tribal affiliations have been disappearing among the Hazaras since the develop-
ment of state structures in Hazarajat.226 
 
                                                 
221 Emadi (2005), pp. 1-26 and Blood (2001), Part 2.  
222 Kakar (2004), pp. 1-5. Confirmed in the interview with LTC Babagul, 15 June 2009. Key related con-
cepts of the Pashtun society are chivalry (Ghayrat and Nang), hospitality (Melmastia), gender boundaries 
(Purdah and Namus) and council (Jirga). 
223 Connaughton (2008), pp. 343-347 and the interview with LTC Babagul, 15 June 2009. 
224 Emadi (2005), pp. 1-26 and Blood (2001), Part 2.  
225 Ibid.  
226 Ibid.  
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Other ethnic groups include several tribal groups of Turkmens and Tatars in the north, 
the Aimaq in the west and the nomadic Kirghiz people in the south. Indo-Iranian Sunnis 
such as Nuristanis, Brahuis and Balochis live in the south near the Pakistan border. 
Scattered but professionally well-positioned Qizilbash people can be found in major 
cities such as Kabul, Herat or Kandahar. Other groups include Tajiki-speaking Sunni 
Arabs in the north and dominantly Shia Muslim Wakhis in the northeast and Farsiwans 
in the south. Some non-Muslim minorities also exist; the most important are the Hindus 
and the Sikhs. Peter R. Blood also names a group called the Kabulis, which provides 
reference to the urban and heterogeneous population of the capital. These Dari-
speaking, secularly educated and Western-oriented people were forced to move abroad 
or change their lifestyle during the Soviet-Afghan war and under the Taliban regime. 
The lack of their intellectual and professional capabilities is a severe blow to the recon-
struction and development of modern Afghanistan.227  
 
Amongst the populations, we may find several armed factions – legitimate and non-
legitimate. The military vacuum after the fall of Taliban at the end of 2001 has again 
given room for the maneuvering of the local warlords. Map 7 of Annex 2 presents the 
regional situation of 2004 with only a marginal presence of the Taliban. Maps 8 and 9 
show estimates of the Taliban influence in 2006 and 2007, respectively, and they tell a 
very different story. The return of the Taliban is a reality not just in Afghanistan, but 
also in Pakistan. There are also signs of increased al Qaeda and foreign fighter presence 
amongst the insurgents. According to a SENLIS report, South Afghanistan was out of 
the control of ISAF and the Afghan government in 2007. At the same time, the insur-
gents have started to use new tactics, with increasing amounts of IEDs and suicide at-
tacks. Defeats in the security sector, counter-narcotic programs and the increasingly 
alarming force ratio between ISAF and the insurgents have led offensive and defensive 
action to replace stability operations.228 
 
According to a RAND study, the six leading insurgent groups include Taliban and neo-
Taliban, Hezb-i-Islami, the Haqqani network, foreign fighters, tribes based in Pakistan 
and Afghanistan and criminal networks.229 A SENLIS study sums up the present day 
anti-government movements as a loose collection of neo-Taliban militias, operating 
somewhat independently from each other. These include: 
- local commanders or warlords 
- nationalist-Islamist Pashtuns 
- opium smugglers and traffickers 
- people who resent occupation forces or central government 
- religious conservatives 
- people forced or threatened to fight 
- poor people and those affected by opium poppy eradication 
- al Qaeda and affiliated Jihadists 
- fundraisers and military trainers from Pakistan and Arab countries 
- other autonomous groups.230 
 
                                                 
227 Emadi (2005), pp. 1-26 and Blood (2001), Part 2. 
228 See SENLIS (2006), SENLIS (2007A) and SENLIS (2007C). 
229 Jones (2008), pp. 37-48. 
230 SENLIS (2006), pp. 53-58.  
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On the Afghan government side, the principal actors are the Afghan National Army 
(ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). The ANA was created in 2002 with an 
objective of 70 000 troops – a figure that had not been reached by 2007. Only two army 
corps out of the five are close to targeted strength. The American and British forces 
have been the main trainers, but many other ISAF countries have also participated in the 
so-called OMLT (Operational Mentor and Liaison Team) activity. Desertion is a major 
problem and the reasons are many: low salary and morale, lack of equipment and weap-
ons, unwillingness to serve far from home and refusal to fight against fellow Af-
ghans.231 The ANP is organized in five regions with a desired end strength of 62 000 
police. It is composed of uniformed police and specialized divisions. They share the 
same problems as the ANA, and corruption and criminal activity are common amongst 
the police. ANP’s casualty rate was higher than that of the ANA (in 2007).232 The police 
are easier targets, because they lack weapons and protection.233 Concerning both or-
ganizations, tribal and ethnic affiliations seem to be stronger than the sense of duty or 
the official organization. Today, ANA and ANP remain as auxiliary forces for the ISAF 
and the OEF and alone they can be considered ineffective, ill-equipped and ill-trained. 
 
 
Figure 5-4. Examples of armed actors in Afghanistan. (Source: SENLIS (2007B, p. 31) 
 
The international actors add to the complexity of the human terrain. Firstly, ISAF and 
OEF troops come from several different countries with considerably different national 
                                                 
231 NPS Summary of Afghan National Army (2007). The foreign advisors of 26 OMLTs operate with 
ANA battlions (kandak), brigades, garrisons and army corps. When necessary, they engage in combat 
with their parent units and provide all kinds of logistics and fire support form the ISAF or the OEF. Au-
thor’s comment: Similar OEF mentor teams are called Embedded Training Teams (ETT).    
232 NPS Summary of Afghan National Police (2007). 
233 Interview with LTC Babagul, 15 June 2009. 
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caveats (limitations) and operational posture. Additionally, private security companies 
(PSC), other private contractors and certain intelligence services add to the complexity 
of the situation. According to a Swiss report, PSCs act in almost all fields of work but 
do not engage actively in combat operations. The identification of units, vehicles and 
individuals is often impossible, which further complicates the identification of friendly, 
neutral and hostile forces (see Figure 5-4).234 
 
- “Before deployment, it was acknowledged that possession of a firearm 
was not an indication of an insurgent.  Farmers would frequently own an 
assault rifle.  The ANA and ANAP were more difficult as both possessed 
medium machine guns and RPGs.  Whilst some of the ANP wore uniform, 
many of them, and all of the ANAP did not.  Beyond established front 
lines (such as in Garmsir), carriage of a weapon did attract attention.  
However, there was the understanding that at the lower levels, many of 
these individuals were hired by the day rather than committed insur-
gents.  Engagements were conducted on the balance of risk (i.e. an ob-
servation patrol or sentry was deemed a risk as opposed to the recovery 
of the dead or injured which was a task more associated with hired lo-
cals).” (A British respondent)   
 
Finally, there are the civil actors of the UN, governmental and non-governmental or-
ganizations – both international and Afghan. All these organizations recruit local peo-
ple. The Afghan and the international media act throughout the country and enlarge the 
human terrain, adding regional and even global audiences. When speaking of the local 
populations, one always has to bear in mind the transnational links involved. Family, 
tribal, ethnic and religious networks are much larger platforms of interaction than may 
be initially assumed within a subunit’s AO or within the artificial boundaries of a dis-
trict or a province.235    
 
5.4 The cultural domain 
 
Besides being a geographical and ethnical intersection, Afghanistan has also always 
been a crossroads for invading armies. In the face of foreign invasion or occupation, 
Afghan people – despite their diversity - have united to fight against the common en-
emy. This has, without exception, eventually ended in the invaders’ defeat. Instead of 
taking time to celebrate their victory, the different ethnicities and factions have returned 
to their normal business – fighting one other.236 It seems that despite its diverse popula-
tions, artificial borders and the lack of central governmental control, the “Accidental 
                                                 
234 SwissPeace (2007), pp. 14-22 and 71-73. In 2007, there were 20 local, 57 international and 13 un-
known PSCs operating in Afghanistan. They worked in consulting, training,, logistic, maintenance, intel-
ligence, demining, poppy eradication, prisoner interrogation, static security, VIP and mobile security, 
surveillance and election support sectors. 
235 Interview with LTC Babagul, 15 June 2009. 
236 Jokinen – Kullberg (2006), pp. 228-240; Emadi (2005), pp. 26–31 and Blood (2001), Part 1. The use 
of the word Afghans was introduced in the 14th century originally meaning only Pashtun tribes, but by the 
19th Century, it extended to include all ethnic communities in the country. As Stan means land, the word 
Afghanistan has a meaning of “land of the Afghans”. 
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Guerilla Syndrome” has always been easily triggered throughout Afghanistan’s history. 
After the events of 11 September 2001, history seems to be repeating itself. After al-
most eight years of conflict, the Afghan population is uniting against the Western 
forces, which are generally seen as an occupation presence.237  
 
In Afghanistan, ethnicity, tribalism and regionalism are dominant features and sources 
of tensions and conflicts. The society is multi-tiered and it is ruled by the rural elite of 
landowners, the urban elite of high-ranking officials and executives, and the religious 
elite. The continuous armed conflict since the 1980s has devastated the country’s econ-
omy and infrastructure, prevented modernization and development and thus severely 
affected the people’s lives. There are huge issues of unemployment, poverty and fam-
ine. It is estimated that about 80% of Afghans live in rural communities, where agricul-
ture and animal husbandry are the main sources of people’s income. People tend to have 
a deep attachment to their land and land ownership is an important issue.238 Land own-
ership is closely related to power especially in rural areas. Local elders, maleks, may 
rule a single village or several small villages, and they usually come from large and re-
spected families. Maleks also provide for their people by giving pieces of farmland and 
accommodation expecting loyalty and services in return.239  
 
An Afghan identifies himself by qawm instead of nationality or purely ethnic affilia-
tion.240 In rural areas, there is no real government control, as disputes and problems are 
dealt with according to traditional ways. Province and district governors are chosen by 
the central government, but their only tools for control are the police and the army.241 
Local control mechanisms are organized in a pyramidal pattern of informal power and 
they are comprised of several key institutions. Koranay stands for an extended group of 
families, which guarantees the economic and social welfare of their members and repre-
sents the most fundamental structure of authority. At the level of Kalay (a self-sufficient 
small or medium-sized village), jirga is a local dispute-settlement and decision-making 
tool that follows traditional laws and rituals and is executed by the elders and landown-
ers. Normally operating at the large village (Qaria) level; shura is a council used in 
semi-formal negotiation and decision-making. Wolaswali (district government) is the 
only formal link with the central government as it connects the local communities to 
provinces.242 These social mechanics apply particularly to Pashtuns, but similar tradi-
tional ways are adapted by all Afghans. There may be, however, variations between 
ethnicities, regions and even between neighboring villages of same ethnicity.243    
 
- “I was tasked with conducting “shures” (meetings) with local elders.  
This was at Coy level and occurred on a weekly basis or more often if the 
                                                 
237 Interview with LTC Babagul, 15 June 2009. 
238 Blood (2001), part 2 and Emadi (2005), pp. 1-26.  
239 Interview with LTC Babagul, 15 June 2009. 
240 Blood (2001), part 2 and Emadi (2005), pp. 1-26. The term qawm defines one’s individual identity in 
his social world expressing any form of solidarity. It usually refers to a family or a clan, but it may also 
refer to geographical residence or occupation. A village frequently corresponds to a qawm, but the term 
can also be used in a wider sense to explain affiliations, networks, kinship and professional life. 
241 Interview with LTC Babagul, 15 June 2009. 
242 SENLIS (2006), Chapter 4, pp. 19-21. Efforts to form a central government for Afghanistan should 
take into account the traditional and decentralized structures of governance.  
243 Interview with LTC Babagul, 15 June 2009.  
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situation required (for example several days prior to the end of a pre-
arranged ceasefire).” (A British respondent). 
 
ISAF and OEF troops, as well as all the other international actors, also come from sev-
eral different societies and cultures. In February 2009, there were 41 troop-contributing 
nations in ISAF – each with its own identity, beliefs, values, attitudes, perceptions, lan-
guage, religion and other cultural manifestations.244  
 
- “Practical details of actions on needed to be clarified to all on every pa-
trol. What to do and who is responsible of different actions during possi-
ble incidents. How is command and control organized? Language issues 
of not been able to command in native language. Level of language skills 
(Latvia) and the understanding of military English (what exactly does 
different abbreviations mean in practice).” (A Finnish respondent) 
 
In the eyes of the Afghan people, it is difficult to distinguish different nationalities 
amongst the foreign troops. The Afghans tend to generalize and speak only of “foreign-
ers”, or they may simply label everybody as “Americans”. The comprehensive approach 
is incomprehensible for them, as what goes on in Kabul or with the central government 
does not have a concrete meaning for their lives. The only visible reference of the gov-
ernment comes in the form of ANA and ANP. Many Afghans see the neighboring coun-
tries as a part of the current insecurity and poverty problem. In the south and in the east, 
people know the Taliban well. In the north, people form their opinions on insurgents 
based on rumors and news, as they have less direct personal contact with them. Poverty 
and unemployment increase insurgent support, as the Taliban have real means to pro-
vide for the basic needs of families. For many people, opium poppy cultivation is the 
only way to make a living and eradication programs conducted by foreign troops create 
more trouble locally than they solve.245  
 
- “Interpreters (IPs) softened the cultural and language barrier. Biggest 
challenge in cultural awareness is for palefaces to understand that in Af-
ghanistan there is no lie or truth. One has the face or he has lost the 
face. It’s always interesting to cooperate in this kind of environment.” (A 
Finnish respondent) 
 
5.5 The social domain 
 
The missions and tasks of the ISAF and its PRTs (see Annex 3) correspond well with 
the stability tasks of the American FM 3-07.246 This fact reinforces the idea that ISAF is 
in fact conducting stabilization operations. Working amongst the people and undertak-
ing CIMIC, liaison, presence patrolling and ISR tasks, the PRTs act at all the levels of 
the Afghan society. They participate in shuras and patrol villages and rural areas, where 
the public and private spheres of urban dwellers, rural farmers and nomads are remarka-
                                                 
244 See FM 3-24 (2006), pp. 3-6…3-9, for more detailed information on cultural manifestations.  
245 SENLIS (2007B), pp. 35-50 and the Interview with LTC Babagul 15 June 2009. 
246 FM 3-07 (2008), Chapter 3. 
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bly different from Western society. Media does not reach the whole population and as a 
result, the religious centres double as information centres. With an illiteracy level of 
70%, the people depend on oral information. Radio has traditionally been the most im-
portant source of information, but the local people consider that its reliability has been 
compromised, as it is now serving the Western countries. Lack of electricity also pre-
vents people from watching television or listening to radio. Internet is generally not 
available.247 ISAF has to compete with the local narratives and win the battle of “story-
telling” in order to win human terrain from the adversaries.248 
 
- “People met at marketplaces, mosques and shuras. They started also to 
meet at provincial councils, but it was only starting in 2005. They got 
their daily info from mullahs, village elders and other important locals. 
Most of the people are still illiterate. They used radios and mobile 
phones. It is difficult to fight against rumors and give information in this 
kind of environment. Some people came to PRT house and asked for info. 
It was not very often... We noticed rumors every time we spoke with lo-
cals. Rumors caused several riots even against ISAF. You can win the 
storytelling contest only with the people you meet and work. It takes a 
long time to create the confidence…Afghan people like stories and mul-
lahs and village elders are the most important people.” (A Finnish re-
spondent) 
 
- “In some areas the people would not directly hear what we are saying. 
The main problem as I see it is the information passed threw religious 
networks. We don’t directly hear what the message of mullahs is. And if 
we do hear, it’s difficult to confront it due to the afghans trust in reli-
gious thruth.” (A Finnish respondent) 
 
Peaceful interaction between different actors does not always occur in Afghanistan. De-
spite the increased troop strength, the security situation rapidly deteriorated between 
2006 and 2008. Since their summer offensive of 2006, the “Neo-Taliban” have gained 
ground as NATO, OEF and local security forces have been unable to respond.249 Ac-
cording to a RAND study, the targets attacked include primarily Afghans: government 
officials, ANA soldiers, ANP police officers, normal citizens, NGO workers, teachers 
and religious figures. Between 2002 and 2006, the attacks have been multiplied by four 
and the lethality of these attacks by eight. Between 2006 and 2007, violence rates grew 
another 27% except in Helmand Province, where they skyrocketed by 60%. Insurgent 
tactics have also developed accordingly. In Helmand in 2008, for example, the Taliban 
occasionally maneuvered in company-battalion size formations instead of their former 
squad-platoon sized efforts.250 Iraq-type tactics have been introduced including an in-
creasing number of suicide attacks and IEDs.251 Fatalities for the international forces 
                                                 
247 Interview with LTC Babagul 15 June 2009. According to Babagul, he had a better situational aware-
ness of things happening in Afghanistan while staying in Paris than what he would have had in Kabul.  
248 See Casebeer (2006), pp. 29-38 for details on the concept of “storytelling”. 
249 SENLIS (2007C), pp. 29-62.  
250 Jones (2008), pp. 48-53.  
251 SENLIS (2007C), p. 30. Between 2001 and 2004, five suicide attacks were reported in Afghanistan. 
The numbers in 2005, 2006 and 2007 were 17, 123 and 131, respectively. 
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have been mounting steadily (see Table 5-3). This has caused debates and reluctance in 
many troop-contributing countries to continue their efforts. 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
(31 
July) 
NATO-
ISAF  
& OEF 
12 69 57 59 131 191 232 294 232 
Table 5-5. Yearly military fatalities of both ISAF and OEF between 2001 and 2008. The 2009 
figure includes the reported casualties by 31 July 2009. 
(Source : http://www.icasualties.org/OEF/. Accessed 13 August 2009). 
 
To improve their security, the international forces conduct kinetic operations, both de-
fensive and offensive. These operations take place mostly in South and East Afghani-
stan, the areas of major troop concentrations of the ISAF and OEF forces. As the num-
bers of combined security forces are insufficient, the forces rely on the use of heavy fire 
support from the air, artillery and mortars.252 Collateral damage has become a major 
issue, as it is very difficult to distinguish combatants from non-combatants. This fact 
combined with the destruction of sources of income for the locals - such as the opium 
poppy cultivations - gives the insurgents the tools they need to win the battle of percep-
tions. In the north, with less drug production and less insurgent activity, the situation is 
much more under control. Nevertheless, the challenges are still the same in all corners 
of the country, as external support is centered in Kabul instead of the provinces and dis-
tricts. The NGOs and UN activities also concentrate on Kabul, partly because of the 
overall approach to support Karzai’s central government and partly because of the diffi-
cult security situation in the provinces. 
 
- “Foreign Resourses: Now > 80% of development money goes to Kabul. 
Now > 80% of foreign actor’s representatives; UNAMA and other UN 
agencies are working in Kabul.” (A Finnish respondent)   
 
The locals have a very different opinion on the tactics used by the Western forces. As 
protecting the populations is now a trend, troops try to surge into towns and villages and 
patrol dismounted amongst the people. The locals see this as “hiding amongst the popu-
lations”; in their opinion, the insurgents should be engaged in the mountains and bad-
lands where they are based. The presence of Western troops on the streets is seen as an 
occupation-type provocation. It is also a direct threat as the insurgents and criminals 
engage the troops in population centers thereby increasing the likelihood of civilian ca-
sualties. The results after almost eight years of occupation are disappointing for Af-
ghans – little has been reconstructed, there has been a lot of fighting and collateral dam-
age and people are still very poor. In their logic, the West has not fulfilled its promises 
and conditions are now worse than during the Taliban regime. As the Taliban are seen 
as fellow Afghans, the people with a background of personal losses find it easy to join 
their ranks. Resistance has naturally been heavier in the south and in the east, as Pash-
                                                 
252 Connaughton (2008), pp. 27-28 and 381-382.  
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tuns have always been the toughest resistance fighters as well as providing the bulk of 
Taliban forces.253 
 
- Interaction with local population in Ghereshk was generally good apart 
from in the Taliban rich areas. In the other district centres it degraded 
the longer time we spent there, due to the increase in attacks we at-
tracted from insurgents which forced many locals to leave the area. ” (A 
British respondent) 
 
- “They wanted us to leave. Farmers fields of poppy were avoided so as to 
reduce further antagonism of the locals. Even in our area of operations 
around the FOBs the Afghans wanted the quiet life, preferably under Ta-
liban rule as they knew that system and felt it was a necessary evil such 
as death and taxes.  For them the effect of conflict near them meant that 
they too were involved in terms of the interruption to their farming, 
threat to their children and the press-ganging of their children to fight 
against ISAF.” (A British respondent)     
 
5.6 Conclusions 
 
We may conclude that ISAF is officially in the stabilization phase and that the troops 
are conducting stability tasks where possible. According to the auxiliary research ques-
tions posed, we have identified key actors within the human terrain and different ways 
and means of interaction between ISAF and the other actors. The tactical battlespace of 
the land operating environment seems to correspond to the seven propositions stated in 
Chapter 2. Stabilization operations in Afghanistan do take place amongst the people and 
in the difficult conditions of ongoing irregular warfare. The relationship between war-
lordism and a failed state seems evident. Several indicators also support David Kilcul-
len’s concept of “Accidental Guerilla Syndrome”. In this sense, the selection of ISAF as 
the case-study platform is well justified. 
 
We have noted that since the beginning of Stage 5 expansion on 05 October 2006, the 
problems have severely increased. There is more violence, the Taliban control more 
areas and there are an ever-increasing number of ISAF troops and ISAF casualties. Of-
ficial and political talk is of stabilization, but in fact, ISAF has been shifting towards 
warfighting operations. This is especially true in East and South Afghanistan where 
ISAF forces have assumed responsibilities in place of OEF forces. Is this just a tempo-
rary increase in intensity? This is to be expected in the stabilization phase (see Figure 3-
1). Or is it a sign of lost control? The work towards normality continues, but we may 
wonder whether Afghanistan is about to return to its own normality (war) instead of 
ours. In any case, the troop contributing countries remain essentially the same as before, 
and OEF missions continue side by side with those of the ISAF. Some countries, such 
as France and the UK, participate in both operations with the same forces. Other coun-
                                                 
253 Interview with LTC Babagul 15 June 2009. Author’s comment: Throughout the academic year of 
2008-2009 at the CID, LTC Babagul highlighted the difference of opinions between the people and the 
Western forces concerning the tactics used in Afghanistan.  
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tries seem to have missed the ongoing “mission creep” of ISAF. The ISAF/OEF mission 
today is not the same that it was in 2002. 
 
- “…But Afghanistan is different, one has to taste, feel, see hear and live 
there and even then we palefaces can not understand these people who 
we call Afghan. They are coming from different tribes and clans, they 
speak lot of different languages (main languages are Dari and Pashtu) 
Their Islam is different than we are used to in other missions. They are 
wahhabites, but not the same than Saudis and so… this is never ending 
story. My opinion is that we Finns we can not ever know this stone-aged 
culture.” (A Finnish respondent) 
 
It seems that the comprehensive approach has failed in Afghanistan so far. The main 
effort has been aimed at supporting Hamid Karzai’s central government so most of the 
effects have tended to stay in Kabul. Somehow, the Western actors have failed to grasp 
that Afghan society is based on local and tribal factors. Every province is a different 
environment, and the social networks do not correspond to the administrative frontiers. 
The resources and means available for the 26 PRTs are too limited and their operating 
methods are too dependent on the lead nation. There is no true unity of effort in ISAF, 
particularly when looking at the tactical level. The other actors on the ground (OEF, 
intelligence services and private contractors) just add to the overall confusion. 
 
- “Some locals (insurgents, clergy, warlords..) will never fully appreciate 
our efforts and western lifestyle, development, democracy etc. They have 
their power and support through the religious, cultural and criminal her-
itage and our presents are slowly changing that.” (A Norwegian respon-
dent) 
 
When studying relevant facts and their logical conclusions, we find some major chal-
lenges for the ISAF particularly at the tactical level. This analysis has been presented in 
detail in Annex 4.254 Based on this study, we may state that the tactical center of gravity 
(CoG) in Afghanistan is the Afghan populations. If so, we return to the classic princi-
ples of COIN and irregular warfare. When reading the different doctrines and manuals, 
we see that they are largely based on lessons learned from recent operations in Afghani-
stan. Applying these new methods again in the same theatre of operations, we see that 
the forces operate with a circular logic. Despite a relatively quick learning curve con-
cerning manual publication and creating new approaches, the problems on the ground 
have not really been solved.  
 
Perhaps the international community has tried to do too much too fast. According to 
certain studies, successful COIN campaigns take approximately 14 years while unsuc-
cessful campaigns take 11. Many campaigns of the past have ended as draws. The inter-
vening powers have thought that external forces adapted to the situation would offer a 
solution. According to statistics, however, the best formula for success has had three 
                                                 
254 The method used in the analysis accords with the French “Méthode de Planification Opérationnelle” 
(MPO), which follows NATO’s operational planning process principles. See PIA-05.401 (2008), pp. 30-
37 
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determining factors: 1) a high level of competence of the local security forces, 2) a pop-
ular government and 3) the fact that external support has been denied to the insur-
gents.255 The Center of Gravity analysis presented in Annex 4 leads to similar conclu-
sions with regard to the tactical effects necessary to achieve or regain positive develop-
ments in stabilization operations.  
 
- “How has the theatre changed since your visit? Yes markedly much more 
reliance on IED and suicide bombers. Has your information been useful 
to successive units? I hope so but Taliban are a changeable enemy and 
quick to learn from their mistakes.  Did your attitudes to the locals 
change the way in which they behaved towards you?  Not at all – the 
positive things that we did could never outweigh the fear that the Taliban 
can exert by killing: terrorising the locals once we left them.” (A British 
respondent) 
 
                                                 
255 Jones (2008), pp. 7-24. 
  
101
 
6 THE SOCIAL BATTLESPACE OF ISAF 
 
 
- COL Nicolas Le Nen, CO GTIA Kapisa, 2009.256 
 
Three tactical contexts of the case study – the Finnish, the French and the British - are 
presented in this chapter. The cross-case comparison is built on two units of analysis, 
the human terrain and the interaction between the force and the other actors. This chap-
ter ends with a crosscheck of the results in relation with the research questions and the 
propositions stated in Chapter 2. Annex 5 gives more detail on the Afghan provinces 
concerned and lists the primary sources used. The execution of the e-mail interviews 
and the principal findings are summarized in Annexes 6 and 7. Special attention should 
be given to the fact that data collection ended in July 2009 and that this thesis was final-
ized in August 2009. Any references to “present situation” refer to this final stage of the 
research process. 
 
6.1 Context 1 – The Finnish forces (with Swedish and Norwegian troops) 
 
Finland began its participation in ISAF in February 2002 with a CIMIC detachment 
working in Kabul AO. Since 2004, the Finnish troops expanded their activities in the 
North contributing to both PRT Meymaneh (Norwegian-led) and PRT Mazar-e-Sharif 
(Swedish-led). In 2007, the Finns focused their operations to Mazar-e-Sharif and 
brought their activities in Meymaneh to a close. Finally, the remaining Finnish troops 
were moved from Kabul to Mazar-e-Sharif in 2009.257 Besides Kabul, Finnish forces 
have so far operated in five provinces of the Northern Afghanistan – Balkh, Faryab, 
Jowzjan, Sar-e-Pol and Samangan.258 This region has been relatively calm when com-
pared with the rest of the country. The biggest incidents concerning the Finnish forces 
have been the attack against Meymaneh base in February 2006 and the death of a Fin-
nish peacekeeper in an IED attack in Meymaneh in May 2007.259 By 31 July 2009, 
Swedish troops had suffered two fatalities in a single IED incident and Norwegians had 
lost four soldiers in four separate hostile fire incidents.260  
 
Between 2002 and 2009, the Finnish forces have consisted of small detachments instead 
of major formations with a total permanent strength peaking at 110.261 In the RC(N), the 
                                                 
256 Warden (2009). 
257 FDF website news archives, http://www.mil.fi/rauhanturvaaja/uutiset/.  
258 Finnish ISAF Handbooks 2/06, 2/07, 2/08 and 1/09. See ANNEX 5 for provincial details.  
259 FDF website news archives, http://www.mil.fi/rauhanturvaaja/uutiset/. 
260 http://icasualties.org/OEF/. Accessed 07 August 2009. 
261 Author’s comment: The deployment of the Election Support Force in July 2009 raised the strength 
temporarily to almost 200 troops. See FDF website news archives, 
http://www.mil.fi/rauhanturvaaja/uutiset/.  
“When you can conduct your operations without shooting any bullets, it’s a good criteria of 
success.” 
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Finns have contributed strongly to liaison and intelligence gathering with Mobile Ob-
server Teams (MOT). The latest contribution has been participation in the Operational 
Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) activity, but not at the small-unit level. In the 
Kabul area, the Finnish contingent concentrated mainly on CIMIC operations and co-
located their National Support Element there. This was the case until all activities were 
collected to Mazar-e-Sharif in 2009. Some officers have served in the ISAF HQ and in 
the RC(N) HQ as well as in PRT staffs.262 There have been no maneuver units at the 
company scale or above in the Finnish contingent so far.  
 
 
Figure 6-1. The Finnish troops. (Source: Puolustusvoimat, http://www.mil.fi/rauhanturvaaja/) 
 
The Swedish contingent also began with small intelligence and CIMIC detachments in 
Kabul before taking over the PRT Mazar-e-Sharif. Having grown from 350 troops in 
2006 to the present 454, the Swedes have had tasks and a presence relatively similar to 
that of the Finns.263 Norway, a NATO country, is in a situation similar to Sweden. Their 
presence has grown from 350 troops in 2006 to the present 500.264 They are currently in 
charge of the PRT in Meymaneh. While their objectives have been similar in nature to 
those of the Finns and Swedes, they have also contributed to the overall effort with ma-
                                                 
262 This information is compiled from the FDF website, http://www.mil.fi/, and the Finnish ISAF Hand-
books. The Election Support Force of July 2009 consisted of a rifle platoon attached to a Swedish com-
pany and several observer teams under the PRT HQ. See FDF website news archives, 
http://www.mil.fi/rauhanturvaaja/uutiset/. 
263 This information is compiled from the Swedish Defense Forces website, 
http://www.mil.se/sv/Internationella-insatser/Pagaende-insatser/Afghanistan/ and the ISAF troop place-
mats at ISAF website, http://www.nato.int/isaf/ Accessed 04 August 2009.  
264 The Norwegian Defense Forces website http://www.mil.no/intops/start/operasjoner/ and the ISAF 
troop placemats at ISAF website, http://www.nato.int/isaf/ Accessed 04 August 2009.  
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neuver units that have participated in RC(N) offensive operations.265 Norway has also 
participated in Special Forces activities since the beginning of OEF and later placed 
these units under the operational control of ISAF.266 It seems that the Swedish and Fin-
nish approaches – as is the norm - are very similar. Norway, having participated in op-
erations in Iraq, has also had a wider role in Afghanistan. At the PRT level and in the 
cadre of ISAF, this has not been as evident. 
 
- “The Nordic countries established face 2 face contact with the locals. 
Germans stayed in APC:s when they were out on patrol. If threat level 
increased, they stayed in camp. (national caveats)… No unit actively 
searced for combat engagement but there was occasitional attacks on 
patrols. These attacks occurred because the opponent was either testing 
us our sending us signals in case we “interfered” in their business.” (A 
Swedish respondent) 
 
- “The PRT [Meymaneh] did not actively search for the enemy to engage it 
alone, but it happened in cooperation with the QRF and the Regional 
ISAF Command (RC-N). The units where both attacked with IED`s and 
ambushed.” (A Norwegian respondent) 
 
Like the other Nordic troops in Northern Afghanistan, the Finnish troops have been 
concentrating primarily on stability tasks, while continually preparing for defensive 
engagements. National instructions allow for the use of force only for self-protection 
and “to fulfill a mission that is in accord with the mandate”.267 This means that the 
Finns have a national caveat limiting offensive operations to practically zero. Even with 
the relatively safe operating environment and their non-offensive posture, the Finnish 
respondents have witnessed some incoming fire, although actual defensive combat has 
only recently taken place.268 According to the respondents, these incidents have hap-
pened primarily when they were “in the wrong place at wrong time”, or when interfer-
ing with local businesses.  
 
- “PRT troops were ambushed and attacked by small arm fire. My opinion 
is that these examples were INS [insurgents] or criminals attack against 
                                                 
265 According to Wikipedia, Norwegian troops have participated at least in two major offensive opera-
tions, Operation “Harekate Yolo” in October 2007 and in Operation “Karez” in May 2008. This is con-
firmed by the Norwegian Defense Forces Website 
http://www.mil.no/languages/english/start/article.jhtml?articleID=147551 and by the references of these 
Wikipedia articles. The order of battle of Norwegian maneuver units in ISAF was not available from their 
defense forces website, but participation of the Telemark Battalion units in ISAF has been referred to by 
many internet sources. See e.g. the Institute for the Study of War (2009): Order of Battle, Coalition Com-
bat Forces in Afghanistan http://www.understandingwar.org/files/AfghanistanOrbattoAugust2009.pdf  
266 See e.g. Norwegian Embassy in the USA website (2002): “Norwegian Special Forces remain in Af-
ghanistan”, http://www.norway.org/News/archive/2002/200201forces.htm, Pugliese, David (2008) and 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007): “Additional Norwegian troop contribution to ISAF”, 
http://www. regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Whats-new/News/2007/Afghanistan-Additional-Norwegian-troop-
c.html?id=451002  
267 Finnish Government report VNS 5/2001 vp. 
268 Author’s comment: After the riot of Meymaneh in February 2006, Finnish troops returned fire for the 
first time in July 2009 after the so-called Election Support Force was activated temporarily as a part of the 
Finnish contingent. See the FDF website news archives, http://www.mil.fi/ajankohtaista/tiedotteet/.  
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ISAF and ANSF in Northern Provinces caused because PRT/ANSF joint 
operation is hampering their normal criminal activities, e.g. poppy har-
vest, illegal weaponry transportation or weapon cache.” (A Finnish re-
spondent) 
 
- “Direct contact to firefight was avoided but prepared for…PRT was at-
tacked during the riot… Few MOTs encountered small arms fire on 
LUPs during patrols. Mostly misunderstandings or scary tactics...” (A 
Finnish respondent) 
 
- ”The AOR was calm area with combatants or criminals mixing up with 
population and avoiding combat against ISAF and ANA. Actions were 
mostly IEDs and some TICs against small units. Attacks against ISAF 
were happening in my opinion if we were able to get too close to crimi-
nal networks.” (A Finnish respondent) 
 
The Finnish troops are either volunteer reservists under 6- or 12-month contracts, or 
professional officers and NCOs. The average age of a Finnish reservist peacekeeper is 
27 and they usually have a civilian profession. Signing on as a peacekeeper requires a 
successful conscript service of 6-12 months and then passing a dedicated selection and 
mission specific training phase of about a month. Many peacekeepers served in other 
operations before coming to Afghanistan.269 In the Swedish and Norwegian forces, pro-
fessionalism is advancing more rapidly than in Finland, but many other factors remain 
similar. For example, the high overall educational background and the Nordic cultural 
heritage are shared qualities amongst these forces. The quality of training was a subject 
of debate amongst all the Nordic respondents and many compared their own system to 
others.  
 
- “Rotation training for us was three weeks long. Not long enough for 
units on the ground. If we refer to other Scandinavian countries – Swe-
den 3 months and Norway up to 6 months.” (A Finnish respondent) 
 
- “Our national cultural awareness was in general very high, ridiculously 
low for the Americans (ignorance is bliss maybe..)” ( A Swedish respon-
dent) 
 
- “In my personally view, not good enough. Tour length normally 6 
months. Mission specific training 3 month in 2007. From 2009 it will be 
5 month.” (A Norwegian respondent) 
 
Finland originally launched its CIMIC-oriented contribution to ISAF as a peacekeeping 
mission, but recognized the hazardous environment and the need to co-operate with 
OEF in order to assure force protection. The Finnish government report to the Parlia-
ment on 04 January 2002 considered ISAF ROE the same as the ROE used in Kos-
                                                 
269 This information is compiled from the FDF website, http://www.mil.fi/, and the Finnish ISAF Hand-
books. 
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ovo.270 In 2004, when Finland decided to participate in the PRT activity in Northern 
Afghanistan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs underlined the fact that Finland was par-
ticipating in a peacekeeping mission mandated by the UN, although with more exten-
sive ROE than in a traditional PKO.271 A new law concerning crisis management opera-
tions replaced the old law for peacekeeping in 2006, clarifying some aspects concerning 
the use of force. The Finnish government report of January 2009 concerning election 
support in Afghanistan still labels ISAF as a PKO. It addresses the need for more 
troops, both Afghan and foreign, to gain control of the security situation. This report 
mentions the improvement of ISAF warfighting capabilities and the increasing casual-
ties of the insurgents, but underlines that in the North, the security situation is better 
than elsewhere.272 The respondents did not fully agree with this opinion: 
 
- “[The insurgents] have increased a lot of they influence on ordinary peo-
ple comparing the first time I was in Kabul. The whole situation is differ-
ent. More actors and more money more even foreign soldiers, but 
…situation is getting worse day by day even in Northern Provinces.” (A 
Finnish respondent) 
 
The three above-mentioned Finnish government documents reveal the “mission creep” 
of ISAF resulting from the AO expansion and the gradual transfer of authority from 
OEF towards ISAF. Originally committed to a CIMIC role in a UN mandated PKO in 
Kabul, Finland is now participating de facto in warfighting activities as a part of the 
NATO – ISAF forces. Moreover, even if Finland does not really see it that way, it is 
considered a member of the U.S.-led coalition.273 If the U.S. military sees it this way, it 
is hard to believe that the local population in Afghanistan could really tell a difference 
between ISAF troops of a PfP-nation and combat troops of the OEF. The Finnish as 
well as other Nordic respondents mentioned the OEF forces on many occasions. Some-
times the forces were mixed at a very low level: 
 
- “My MOT was ambushed during a joint foot patrol with ANA Coy and 
US ETT unit. Norwegian TACP was included…The reason for the am-
bush was due poor situational awareness or better, the lack of under-
standing the information available. The US ETT advisor was briefed and 
even double briefed by me personally about the tension… in the patrol 
area. Still the ANA Coy was pushed strongly… into fighting area. The 
contact was solved when I provided the ANA Coy Commander phone 
numbers to talk to the opposite side.” (A Finnish respondent) 
 
Globally, the Finnish contribution of just over 100 troops in relatively safe areas of Af-
ghanistan can be seen as a symbolic effort. For every soldier on the ground, however, 
the personal exposure is far from symbolic. This makes domestic government policies 
and shoulder patches almost irrelevant. It remains to be seen if this stability-oriented 
approach will remain effective. The upcoming elections in 2009 will probably cause 
                                                 
270 Finnish Government report VNS 5/2001 vp.  
271 Ministry of Foreign Affairs report, UTP 13/2004 vp. 
272 Finnish Government report VNS 8/2008 vp. 
273 Finland is listed as a country supporting the Global War on Terror in the U.S. Central Command web-
site, http://www.centcom.mil/en/countries/coalition/. Accessed 15 May 2009. 
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more tensions in the north and the increasing Neo-Taliban influence is likely to affect 
the Northern provinces. The ongoing surge in the South and East Afghanistan – espe-
cially in Helmand Province – may push the insurgents further north as their freedom of 
maneuver will become more limited.274 The flow of development money might be the 
key, but it will only contain the situation until the moment when other armed actors take 
action. Some also feel that the Finnish troops should also be more aggressive, at least in 
the stability framework of operations: 
 
- “Local security officials respected only power and this wasn’t under-
stand by PRT high ranking officials who liked interact with them in same 
manner you treat people in Scandinavian countries. This resulted many 
times that PRT and MOT was used by locals because we were prevented 
from using tough stand against corrupt locals... The leaders in MOT lev-
el i.e. troops going out would have liked to have tougher stand against 
the locals but higher level from PRT, RC (N) didn’t want to act more ag-
gressively in the area. This caused frustration among field leaders.” (A 
Finnish respondent) 
  
6.2 Rival Context 2 – The French Forces  
 
France was amongst the first countries to provide combat aircraft, naval presence and 
Special Forces to support U.S.-led Coalition troops since December 2001. They also 
made an early contribution, providing a 500-man strong battalion to Kabul in January 
2002. Later, the French forces increased their presence from 1,000 troops (October 
2006) to 3160 troops (July 2009). The main ground forces activities in early 2009 in-
cluded the following: 
- Lead nation of the Regional Command Capital, RC(C) - previously 
known as the Kabul Multinational Brigade (KMNB) 
- French Battalion (BATFRA) of the RC(C) near Kabul 
- Combat Service Support Battalion (BCS) near Kabul  
- French Battlegroup (GTIA Kapisa) of the RC(E) 
- OMLTs in Kabul and Uruzgan 
- Opération Epidote under OEF training the ANA officers 
- ANA Special Forces training under OEF.275 
 
As a result of committing their troops to both ISAF and OEF operations, the French 
have been engaged in direct combat operations since the beginning. By 31 July 2009, 
                                                 
274 In July 2009, 4000 U.S. Marines of the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (TF Leatherneck) and 650 
ANSF soldiers and police launched a major operation in central Helmand Province supported by air assets 
and in co-operation with the British forces. See http://www.centcom.mil/en/press-releases/marines-
afghan-troops-launch-large-operation-in-helmand.html and 
http://www.janes.com/news/defence/land/jdw/jdw090710_1_n.shtml. This Operation Khanjar is aimed to 
secure the AO before the elections of 2009. 
275 This information is compiled from the website of the French Armed Forces 
http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/, and from the website of the U.S. Central Command 
http://www.centcom.mil/. Accessed 07 August 2009. See also Merchet (2008), pp. 103-115. 
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the French had suffered 28 casualties in Afghanistan.276 Though they conduct varying 
types of stability, defensive and offensive operations, the French have decided not to 
take over a PRT.277 Besides the Special Forces activities in support of the Coalition 
forces, the takeover of two specific AOs has been a clear indication for a more active 
role. The first was the so-called Combined Joint Operational Area (CJOA) of Surobi 
District east of Kabul, where the French have deployed a subunit to FOB Tora.278 The 
French took it over from the Italians in August 2008 after a year’s break, as this CJOA 
Surobi was traditionally run by the rotating lead nation of the RC(C). The situation had 
become much worse since their last stay before August 2007, with a distinct increase in 
insurgent activity and in opium poppy cultivation.279 It was in CJOA Surobi, in Uzbeen 
Valley, where a French platoon was fatally ambushed on 18 August 2008 resulting in 10 
French KIA and 21 WIA - the largest single fatal incident for the French military since 
the Beirut bombings of 1983.280  
 
 
Figure 6-2. The French troops.  
(Source: http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/operations_exterieures/) 
 
                                                 
276 http://icasualties.org/OEF/. Accessed 07 August 2009. Four fatalities have been caused by non-hostile 
incidents. 
277 Merchet (2008), pp. 150-151. 
278 Ibid. Merchet speculates that President Sarkozy’s eagerness to close ranks with the Americans and to 
integrate into NATO structures were the reason for the major changes of 2008. 
279 Merchet (2008), pp. 17-18. 
280 Pons (2009), pp. 11-64 and Pons (2008), pp. 14–19.  
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The other major step forward was taking over the Kapisa Province from the Americans 
in RC(E) in July 2008.281 The Kapisa Province has been labeled “Taliban’s gateway to 
Kabul” with a lot of activity from both sides –insurgents and counterinsurgents.282 A 
French Battlegroup (called as GTIA Kapisa or TF Chimera) built on the 8ème RPIMa 
took over this AO from the Americans setting their foothold in two FOBs, Tag Ab and 
Nijrab. According to the commanding officer of the unit, their tasks were three-fold: 
presence patrolling, engaging in large-scale operations with the ANA/ANP and direct 
support for the population. Throughout the 6-month tour, the regiment lost 15 WIA in 
Kapisa Province alone. They also lost 8 KIA and 11 WIA in the Uzbeen Valley ambush, 
as one of their subunits was stationed there to support the BATFRA.283 The heat of bat-
tle has not been less intense later on, as the 27ème BCA (the successor unit to the 8ème 
RPIMa, also known as TF Tiger) reported firing thousands of small-caliber rounds, 150 
heavy mortar rounds and using A-10 aircraft to support them with 1300 30mm rounds 
and two 250kg bombs – all in a single engagement on 06 February 2009.284   
 
French combat aviation has been active in Afghanistan AO since December 2001. Op-
erating from an aircraft carrier and from bases inside and close to Afghanistan, bombing 
sorties have increased significantly. 2007 seems to be the turning point, as French air-
craft allegedly dropped more bombs in a single month than they had in the previous 
year. The exact numbers are classified, but bombing missions have allegedly averaged 
20 per month.285 Redeployment to CJOA Surobi in 2008 and the new AO in Kapisa 
Province have caused another leap in the intensity of French operations in Afghanistan. 
With the bolder measures and new AOs of the 8ème RPIMa, combat action became more 
frequent than before.286 The next rotating units, the 27ème BCA and the 3ème RIMa, have 
suffered only two KIA during their period of service in Kapisa – Surobi AOs.287 This 
may be due to the seasonal nature of Taliban operations in the area.288 Otherwise, prior 
to the 8ème RPIMa’s ventures, the French seemed to have relatively calm AOs. The two 
French respondents who served in Afghanistan before 2008 had responses very similar 
to those of the Nordic respondents. The third respondent from 8ème RPIMa, in the Kapi-
sa Province, explained the action in a manner very similar to that of the British respon-
dents from Helmand Province. The author’s conclusion is that before 2008 (OEF mis-
sions excluded), the French emphasis was in stability tasks with some defensive action. 
Deployment to Kapisa – Surobi AOs added offensive operations to their toolbox.  
                                                 
281 Pons (2009), pp. 326-329 and the website of the French Armed Forces 
http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/. 
282 Dupee (2008).  
283 Statement of the commanding officer of the 8ème RPIMa, COL Aragones, on 05 March 2009. 
http://www.defense.gouv.fr/terre/breves/afghanistan_interview_du_colonel_aragones. Accessed 29 June 
2009. According to an e-mail from a French respondent, the first French unit to operate in Kapisa Prov-
ince was the OMLT from the 27ème BCA suppoting an ANA Kandak (a battalion-sized unit) in early 
2008. In his opinion, prior operations were mainly the responsibility of the ANA, as the Americans were 
less numerous than the 8ème RPIMa.  
284 Asquin (2009). 
285 Merchet (2008), pp. 106-109. Author’s comment: This book is obviously written as a criticism to Pres-
ident Sarkozy’s policy in Afghanistan. It was inspired by the casualties of the Uzbeen Valley ambush. 
286 See Pons (2009) and Merchet (2008).  
287 http://icasualties.org/OEF/. Accessed 07 August 2009. Author’s comment: This may be at least par-
tially be explained by seasonal variations of insurgent and criminal activities.  
288 An e-mail comment by a French respondent.  
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- “The situation in the RC-C AOR in 2007 was “quiet” and relations with 
population were generally speaking friendly. The town of Kaboul is a 
“mixed area”: ISAF / OEF (Phoenix) / RC-C. The main problem accord-
ing to me was the effect of “outside unit” going through the capital (con-
voy, OEF…) with no concern with the population and their feeling.” (A 
French respondent) 
 
- “As soon as the deployed troops were present everyday, and that they 
accept to discuss with the local people, I think they were quite well ac-
cepted. Mainly because they could be at the origin of a cimic action in 
their favor (medical services, school or well constructions, etc.)” (A 
French respondent) 
 
- “We actively search for the enemy and we engaged it daily (at least sev-
eral times in a week). Firefights occurred at all levels from battalion 
down to platoon. At Coy and Bon level, as operations were planned upon 
reliable information, this was not surprising to be involved in firefights. 
At platoon level (patrols), ambushes and IED attacks occurred some-
times very close around FOBs. In my opinion, this occurred because in-
surgents wanted to restrain our patrol. They wanted to restrain our will 
to execute patrol and they wanted to restrain our patrol area (e.g. by 
closing some valley entrances with IED).” (A French respondent, Kapisa 
Province) 
 
The French were confident in their training and rotation system. The only shortcoming 
was their limited ability to speak English, especially at the sub-unit leader and individ-
ual soldier level. This affected not only their interaction between other ISAF/OEF na-
tionalities, but also the use of locally recruited interpreters, who rarely had any French 
language skills.  
 
- “The preparatory training is around 4 months (minimum, for OMLT it’s 
6 months). According to me the preparatory training educative is 
enough, due to the actual mission. Strength of cultural awareness is tes-
timony of previous units. Shortcomings are mainly due to the “level” of 
the “public” (soldiers)” (A French respondent) 
 
- “We were very well informed of the local culture and history, and of the 
way of mind, and socio-ethnical composition of the country. Before ar-
riving in Afghanistan, and weekly on the theatre, we had lectures on var-
ious cultural subjects.”(A French respondent) 
 
- “Few were French – Pashto/ Dari translators, but most of them were 
English – Pashto / Dari translators. Translation was not an issue at 
GTIA level, because we used excellent translators at this level and be-
cause staff officers (esp. CO and S3) were fluent in English. On the con-
trary, at platoon level talks had to be very simple because translators 
were not always very proficient in both Afghan languages (Dari and 
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Pashto) and because all of platoon leaders were not very proficient in 
English (esp. NCO platoon leaders).” (A French respondent) 
 
6.3 Rival Context 3 – The British Forces 
 
Following 9/11, the United Kingdom became involved in operations in Afghanistan 
alongside the U.S. beginning with the first attacks in October 2001. Under the name 
Operation Veritas, the first UK ground troops were deployed to Bagram in November 
2001. UK Special Forces and Royal Marines also took part in ground combat in eastern 
Afghanistan. The UK was the first lead-nation of the ISAF, and the UK contribution 
peaked at 2100 troops under the name Operation Fingal. These two initial efforts were 
followed by Operation Herrick, which has continued ever since. Between 2002 and 
2003, the British troops provided security and ANA training in Kabul before participat-
ing in the Stage 1 expansion to the North of ISAF. Together with the Nordic countries, 
the UK set up two PRTs in Mazar-e-Sharif and Meymaneh and provided a rapid reac-
tion force for the area.289  
 
In 2006, anticipating the Stage 2 and 3 expansions of ISAF into the western and south-
ern parts of Afghanistan, respectively, the British forces withdrew from the north and 
concentrated in the south. The UK has participated in leading the RC(S) HQ, has pro-
vided a PRT in Lashkar-Gah of Helmand Province and contributed a brigade-sized ma-
neuver force in Helmand. Operation Herrick IV was the first of these maneuver forces 
in Helmand centered initially on 16 Air Assault Brigade. The UK ISAF troop strength 
has climbed steadily from 5,200 (October 2006) to 9,000 (July 2009). In addition to the 
main effort in the south, one light role infantry battalion remained in Kabul area until 
2008. They have also contributed strongly to the OMLT activity and ANA junior NCO 
and officer training. With six-month rotations, some of the infantry battalions have al-
ready served two or three rotations in Afghanistan in addition to their tours in Iraq.290 
The British forces are all professionals with some reinforcements from Territorial Army 
volunteers.  
 
- “Preparatory training lasted for between 5 and 6 months (based on the 
date of deployment).  As the second formation to deploy, much of it was 
self-help however the OPTAG [Operational Training and Advisory 
Group] organization was able to provide external assessment and exer-
cise facilities.  Lectures, language training and Afghan civilians were all 
employed in this package (this is now a formal process, centrally run). A 
Brigade study period and train the trainer package enabled the cascade 
of information to the lowest level. Members of 16 AA Bde (the preceding 
formation to deploy) were consulted and assisted with the Mission Re-
                                                 
289 Compiled from information available at the UK Ministry of Defence website at. http://www.mod.uk/ 
and http://www.operations.mod.uk/ supplemented by information from the ISAF website, 
http://www.nato.int/isaf/ and Wikipedia http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/. 
290 Ibid. Author’s comment: The 3 Para Battlegroup entered the Helmand province in 2006 under the 
formal command of OEF, but was later transferred under ISAF command at the end of July 2006. See 
Bishop (2008), p. 44. The same battlegroup returned to Afghanistan in autumn of 2008. See Bishop 
(2009). 
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hearsal Exercise (this is also a formally established practice now).” (A 
British respondent) 
 
- “7 month tours with cultural training given before arrival (short and 
largely ineffectual) however a handful from each Coy conducted lan-
guage training of only 10 weeks that gave them very basic skills, which 
they could build on by working with the interpreters.  OPTAG at the time 
was training for IRAQ and not AFGH so this needed to change as the 
threat level and MO [Method of Operation] of the enemy was very differ-
ent.” (A British respondent) 
 
 
Figure 6-3. The British troops. (Pictures used with the permission of the Defense Image Data-
base, MoD/Crown Copyright, http://www.defenceimagedatabase.mod.uk/fotoweb/Grid.fwx/) 
 
The Helmand Province can be considered one of the most difficult and dangerous areas 
in Afghanistan. Insurgent activities as well as opium poppy cultivation have been on the 
rise especially since 2006, the beginning of the main effort in the south (see Maps 7, 8 
and 9 of Annex 2). In their engagements, the British have used air support, artillery and 
infantry heavy weapons regularly. Attempting to apply a comprehensive approach to 
undermine the insurgents’ support from the local population, the British have not really 
succeeded in calming the area down. Instead, they have been engaged in continuous 
combat with the casualty rate allegedly climbing to 10%.291 Considering the 191 sol-
diers killed in Afghanistan by 31 July 2009, the British come in second on the casualty 
list after the USA (761 killed). They are followed closely by the Canadians (126 killed) 
who operate in the nearby Kandahar Province.292  
                                                 
291 Some UK magazines and journals claim that the casualty rate has reached World War 2 levels of 10%. 
According to these publications, the UK Ministry of Defence denies this. See Maddox (2006) and Hard-
ing (2007).  
292 http://icasualties.org/OEF/. Accessed 06 August 2009.  
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- “Engagement with Taliban elements tended to be of the 5.56 and 7.62 
variety! Only comms with them were intercepted ICOM conversations. 
These tended to be transmissions that were either designed to inform 
their commanders of progress or inform us of their plans – as they knew 
they were being listened in to.” (A British respondent) 
 
As stability operations and attempts to maintain freedom of action failed, static defen-
sive postures and limited offensive operations replaced reconstruction with destruction. 
Of particular note, the 3 Para Battlegroup, in 2006, was stuck in so-called “platoon 
houses” which were subject to heavy incoming fire almost daily.293 Its successor unit, 
the 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines, was able to carry out focused offensive op-
erations and strike at Taliban strongholds.294 The British questionnaire respondents from 
these units described the situation accordingly. 
 
- “Yes, targets were sought to turn the battle from one that was defensive 
in the FOBs to wrestle the initiative from the Taliban and interdict their 
winter resupply from Pakistan (through Quetta).  In the FOBs the battle 
was defensive fighting up to 10 different firing positions at the same time.  
Enemy strengths ranged from 5 to 80 depending on their level of com-
mitment and was normally preceded immediately by mortars or 107mm 
rockets.  They always sought to fight in the afternoon which would give 
them time to hit the FOBs and then escape in the cover of darkness.” (A 
British respondent) 
 
- “Urban patrols conducted in a Northern Ireland style within local areas.  
OPs and ambushes on MSRs [Main Supply Routes] and regularly used 
en routes.  VCPs were also established – when possible with the ANP.  
The MOG (Manoeuvre Offensive Groups) were able to achieve surprise 
and target enemy concentrations.  Recce forces often used offensive ac-
tion on identified targets but the theatre was still immature and we had 
insufficient combat power.  On RIPs [Relief In Place] we tried to surge 
manpower onto tasks to create 2 x Coy Gps often with Cdo HQ to strike 
areas that posed a threat to the FOB’s existence.” (A British respondent) 
 
- “Wherever possible, wide ranging patrols were employed.  Operational 
risk was taken on static sites wherever possible to free up combat power 
for Mobility Outreach Groups (MOGs).  These would conduct patrols 
(usually about 2-3 weeks) in contested areas. Recce forces would deploy 
for up to 8 weeks at a time but could ebb and surge as required.  Close 
range patrols would normally not exceed 36 hrs. Deliberate operations 
by the IX Gp [Information Exploitation Group] could last anywhere from 
12 hrs to a week… The IX Gp employed both recce forces and technical 
means to actively identify insurgent locations and activities. Where ap-
                                                 
293 See Bishop (2008). 
294 See Southby-Tailyour (2008). Author’s comment: In July 2009, a brigade of U.S. Marines was sent to 
reinforce the British and to take charge of the situation in Helmand.  
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propriate, these would be engaged in deliberate operations.  C2 nodes 
and strong holds in particular were targeted.” (A British respondent)  
 
6.4 Cross-case analysis of the human dimension 
 
This analysis is done in two stages to clearly separate the research subjects from their 
contexts.295 The first part compares the tactical level contexts between the three cases; it 
corresponds to the vertical axes of Figure 5-1. It is followed by a closer study of the two 
embedded units of analysis. This cross-case study corresponds to the horizontal axes of 
Figure 5-1. The multiple-case study approach was founded on the assumption that the 
contexts would be drastically different – recalling the amount of combat action and ca-
sualties already seen. It was also a methodological choice, as Afghanistan could also be 
seen also as a single case - if only considering the operational level. The most interest-
ing aspect of the study involved trying to find similarities and differences on the two 
horizontal axes despite the different contexts. This would either prove or refute the con-
tradiction between operational and tactical realities. It should be remembered that the 
baseline case is the Finnish effort in Afghanistan. It was also necessary to verify some 
Norwegian and Swedish opinions, as the Finns have for the most part operated under 
their PRT commands. These Nordic approaches have not been lifted to the case status of 
rivals, and they are included only to provide some depth to the Finnish case.  
 
6.4.1 Context comparison of the three cases 
 
There seem to be two major differences between the French and Finnish forces opera-
tional posture. Willingness to expose troops in offensive kinetic operations is the first. 
The comments made by the French respondents demonstrate the changing nature of 
French land operations in Afghanistan. Apart from their OEF Special Forces contribu-
tion and air support activity, the Surobi and Kapisa AOs have changed their role pro-
foundly. Assigning OMLTs at Kandak level also proves the willingness to engage the 
troops. The second point is that the French are genuinely responsible for their dedicated 
AORs. The two battalion-sized maneuver units operate together with other ISAF and 
OEF units as well as with ANA and ANP. As “battlespace owners”, these battalions 
have to take charge of situations, no matter what is happening. This causes a completely 
different problem when compared with Finnish elements operating in the stability-
focused cadre of a PRT. Of course, the professionalization of the French Army facili-
tates this approach.296 This combined with the different threat level in the Taliban-
infected areas of Surobi and Kapisa adds interest to this case. Although the human ter-
rain is not so far from our baseline case, the mission profile of the French contingent 
differs already significantly.  
 
                                                 
295 Huttunen, Mika: Tapaustutkimus operaatiotaidossa ja taktiikassa, an article in Huttunen – Metteri 
(2008), p. 128. 
296 Author’s comment: France abandoned obligatory military service in 1996 and the last conscripts fin-
ished their service in 2001.  
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Compared with the Finnish and French contexts, the British seem to have the most de-
manding area of operations in Helmand. Their tasks are similar to those of Finnish units 
when considering the Lashkar-Gah PRT, but the Helmand Task Force maneuver units 
have a completely different mission that includes offensive combat operations. The 
British forces have vast experience in irregular warfare and counterinsurgency opera-
tions tracing back to Malaya, Aden, Northern Ireland and the Balkans. This tradition 
combined with the professionalization and the strict regimental system of their military 
has unquestionable shaped their approach in Afghanistan.297 The French have a similar 
background, with lessons learned from Indochina, Algeria, Africa and the Balkans.298 
They also operate a regimental system, although it was not professionalized until the 
end of the 20th century. These regimental “families”, usually deployed with the strength 
of a reinforced battalion, have suffered as a result of the current operational tempo and 
the friction caused by downsizing the forces after the end of the Cold War. Battalions 
are rarely deployed with all their organic subunits, and they are more likely to include 
attached companies and other specialist detachments from different regiments and sup-
porting arms.299   
 
- “Soldiers did not struggle from going from Ops to routine patrolling but 
did struggle when going from 6 weeks in a punchy district centre to rou-
tine patrolling where there was expectation that they must interact with 
the local population.” (A British respondent) 
 
 FINNISH FRENCH BRITISH 
Has previous experience in “peacekeeping 
style” stabilization 
YES YES YES 
Has previous experience in “small war 
style” stabilization or counterinsurgency 
NO YES YES 
Army’s main focus is in homeland de-
fense  
YES NO NO 
Participated in the initial stages of Opera-
tion Enduring Freedom 
NO YES YES 
Has had responsibility in PRTs shared  
(with Sweden) 
NO YES 
Has contributed with battalion-sized ma-
neuver units 
NO YES YES 
Operates a fully professional force NO YES YES 
Rotation length in-country 6 to 12 months 4 to 6 months 6 to 7 months 
Has conducted offensive operations NO YES YES 
Troop strength from 2006 to 2009 100 => 110 1000 => 3160 5200 => 9000 
Fatalities in Afghanistan by 31 July 2009 1 28 191 
Table 6-4. Comparison of troop contributors and their action in Afghanistan. Finland differs from 
the others by almost every measure. 
 
As we have already witnessed, the three contexts differ significantly in two ways. 
Firstly, the troop contributors and their actions in Afghanistan have been and still are 
different at least in the following categories: 
                                                 
297 See Marston-Malkasian (2008) and Nagl (2005). 
298 See Galula (1964) and Trinquier (1964) on the earlier French lessons learned from Indochina and 
Algeria. 
299 Author’s observation based on both formal military education and personal studies.   
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- national doctrine, traditions and former operational experience, 
- participation in ISAF (and OEF) concerning unit types and troop 
strengths and 
- participation in kinetic operations (or possible national caveats). 
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Case study reference (FIN, FRA, 
UK) 
FIN 
 
FIN FIN 
 
FIN FIN FIN 
FRA 
UK 
FRA UK 
Opium poppy cultivation (ha) 2005   
                                                  2008 
10837 
<100 
1960 
<100 
3040 
291 
2024 
<100 
2252 
<100 
<100 
310 
115 
436 
26500 
103590 
Opium poppy eradication (ha) 2007 
                                                  2008 
14 
0 
0 
0 
337 
0 
122 
0 
114 
0 
14 
20 
10 
59 
4003 
2537 
Violent incidents against NGOs 2007 
                                                  2008 
19 
22 
22 
24 
76 
79 
29 
26 
28 
45 
ISAF/OEF fatalities 2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
8 
12 
15 
0 
0 
1 
2 
2 
28 
57 
75 
Pashtuns are a majority in the  
             province 
no no no no no no no YES 
Strong Taliban activity 2006 
2007 
no 
some 
no 
no 
no 
some 
no 
some 
no 
no 
some 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
Table 6-5. Comparison of the tactical operating environment by province. It should be noted 
that the French Battlegroup deployed to Kapisa province in July 2008 and the British Helmand 
Task Force deployed to Helmand in June-July 2006. Sources used include: 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan_Opium_Survey_2008.pdf  
- opium poppy cultivation and eradication numbers listed by province 
http://www.afgnso.org/index_files/Page595.htm 
- incidents against NGOs are listed by “province clusters” (Kapisa is connected 
with data from Nuristan and Laghman provinces, Kabul is connected with Logar 
and Wardak provinces and Helmand is connected with Kandahar and Zabul) 
http://icasualties.org/OEF/Afghanistan.aspx 
- counted ISAF/OEF fatalities include all forces without taking nationality into ac-
count but only include those resulting from hostile action; there may be inaccu-
racies as not all the locations were specified 
SENLIS (2006) and SENLIS (2007B) 
- the Taliban activity is interpreted from the maps (see Annex 2, maps 8 and 9) 
 
The second main difference lies in the tactical environment. The significance of opium 
poppy cultivation and eradication varies between the provinces and so does the overall 
threat level. The metrics used here are from public sources and their accuracy may be 
questionable. Some incidents are probably not even reported and every stage of report-
ing is subject to interpretation. In 2009, there has been little information publicly avail-
able on insurgent activities and on the attack rates against ISAF and OEF troops, espe-
cially by province. Therefore, the only sources found refer to the years 2006 and 2007 
and provide only annual statistics.  The incident rates naturally depend on the activity 
levels. The NGOs, for example, are operating more intensely in Kabul than in other 
provinces. Even with these biases, these statistics provide a qualitative view on what is 
going on in each province. Table 6-5 gives an idea of these provincial differences. The 
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Helmand Province stands out by almost every measure and the ISAF/OEF casualty rate 
has climbed since the start of Op Herrick IV in 2006. 
 
6.4.2 The actors of the human terrain 
 
Considering our first unit of analysis, the human terrain, there are no remarkable differ-
ences between the three cases studied. The ISAF force composition naturally varies, as 
there are different troop contributing countries in each RC. The OEF presence was rec-
ognized in all three areas and at all times. The local human terrain does vary according 
to our cases studied. In the north and in Kabul, the population is of mixed ethnicities. 
The Pashtun-dominated areas include the whole Helmand Province, the troubled dis-
tricts of Kapisa Province (Tag Ab and Nijrab) and the Surobi district of Kabul province. 
Pakistani border proximity with cross-border insurgent and terrorist activity puts the 
eastern and southern parts of the country in a different situation than the relatively 
peaceful north. The closeness of Iran may also affect the situation in Helmand. Locally, 
the human terrain dictated the difference between friendly and hostile encounters.  
 
- “Acceptance of local population depended of the area. Pashtun areas 
didn’t like us so much (it was hard to get the contact to the population). 
Often we checked how children reacted when we arrived - if they ran 
away we usually raised the guard.” (A Finnish respondent) 
 
-  “This would depend on the proximity and size of insurgent forces.  La-
bels such as ‘friendly’ or ‘unfriendly village’ were often used.  In many 
cases, the negative response in an ‘unfriendly village’ would be an elder 
asking us not to enter as it would illicit a response by the insurgents.  In 
other locations (particularly in the irrigated green-zone) there was a di-
rect correlation between proximity and hostility – usually at 100 – 200m 
or tied to a specific geographic feature such as a canal.” (A British re-
spondent) 
 
All respondents emphasized the relationship with the ANSF, primarily between the 
ANA and the ANP. On the adversary side, criminals and insurgents or Taliban were 
mentioned almost without exception. Warlordism still exists and many warlords have 
legitimate roles in province, region or national levels. There is a blurring of roles be-
tween officials, politicians and warlords.  Many people may have dual roles; they are 
farmers by day and guerillas or criminals by night. The insurgents and criminals were 
well aware of ROEs and possible caveats and could exploit them by traveling unarmed 
and even participating in shuras. Many respondents mentioned that the activities of dif-
ferent ISAF units were observed closely and systematically by the locals.300 In this 
sense, the theory of different spatial or contextual statuses Elbridge and Neboshynsky 
mentioned in Chapter 4 seem to be accurate. Combatant identification was named as a 
                                                 
300 Author’s comment: The term “dicking” is used by the British Army and it refers to apparently casual, 
apparently civilian but very purposeful surveillance, where the information is passed to possible assail-
ants. The term has its origins in operations in Northern Ireland.  
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major challenge – an almost impossible one to overcome – when describing the local 
conditions.  
 
- “The main illegal armed groups operating and fighting in the province 
were Azadi and Jumpesh. Both were listed as political parties but were 
repeatedly argued to lose their status due to illegal activities and armed 
action… The fact was that they had the guns so they had the power ? 
they were contributing to the decision making process in the dis-
trict/province… Most combatants did not carry any uniform, weapons or 
patches in order not to be recognized. Some of them had an official sta-
tus as well as an unofficial position in an illegal armed group.” (A Fin-
nish respondent) 
 
- “The amount of TIC was low in northern Afghanistan. The problem is 
more to understand the networks that Afghans have. The officials that 
have connections to criminal networks and to insurgents are perhaps the 
bigger problem. Other challenge is to understanding how insurgents use 
the more calm area as safe heaven for operations conducted in other 
provinces.” (A Finnish respondent) 
 
- “Melting pot with Taliban, warlord, Al Qaîda, criminal and civilians: no 
uniform, no sign, easier to say that every body is an insurgent. Also ac-
cording to national security forces, a lot of strangers among insurgents. 
Also confusion in language or traduction: for example Chechen is a figh-
ter for afghan, someone coming from Chechnya for ISAF.”  (A French 
respondent) 
 
- “Everybody is a non-combatant as long as there is no evidence he is a 
combatant. Evidence is the use of firearm against you or the ownership 
of IED parts. Insurgents used weapons cache, so they were able to travel 
without weapons.” (A French respondent)  
 
- “…combattants would regularly disguise themselves as locals, knowing 
the ROE and conduct “dicking” missions on mopeds. The only way of 
determining friend from foe was by fighting age and attitude.” (A British 
respondent) 
 
The presence of the international community, the media and NGOs is most visible in 
Kabul. Elsewhere the footprint of these actors is largely dependent on the security situa-
tion. The media includes all kinds of actors, but national armed forces and NATO/ISAF 
reporters were mentioned more than commercial reporters. The British respondents 
seemed to have had more experiences with embedded journalists.  
 
- “The local media was build from the religious perspective. Every time we 
met with the local mullahs and elders we tried to influence with our main 
messages and to discuss the problems and issues at hand to our favor. 
Local radio was also involved. The PRT had a media team to make local 
news witch could be sent out in radio or leaflets. MOTs distributed thou-
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sands of ISAF news during their patrols.  National freelance news team 
was sent to film and interview my team for television.” (A Finnish re-
spondent)     
 
- “News, rumors and hearsay spread around villages was the “truth” for 
the most people. They had an affect on how the locals felt about you. The 
worst example was the 2006 riot against the Meymanah PRT. Local 
power brokers used the Danish cartoon incident to provoke the people to 
demonstrate and attack the PRT compound. A number of armed men with 
small arms, hand grenades and RPG were among the demonstrators and 
tried to over run the PRT.” (A Finnish respondent)     
 
- “Journalists could be attached to Coys for upto 7 days, undertake rou-
tine patrolling etc we also ran large press visits consisting of usually 15-
20 pax over a 3 day period in upto 3 locations.” (A British respondent)     
 
- ”International but predominantly UK media frequently visited HTF loca-
tions (whenever the security situation permitted).  Media liaison officers 
facilitated their movement. TV, radio and print product was produced in 
accordance with the ‘lines to take’ and within the speaker’s area of re-
sponsibility/expertise.  Interviews were conducted at all levels from the 
Commander down to individual Marines.” (A British respondent)       
 
The questionnaire results confirm that the overall structures of the human terrain match 
those already outlined and predicted in Chapter 4 and no new groups were listed. A 
more detailed summary can be found from Annex 7. The lack of surprises is probably 
owed to two reasons: the solid knowledge already obtained from written sources as well 
as the questionnaire design, which guided the respondents to some extent. The impor-
tance of public sphere contacts at the local level was clearly highlighted by all the re-
spondents, whereas central government and regional official authorities were less em-
phasized. This is natural given the level of work and the rank of respondents (the high-
est were at Regional Command HQs).  
 
6.4.3 The interaction between the force and the other actors 
 
Concerning the interaction, cultural and language barriers were a major concern and the 
problem of mismatching lifeworlds was identified by all the respondents. Interpreters 
were therefore mentioned as having a key role and could be considered a high-value 
asset, whereas local contractors were useful partners at best or just a means to promote 
employment. Not all of the respondents were happy with their locally employed civil-
ians, though some had good experiences when using locals as indicators or even as cul-
tural guides. 
 
- “The interpreters were local youths, ageing from 22 to 35 years. Most of 
them had reasonably language skills and were able to perform to their 
tasks… The interpreter was a very good sign of threat level in the area. If 
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they were quiet and scared something usually was wrong in the meeting 
or area.” (A Finnish respondent) 
 
- “We were forced to use IP and didn’t have any practical knowledge of 
local language which made conversations long and difficult. Actual in-
formation was often/sometimes very little because of this interaction. 
Even the IP’s couldn’t be trusted because they might have had their own 
interests in these meetings.” (A Finnish respondent) 
 
- “We both used locally recruited interpreters and national ones. For the 
more general and less sensitive ops we used the locally recruited inter-
preters... Many times they worked as “door openers” for us.  Many times 
we used the local population to “leap frog” a trace of promising infor-
mation. That is, they went in our vehicles to show us a “safe” route to a 
possible “next” meeting.” (A Swedish respondent)    
 
- “Interpreters were local employees. They had all kind of levels and very 
few were able to speak French. This last point constituted a major diffi-
culty for our NCO platoon leaders who speak bad English.” (A French 
respondent) 
 
- “Locally employed civilians (LECs) were used of Pakistani or Afghan 
origin.  Not always the best as bloody lazy on the whole.  When they put 
their body armour on you knew you were in the shit! Inshallah…” (A 
British respondent)    
 
-  “…I had several Pakistani / Afghan interpreters.  They were loyal but 
lacked emotional robustness.  They had to be kept out of the Ops Room 
for Opsec reasons but were generally of great benefit. Liked to shag each 
other too!” (A British respondent)    
 
Cooperation, support and assistance to the Afghan National Security Forces (mainly 
ANA and ANP) had been daily business for all the respondents. Not all the experiences 
were positive and especially the ANP was mentioned as corrupt and incompetent. 
OMLTs (and OEF ETTs) were used as liaison teams and force multipliers.  
 
- “People liked to see and interact with us. They liked to see us working 
together with the ANA. We felt always well come (it was year 2005 in 
northern Af!). Interaction between ANA was easy, because there was US 
led ETT in between.” (A Finnish respondent) 
 
- “Co-operation with Afghans is the only way to mentor their development 
and handing over actual responsibility step by step. The ambition level 
during last months was that 25-50 % of for example patrolling should be 
conducted jointly with ANP / ANA. I already mentioned the distrust lo-
cals had especially towards police organizations. In supporting some 
heavily corrupted police chief you can discredit ISAF as well.” (A Fin-
nish respondent) 
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- “ANP and ANA operated with us at Coy level. During Ops they could be 
attached to Pl level. The British military boys often found the ‘physical 
closeness’ of ANA/ANP and there seemingly over familiarity with one 
another uncomfortable.” (A British respondent)  
 
- “I had a detachment of 6 x ANP (Afghan National Police). They were 
corrupt, lacked training, sought to conduct their bribery and extortion 
under the umbrella of security that I provided. They were extremely dis-
liked and not trusted by the local inhabitants and my association with 
them made me equally unpopular for supporting them logistically and 
providing them with security. Additionally they would “dick” my patrols 
prior to departure necessitating the requirement to conduct “dummy” 
callouts to observe their actions and when concerned that they were in-
forming the Taliban about my pending departure I had them removed.  
Finally they shared a small FOB with my Coy and spent much time en-
gaged in homosexual activities which my men found extremely unpalat-
able.” (A British respondent) 
 
Interaction with the locals included meetings of all kinds: shuras, HUMINT contacts 
and so on. The official sphere (provincial and district offices) was mentioned, but the 
local public sphere (marketplaces, bazaars, village squares) was usually in the context of 
meetings. Malek houses are somewhat semi-public, as their homes need to be large 
enough for meetings.301 The private sphere (homes) was otherwise not really mentioned 
in the responses. Contact arrangements were organized horizontally according to the 
ISAF military hierarchy, so for example a PRT HQ was responsible for the liaison with 
the provincial governor’s office while MOTs worked at the district level. Maneuver 
units had much less interaction with the local authorities than the PRTs. The current 
task, unit posture (dress code, moving mounted or dismounted, openly or discretely) and 
the situational context dictated the outcome of the encounter. “Habermasian” validity 
checks were done on both sides, to determine the intentions and truthfulness of the other 
party. 
 
- “Normally ISAF and all other foreign actors were accepted. That is ob-
vious because so much money is coming to the country from foreign na-
tions. Every third month some of our four provincial governor noticed 
that PRT has done more project or development work in other province 
than his own. He normally launched a media campaign against PRT 
Commander. Only actors against PRT were of cause INS [Insurgents], 
but they are trying to improve their own agenda and that is understand-
able.” (A Finnish respondent) 
 
- “The posture among the locals was mostly friendly and light and caused 
no problems. Sometimes we used full combat gear to show capability and 
strength in certain areas or meetings. People understood the fact that we 
had orders and procedures we had to follow as soldiers. We had to de-
                                                 
301 Confirmed in the interview with LTC Babagul, 15 June 2009. 
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cline offers of staying in the village and house for a night several times. 
If we managed to show up to an area or a compound undetected it made 
people (key players) nervous. It showed them that we could get passed 
their guard and follow their actions (legal and illegal) when we want to.” 
(A Finnish respondent) 
 
- “You had to adapt the behaviour according to whom you were meeting 
and in which circumstance. The only problems we encountered and situ-
ations that we had problems with were when we interacted with the 
“former” warlords and their personnel. In these situations you had to 
promote a very self assure, “commander-like”, war fighting, profes-
sional and “no bullshit” attitude. A stone throwing competition didn’t 
impress a “general” whom had been fighting the Russians. So, accepted 
in a professional, brothers-in-arms, war fighter kind of way.” (A Swed-
ish respondent) 
 
- “The major cultural difficulties or limiting factors were that our contacts 
always looked over the shoulder in a way “to see if the wolfs were com-
ing”. That is, there was always an imagined but very real line which they 
never crossed. We always felt, and sometimes they said so out loud, that 
they told us just so much as not to endanger their future position (life) if 
the wind changed.” (A Swedish respondent) 
 
- “All patrols left the DC [District Centre] expecting to conduct high-
intensity combat ops if the need arose – complete with NVGs [Night Vi-
sion Goggles] etc even if doing a daylight patrol expected to be finishing 
before darkness fell.  A QRF was always stood by for any eventuality.  
When hearts and minds patrols were needed they were conducted in be-
rets with the troops ready to put helmets back on if the need arose.”  (A 
British respondent) 
 
Respondents were not especially interested in dealing with the international community 
and the NGOs. This was especially true in the south, where the volatile security situa-
tion made cooperation difficult. Information flow was primarily one-way, and the need 
to de-conflict projects and actions was mentioned in many responses. Despite the wide 
range of actors, such as the diverse NGO community and the private contractors of dif-
ferent trades, regular meetings were the interaction platform. UNAMA’s role was men-
tioned, but the PRT lead-nation civilian contribution seemed to have more weight in the 
practical life of the respondents.  
 
- “Most of the NGOs didn’t want to operate together with ISAF and they 
limited also information exchange directly. They could pass information 
threw UNAMA or ANSO (security organization supporting NGOs).” (A 
Finnish respondent) 
 
- “In Ghereshk it was easy [to interact] as key players were easily reach-
able and happy to talk. In other areas it was a lot harder and very de-
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pendant on insurgent activity and therefore when meetings could be held 
there was often a presumed Taliban presence” (A British respondent) 
 
- “The link… was through the Joint CIMIC group and at all times was 
without satisfaction due to their reluctance to be involved in what was a 
volatile situation in Helmand Province.” (A British respondent) 
 
When considering the interaction, the respondents emphasized the significance of pre-
vious mission experience and sufficient rotation lengths. They also evaluated the effects 
of the accumulating stress caused by the constant danger. The respondents least worried 
about stress were the British and French respondents. This may reflect the difference of 
professional units and reservists.  
 
- “If MOT commander stayed in the same area for 12 months he was able 
to have very good sources. Some could do this with 6 months deployment 
as well… Deployment time with 6 months is understandable in the view 
of well being of soldiers, but it is limiting the understanding and experi-
ence you get on the ground.” (A Finnish respondent) 
 
- “One factor of success, in my opinion, was that my units’ average age 
was 29. This combined with earlier experiences gave everyone a solid 
ground to stand on. Of course we didn’t know everything. And these 
blind spots were overcome by an attitude to “move slowly” and to get a 
feel of the situation before acting. We also used our “free time” to so-
cialize with the locally recruited interpreters. That is, discuss Afghani-
stan’s history, culture etc in a “no-ops” way.” (A Swedish respondent) 
 
- Our unit operated a 6-month rotation without leaves. The mission spe-
cific training was also 6-mont long. Specific training included cultural 
awareness training. However, and as already written above, our battal-
ion was used to deploy abroad, esp. in Africa and in Ex-Yugoslavia. 
Each Coy spends roughly 4 months abroad every year. Personally, this 
was my ninth mission. So, we had to learn specific customs about Afghan 
people, but we were already prepared to meet a different culture. You 
can always do better on any subject, but our preparatory training was 
really educative enough. (A French respondent) 
 
 
6.5 Amongst the people in Afghanistan 
 
The first significant observation is that despite certain contextual differences (participat-
ing ISAF troop, contributing nations and the local indigenous human terrain mixtures), 
the first unit of analysis revealed no major differences between the three cases. When 
listed by category, the actor list is similar. The real difference lies within the lifeworlds, 
which means that the force composition interlinked with the local human terrain is a 
crucial factor. The combination of cultural backgrounds, variations and manifestations 
will always produce a different mix in each case. This setup of lifeworlds with each 
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contextual situation will progressively affect the relationship of the stabilization force 
and the other actors.  
 
The second observation has to do with the volume and the nature of interaction. Maneu-
ver units had less non-kinetic interaction with the local human terrain than the PRTs. 
The more active the units are, the more likely it is that they are interfering with the lo-
cals’ businesses. As the reinforced Finnish contingent (the election support force of July 
2009) has increased its maneuvers, it has encountered more “troops in contact” situa-
tions than during all the previous years combined. The Kapisa province was more or 
less untouched by OEF/ISAF forces before the deployment of the 8ème RPIMa in July 
2008. Helmand was already hostile before 2006, but after the insertion of 3 Para, things 
got worse. The yearly casualty list of ISAF/OEF forces has been increasing steadily 
since Op Herrick IV began. The fatality figures have climbed proportionally with the 
RC(S) and the UK contingent troop augmentations. In the Pashtun dominated areas of 
Helmand, the resistance peaked as soon as active operations began. In the North and in 
the East, where there are fewer Pashtuns, there has been less resistance so far. The con-
clusion is that increasing the volume of military activities and especially forceful inter-
ventions within the local public sphere increases the probability of triggering the “rejec-
tion phase” of the Accidental Guerilla Syndrome (see Section 2.2). The local human 
terrain and its cultural manifestations dictate the quality and quantity of this response.  
 
The third observation concerns the deployment and maneuver options used. In Afghani-
stan, the bigger bases (Forward Support Bases of the RCs and the PRT/maneuver unit 
main bases) are large and relatively secure. The smaller bases (such as temporary or 
permanent FOBs, Provincial Offices, and even the observation posts and checkpoints) 
are usually close to or directly amongst the people. Offensive and defensive operations 
can take place anywhere, but non-kinetic tasks - stability operations - are naturally con-
ducted in various population centers. Besides trying to provide a safe and secure envi-
ronment, being where the people are can be seen as an effort to achieve or maintain a 
positive “stranger” status (see Section 4.5). According to our Afghan interviewee and 
other evidence, the Afghans see it the opposite way – the Western troops are “hiding 
amongst the people” and acting as an “occupation force”. In the Afghan cultures in gen-
eral and amongst the Pashtuns in particular, it seems impossible for an ISAF soldier to 
be a “stranger” after eight years of unfulfilled hopes, substantial collateral damage and 
civilian casualties and no real unity of effort on the part of ISAF/OEF.  
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Figure 6-6. Author’s estimation of the proportions of full spectrum operations within the three 
contingents of ISAF. The French part is from 2008 onwards and the British part from 2006 on-
wards. The estimation is based on the three case studies and their evidence material.  
 
According to public sources, the overall missions of ISAF and the tasks executed by the 
PRTs have remained the same throughout the operation. With a graphic overview, we 
can give a rough estimate of the percentage of stability, offensive and defensive actions 
within the three tactical contexts (see Figure 6-6). This is worth comparing with the 
“clear - hold - build” model of FM 3-24.2 (Figure 3-6).  
 
One conclusion could be that the Helmand and Kapisa Provinces are still in the “clear 
phase”, while other provinces are staggering between “hold” and “build”. On the other 
hand, we could question whether the North has been “cleared” at all, as stability tasks 
have been emphasized by some of the troop contributors. We could also argue that non-
kinetic effects have been more efficient in some battlespaces due to the methods used or 
because of shorter social distances created by the actors. As it is impossible to duplicate 
the whole ISAF experience with a different force mixture to verify these results, we can 
only speculate with three possible explanations for the varying situations. 
 
1) The local human terrain has been a decisive factor. 
2) Troop deployment has created a favorable or an unfavorable social distance be-
tween the stabilization force and the other actors. 
3) Troop employment has either increased social integration and prevented the 
“Accidental Guerilla Syndrome” or increased alienation and triggered the rejec-
tion phase. 
 
Concerning the temporal dimension of the battlespace, the duration of the operation as a 
whole – with the kinetic and non-kinetic battlespace effects that have taken place to date 
– is working against the ISAF and OEF forces. The tactical units have no control over 
this, as they are deployed according to force generation meetings and strategic level 
decisions. With a typical frequency of 6-month rotations, they are re-learning and re-
adapting all the time. Most of the time, the low-level tactical commanders have few 
options when it comes to employing their forces, as they inherit static tasks and other 
obligations from their predecessors. Maneuverist approaches are hard to execute if 
hands are tied from the start by a top-down phasing of operations. This problem is exac-
erbated by nationally controlled rotation frequency and set durations.  
 
On the whole, the information environment is also out of the tactical commanders’ con-
trol, as the various field-deployed media will report in close to real time. National con-
cerns of the troop contributors combined with the modern media effect will easily by-
pass the ISAF and RC headquarters as events can be pinpointed down to the PRT or 
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Battalion level or below. The storytelling contest between the force and the other actors 
also remains impossible to win unless the commander has the means to get inside the 
local communities to influence or at least track the indigenous discourse. The strongest 
battlespace effects take place in the information dimension. This holds true even if some 
of the initial effects were kinetic. All of this creates recurring opportunities that the ad-
versaries can exploit. Getting inside their OODA-loop in terms of speed should be easy 
with our technology and well-trained battle staffs. We should, however, question 
whether our own OODA-loop was broken from the beginning, particularly if we have in 
fact failed in our intelligence preparation of battlespace concerning the significance of 
the human dimension.302 
 
When seeking success at the tactical level, the significant factors concerning the human 
dimension of battlespace in ISAF seem to be: 
1) the social distance between each tactical unit and/or a national contingent and 
the local human terrain (each group has to be estimated separately), 
2) the volume and nature of kinetic operations and other non-kinetic activities, 
3) the deployment and maneuver options used in kinetic and non-kinetic ap-
proaches,  
4) the predictability and the amount of maneuverist approach in terms of the dura-
tion, the frequency and the sequence of operations,   
5) the amount of “mission tactics” available for tactical level commanders and 
6) the amount of cultural awareness and information operations resources available 
for tactical level commanders. 
 
                                                 
302 See also Ullman, David G. (2007): “OO-OO-OO!” The Sound of Broken OODA Loop. Crosstalk, 
April 2007 issue. http://www.stsc.hill.af.mil/Crosstalk/2007/04/0704Ullman.html  
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7 DISCUSSION 
 
7.1 Research results 
 
The main research problem revolved around a possible new approach – the “social” 
battlespace of stabilization operations. The central research question was “How do the 
human structures and social interactions affect tactical level land operations of the 
stabilization force”? It was broken down in sub-questions, which have already been 
answered in the respective chapters of this final report. Following the research process 
of Figure 2-6, the discourse leading to the actual research results begins at the pre-
understanding stage. The discourse leads to certain general conclusions based on the 
case study. The validity and reliability of these results and conclusions are evaluated in 
the next part. The last part of this chapter will give some recommendations for future 
research subjects.  
 
This thesis was based on seven propositions describing the tactical level of a suggested 
new paradigm of war – war amongst the people. Derived from the initial research work 
and aimed at providing a pre-understanding for both the research design and the final 
report, these propositions also guided the choice of the case study environment. In Af-
ghanistan, all seven propositions are matched by the tactical reality. Therefore, on a 
whole, ISAF can be accepted as a critical case of modern stabilization operations. Two 
of the propositions rise above the others in importance. First, the contradiction between 
the operational level and the tactical level is evident. With an operational perspective, 
one could easily have been tempted to prepare a single-case study, because ISAF seems 
to have a unity of command and a unity of effort. This thesis has shown that tactical 
realities are diverse and the dictating element is the human dimension of the battlespace. 
Secondly, the importance of the “Accidental Guerilla Syndrome” has been concretely 
visible in post-2006 ISAF operations throughout the country.  
 
The case study showed no surprises in terms of the generic actor list of a stabilization 
operation. Even though this list may be predictable at the operational level, the tactical 
level human terrain is more complex and variable. The local indigenous human terrain 
and the diverse origins of the international actors will always produce a unique mix of 
actors. Analyzing the human terrain in geo-spatial terms is, however, not the right ap-
proach. The three-layer model of the human dimension of battlespace presented in this 
thesis becomes important when conducting a complete tactical level IPB and estimating 
friendly forces. It is necessary to look closely at the cultural domain and especially the 
possible combinations of lifeworlds before deploying any units on the ground. Deploy-
ment decisions should not be based solely on the evaluations of tables of organization 
and equipment or on the different kinetic capabilities of units.  
 
Military actions are powerful tools for communication. In stability operations, commu-
nicative action may be the optimal category of action. In real life situations, however, 
this is rarely the case even amongst the multinational force itself. The lower planes of 
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the Habermasian scale - dramaturgical action and normatively regulated action - provide 
a desirable and a realistic theoretical framework for deployed troops. If a unit separates 
itself from society and acts strictly according to its mission, it is likely to unleash coun-
terproductive processes. Our case study on ISAF also highlighted the possibility of neg-
ative effects when over-emphasizing presence amongst the people. This example can be 
seen as a typical validity claim failure of both the normative rightness check (the Af-
ghans see urban operations as an insult and as an act of an occupation force) and the 
subjective truthfulness check (the Afghans consider that the Western troops are “hiding 
amongst the people” even though the troops claim to be protecting them). Though hon-
estly aiming for social action, ISAF has lacked true cultural awareness to get it right. 
 
Social action was defined as a subset of any human action, but linked and dependent on 
the behavior of other people - i.e. it is action meaningfully determined by the behavior 
of others. A military reader should not be blinded by this term, as returning fire or am-
bushing the enemy can also be seen as social action. Any socially oriented action should 
only be taken after evaluating the short and long-term consequences within the context 
of the tactical battlespace. Action without prior considerations of possible consequences 
and culturally based validity checks is likely to undermine a positive “stranger” status. 
This socially ignorant action is more likely to trigger the rejection phase of the “Acci-
dental Guerilla Syndrome” than a socially oriented action.  Whether non-kinetic or ki-
netic by its nature, using social action is the best way to react to situations and to antici-
pate future events within the causal logic of tactical battlespace.  
 
Specific operational mindsets, such as a peacekeeping-style deployment, an enemy-
centric counter-terrorist campaign or a population-centric counterinsurgency approach, 
are likely to become blurred in the various tactical realities of an operation. This is es-
pecially true for units whose areas of responsibility involve co-existence amongst the 
people. When tasking a unit to pursue a violent kinetic task, commanders will face the 
dilemma of whom to choose to execute it. A local unit responsible for its AOR is more 
likely to use socially oriented means even in a high intensity situation. The risk is that 
this unit is too closely related to the local human terrain, a fact that may endanger its 
objectivity. A reinforcing QRF unit is probably less vulnerable in terms of cultural re-
production, social integration and socialization processes affecting the local unit. On the 
other hand, such mobile units are likely to be less hesitative to use force, as they will not 
face the consequences of such force. After any type of event, “the battlespace owner 
unit” ultimately has to deal with consequences. “Battlespace owner units” must possess 
a high level of cultural awareness and operational experience in order to act responsibly 
in the framework of full spectrum operations. 
 
The forecasted intensity, volume and nature of kinetic and non-kinetic operations in 
each tactical context should be taken into consideration before deciding on unit de-
ployment. This factor, combined with the cultural capabilities and lifeworld compatibil-
ity of a given unit in relation with the other local actors, is a major consideration in 
force generation. Missions aimed at stability and human intelligence should be done by 
units with a high level of cultural competence. Predominantly kinetic missions should 
be given to professional units trained and equipped for dealing with this kind of envi-
ronment. Other units (not qualifying as highly cultural-competent or very combat-
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effective) should be utilized in static security and support tasks in which less importance 
is placed on social success.  
 
It is realistic to think that the British forces in Helmand have been the right asset at least 
qualitatively, even though we may question the sufficiency of quantity. Such a hostile 
environment has called for high professionalism and a willingness to engage in combat. 
The French were surprised in August 2008 by a single fatal ambush, but they have been 
able to adapt to the new environment - at least since then they have not suffered such 
losses in a single engagement. It is probably also reasonable to consider that the Finnish 
troops are in the correct tactical environment considering their background, compe-
tences and national views. We will never know what would have happened had a Fin-
nish infantry battalion taken over as the Helmand task force in the summer of 2006. We 
may also wonder whether the French or British paratroopers would have conducted suc-
cessful non-kinetic stability operations in North Afghanistan.  
 
Based on these three cases, it looks like that ISAF has deployed its troops fairly well 
according to these particular troop contributor capacities. The ways of employing the 
force locally leaves room for speculations, as the ratio between stability, defensive and 
offensive operations is always questionable. However, a precise evaluation of force em-
ployment would require a comprehensive analysis that includes national political agen-
das, economic resources available and techniques, and the tactics and procedures used at 
the local level. An intricate local web of actors with varying contexts and situations also 
affect force employment. We could argue that planning should be done simultaneously 
from the top-down and the bottom-up. A human-centric enhanced tactical IPB tem-
plated with an honest friendly force capability estimate and different courses of action 
could be the key in avoiding mistakes in deployment. Deploying the wrong mixture of 
assets in relation to the demands of the human dimension of battlespace may lead to 
losses in the battle for “hearts and minds” and media images. It may therefore ultimately 
cause a failure of mission. Strategic corporals or privates do not self-deploy; they are 
deployed by the force generators and decision makers. Thinking tactically and practi-
cally is essential to pave the way for success in the stabilization phase. 
 
7.2 Validity and reliability evaluation 
 
The idea behind this thesis is the relevance of a possible new paradigm of war – the war 
amongst the people. Theorists such as Nils Marius Rekkedal and Hervé Coutau-Bégarie 
have included this school of thought in their works and presentations as a rival para-
digm explaining modern warfare. They have referred to certain practitioners, the Gener-
als Rupert Smith and Vincent Desportes, as the leading authors who have attempted to 
explain this paradigm. With no serious scientific publications available at this time, the 
author has chosen to use these sources as the cornerstone of this study. One should not 
forget that the practical portion of operational art takes place continuously in different 
battlefields, but the scientific portion of it suffers a certain delay. This thesis, apparently 
caught in the gap between practice and theory, is therefore not founded on exact or solid 
scientific research concerning this particular paradigm of warfare. The author has ac-
cepted the risks involved in an investigation whose research background is readily com-
promised. The possible benefits of creating new information outweighed this shortcom-
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ing. It is said that science should correct itself in time, and any erred conclusions can be 
improved in future research.   
 
Defining stabilization has probably not contributed much to the overall semantic de-
bates on how to categorize military operations. However - at least in the author’s opin-
ion - it did highlight the differences in perspectives, doctrines and practices. This should 
be seen as a prelude to the confusing complexity of the strategic level. The operational 
level is squeezed in between tactical realities and political-strategic agendas and dia-
logues. This thesis follows NATO’s logic on the levels of war and on the execution of 
an expeditionary campaign. For a reader who disagrees with these basic assumptions, 
this thesis probably lacks rationality. As it was written by a Finnish officer, this thesis 
may be considered as predominantly Western-minded, and it is written for a like audi-
ence. Readers with other cultural backgrounds may disagree or disapprove any of the 
grounding assumptions, methods for analysis or the conclusions reached here. In this 
sense, the strong effect of the ontological choices can be seen as a weakness of this 
study. 
 
Constructing the model of “social” battlespace has been paramount to this thesis. The 
usefulness of challenging an existing conceptual framework can of course be ques-
tioned. Human, physical, informational and temporal dimensions could also be organ-
ized differently, as some aspects do not necessarily belong to a single dimension. As the 
boundaries are obscured, some critics could deny, for example, the existence of the hu-
man dimension as such. A technically oriented study would probably categorize humans 
as physical objects or targets, while human communication could be seen in the context 
of the electromagnetic spectrum. The object of study is a decisive factor in determining 
the scope and the methods in each case. This study has focused on post-intervention 
stabilization in the framework of irregular warfare. The question as to whether the “so-
cial” battlespace is applicable to modern high-intensity warfare should be studied sepa-
rately.  
 
Collecting case study evidence from written sources was an almost never-ending proc-
ess hampered by the fact that reliable (and therefore restricted or confidential) sources 
could not be used. The use of open sources alone meant dealing with texts written for 
commercial purposes as well as texts written according to national agendas of the na-
tions contributing troops. The other means of gathering information was the e-mail 
questionnaire. Annex 6 describes the difficulty of selecting the interviewees. In many 
ways the questionnaire structure, the availability of respondents and the subjective nar-
ratives of each respondent strongly affected this research. The questionnaire was proba-
bly too long and complicated and the questions may have guided the answers. A lengthy 
single-round interview was necessary, as the time available did not allow for the multi-
ple interview rounds necessary for the Delphi method. Face-to-face interviews were not 
possible because of the distances involved between the author and the respondents. The 
author still feels that the e-mail version produced more complete and conclusive infor-
mation than an oral semi-structured interview would have. This is because the respon-
dents could take their time and reflect on their experiences without interferences from 
the interviewer.  
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Despite the challenges in collecting evidence, the author feels that the process of gather-
ing evidence through research questions, the case study protocol, the research database 
and the final report was a success. This especially applies to the questionnaire, as the 
database was based on the evidence and utilized a two-step analyzing method (see An-
nex 6). This part of the research should be repeatable by other researchers. All the writ-
ten sources have mainly been used to increase the author’s knowledge hermeneutically 
through continuous interpretation. The observations based on the literature have not 
been documented systematically. The case study database therefore does not include a 
complete analysis of each written source. This is a result of the time-constraints and the 
working method of the author. The findings were often added directly to “a living doc-
ument”, the research report draft. As this process is related to the pre-understanding, the 
personal experiences and the lifeworld of the author, any other researcher attempting to 
repeat this process would probably have a different approach when drafting the results 
and report.  
 
Objectivity has been sought throughout this study. The author has not served in Af-
ghanistan and has never even visited the country. The choices made along the way were 
detailed in Chapters 2 and 5 and in Annex 6 when explaining the methods used. Other 
cases could have been selected had the author had access to other interviewees and bal-
anced previous knowledge on other regions, provinces or troop contributors. The ques-
tion remains, whether the attempt to provide a practical approach through three cases 
only is valid enough. Another question is whether the results would be dramatically 
different if another type of sample had been used. The generalization of the research 
results is the third question that should be posed. It is of course clear that every opera-
tion is different and unique. Therefore, the results of this research are approximate at 
best. In any case, they only apply to the stabilization phase of operations. The human 
dimension of battlespace in the intervention or normalization phases should be studied 
separately.   
 
7.3 Recommendations for future research 
 
This thesis has evaluated the social battlespace at a very theoretical level and within a 
relatively limited scope. Future research could examine the possibilities of applying this 
concept more broadly i.e. in high intensity warfare and in calmer peacekeeping opera-
tions. It would be interesting to examine whether the battlespace would remain human-
centric in scenarios of different intensities, in different phases of an expeditionary cam-
paign or in different operational environments. The usefulness of the enhanced concep-
tual model of tactical battlespace introduced in this thesis should be re-examined when 
each new research project is undertaken. 
 
A practical way to extend this research would be to investigate the influence of the so-
cial battlespace to different planning tools and processes. A friendly force capability 
evaluation should perhaps include a detailed estimation of cultural capabilities for each 
unit. Current IPB processes could be enhanced to offer an in-depth analysis of the local 
human terrain and its cultural influences, variations and manifestations. A specific so-
cial template could be developed to analyze the social distance between each unit and 
the local actors likely to be encountered. Finally, courses of action evaluation, wargam-
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ing and other related analysis could be expanded to include the factors of social battle-
space. Each of these four categories offers a practical level research problem that could 
be investigated in the framework of national or NATO planning procedures.      
 
Understanding the logic of the social battlespace is critical to battle staff, individual 
leader and pre-deployment unit training. Future research could be directed to improving 
these training programs at a general level or mission-specifically. Another application 
would be to examine a current table of organization and equipment (such as a European 
Union Battlegroup or a NATO Response Force maneuver unit) and how it could be task 
organized to dominate its social battlespace. This kind of research could be centered on 
intelligence gathering, information management, command and control, or perhaps on 
kinetic and non-kinetic battlespace effects. Developing specific measures of effective-
ness is another possible approach to future research. The author firmly believes that it is 
possible to execute a maneuverist approach in a tactical environment of irregular war-
fare and when acting amongst the populations.   
 
For the Finnish Army – as mentioned in Chapter 3 – this thesis should provoke a doc-
trinal debate. Understanding the differences between the three phases – intervention, 
stabilization and normalization – is one thing; designing the national contingent based 
on real tactical needs is another. A key question for the future is whether we plan to 
deploy a “battlespace owner” unit all by ourselves or, for example, with our Nordic 
friends. An EU Battlegroup is likely to be a combined venture, but we do have a tradi-
tion of deploying a full Finnish battalion if needed. Whether we prefer to invest in mul-
tinational maneuver units or, less importantly, decide to provide only specialized small-
units, this question is not only national. However, if we continue to consider the option 
of the national battalion in the future, we should make a concentrated effort on studying 
the requirements of modern full spectrum operations. 
 
The Finnish Army should launch studies on how to increase its preparedness for future 
expeditionary land operations. Ruling out the intervention phase, we should concentrate 
our national effort on studying the decisive phase and the most likely context for our 
future deployments: the stabilization phase. First and foremost, we should improve the 
national toolbox to improve our social battlespace proficiency. This should be done in 
order to close the social distance gap between our national force and the other actors. It 
should always start with interoperability with the other troop contributors, but ulti-
mately our efforts should be aimed at social integration within a tactical operating envi-
ronment. At least three categories of study are readily identifiable:  
 
- Unit and individual cultural awareness levels and skills (overall factors 
and mission-specific factors). 
- Means to overcome potential mismatched lifeworlds within the future 
tactical operating environments (interpreters, cultural mediators, lan-
guage skills, pre-deployment training packages etc.). 
- A national or multinational enhanced IPB process with a strong emphasis 
on the human dimension. This should include “reachback” links via Na-
tional Intelligence Cells or their multinational equivalents.  
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Further development of social battlespace metrics via quantitative and qualitative re-
search is a vital task. The abovementioned categories could also be used in developing a 
system to measure our social battlespace proficiency. This will be invaluable for any 
attempts to provide an effective multinational stabilization force in the future.  
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Major Teemu Nurmela’s GSO thesis    ANNEX 1  1 (2) 
 
HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN 
 
330 – 327 B.C. Alexander the Great conquered Afghanistan 
 
652 – 664 A.D. The Arabs conquered the ancient Afghanistan 
 
1220  Genghis Khan and his Mongol army invaded the country 
 
1839 – 1842  The first Anglo-Afghan war 
 
1878  The second Anglo-Afghan war 
 
1893  The Durand line is established between Afghanistan and Pakistan 
 
1919  Independence of the country after the third Anglo-Afghan war 
 
1979 – 1989  Soviet occupation and the war of Afghanistan 
 
1994  The Taliban militia seizes Kandahar at the end of the civil war 
 
1996  The beginning of the Taliban regime in Kabul 
 
1998  U.S. cruise missile strikes on Al Qaeda training camps 
 
2001  The attacks of September 11th in New York and Washington D.C. 
  The beginning of “Operation Enduring Freedom” 
  ISAF mandated by the UN on 20 December  
 
2006  ISAF became responsible for the whole country on 05 October  
 
 
The history leading to the present conflict 
 
The long War of Afghanistan ended when the Soviets pulled their last forces out in 1989. The 
ten years of guerilla warfare had brought in many players. Pakistan became the main supply 
route for weapons, volunteer fighters and their training. Pakistani intelligence service ISI chan-
neled these resources into Afghanistan with the support of Saudi Arabia and the USA. This in-
cluded educating poor people in Madrassas to become fanatic fighters - these students were 
called Talibs. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his Hezb-I Islam party were able to gain a big part of 
Pakistani and CIA support despite their radical and anti-Western mindset. His biggest competi-
tor was Ahmad Shah Mahsood, a Tajik who had fought well in the Panjshir valley. When Ma-
sud’s Afghans guerillas liberated Kabul and set up a Tajik-led government, a civil war ensured. 
Hekmatyar’s Islamists were not able to win Mahsood’s army and he lost Pakistan’s support. 
Dostum’s Uzbeks took over the Mazar-e-Sharif area. There was no end in sight for the civil 
war.303   
 
                                                 
303 Jokinen – Kullberg (2006), p. 232-242. Madrasa means a religious school.  
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A new movement, the extremely religious Taliban, gradually took the leading role in the fight 
against the Mujahedin government. Starting in the region of Kandahar in 1994, the Taliban 
quickly grew stronger under the leadership of mullah Omar. They were able to assemble former 
communist officers, former warlords, and a considerable amount of Soviet weapons; in addition, 
they won the support of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Sheikh Osama 
bin Laden provided funding and ideology and was allowed to set up a support and training net-
work for al Qaeda. After taking Herat in 1995, Taliban seized Kabul in 1996 and set up a new 
regime. Al Qaeda supported the Taliban financially, but the Taliban also profited from drug 
production and trafficking. However, the Taliban were unable to take control of the whole coun-
try as Mahsood, Dostum, Rabbani and other local warlords – later called the Northern Alliance 
– held their ground.304   
 
Following the bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the U.S. military 
struck al Qaeda training camps with cruise missiles in Afghanistan. The ensuing sanctions 
against Taliban regime were counterproductive. They did not hand over bin Laden and al Qaeda 
and Taliban formed an even closer alliance. On 09 September 2001, Mahsood was assassinated 
and two days later, New York and Washington were devastated by terrorist attacks. Operation 
Enduring Freedom commenced 07 October 2001, only 26 days after the 9/11 attacks. In a rapid 
and decisive manner, the U.S.-led Coalition joined forces with the Northern Alliance to defeat 
the Taliban and finally seized Kabul on 13 November 2001. This intervention was mandated by 
Article 51 of the UN Charter, recognizing the right to self-defense. Unlike the ISAF (which was 
established later), OEF had no bilateral SOFA or MTA with the Afghan government. Besides 
the American forces, the main troop contributors were the UK, Australia, France, Germany, 
Canada, Denmark and Italy. The coalition’s presence on the ground grew steadily from 11,500 
soldiers in early 2003 to 19,600 troops by late 2004.305 
 
The new president was a Pashtun named Hamid Karzai. His position was authorized in 2002 by 
the first Loya Jirga in 20 years. By cleverly selecting candidates for the new government’s key 
positions, he was able to expand the central government’s authority at least nominally through-
out the country. Although security was better than it had been since the post-Soviet period had 
begun, clashes between warlords continued especially in the North and in Herat area. Towards 
2005, the Taliban regrouped once again from the strong Pashtun areas of East and South Af-
ghanistan and from the Pakistani Waziristan. More recently, al Qaeda and Hekmatyar’s Hezb-I 
Islam have returned and have allegedly been responsible for the increasing terrorism statistics in 
Afghanistan, while the Taliban has mainly used guerilla tactics. However, the so-called Neo-
Talibans – who have alleged links to Iraq - have started using suicide attacks, IEDs, kidnappings 
and executions. Dostum in the North and Khan in Herat area have also contributed to crippling 
the authority of Karzai’s government.306 In 2009, the troop strength of ISAF (responsible for the 
whole country since the end of 2006) has climbed steadily, but violence is still spreading and 
the insurgent activity does not seem to be diminishing. 
                                                 
304 Jokinen – Kullberg (2006), p. 242-249 and Their, J. Alexander in Durch (ed.) (2006), p. 474-476. 
305 Their, J. Alexander in Durch (ed.) (2006), p. 474-493. 
306 Jokinen – Kullberg (2006), p. 249-261. 
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SELECTED MAPS OF AFGHANISTAN 
 
Map 1. Afghanistan provinces and provincial capitals. 
(Source: http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/afghanis-reg.pdf) 
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Map 2. ISAF Regional commands, PRT locations and lead nations as of 01 Sept 2008. 
(Source: http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/maps/graphics/afganistan_prt_rc.pdf) 
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Map 3. The geographical features of Afghanistan (Source: ISAF Rauhanturvaajan opas 2/2008, 
p. 10).  
A1: The Northern Plains  A2: Southwestern plains and desert 
A3: The Eastern Highland Ranges A4: The Central Highland Ranges 
A5: The Jalalabad Valley 
 
 
Map 4. Geographical distribution of ethnic groups in Afghanistan. 
(Source: ISAF Rauhanturvaajan opas 2/2008, p. 12) 
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Map 5. Population density in 2002. 
(Source: http://geobase.org.af/maps/national/population/population_density_2002.pdf) 
 
 
Map 6. Opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, 2005-2007. 
(Source: http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/AFG07_ExSum_web.pdf) 
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Map 7. Warlord areas of influence as of 2004. 
(Source: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/maps.htm) 
 
 
Map 8. A geographical estimate of Afghan government and Taliban controlled areas in 2006. 
(source: 
http://www.stratfor.com/files/mmf/c/b/cb1c4c04190d458bb98a31c80fb58dcceab4d333.jpg) 
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Map 9. Estimation of Taliban presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2007. 
(Source: SENLIS (2007B): Afghanistan Decision Point 2008, MF Publishing, London, p. 18). 
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Major Teemu Nurmela’s GSO thesis   ANNEX 3  1 (2) 
 
MISSIONS AND TASKS OF ISAF 
 
MISSIONS OF ISAF307 
 
Security 
• Conducting security and stability operations 
• Supporting the Afghan National Army 
• Supporting the Afghan National Police 
• Disarming illegally armed groups 
• Facilitating ammunition depots managements 
• Providing post-operation assistance 
Reconstruction and development 
• Providing security to permit reconstruction 
• Humanitarian assistance 
Governance 
Counter-narcotics 
 
TASKS FOR PRTs308 
 
The PRTs’ objectives include: 
 
• To support the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRA) in the develop-
ment of a more stable and secure environment;  
• To assist in extending the authority of the GIRA;  
• To support where appropriate the Security Sector Reform (SSR) initiatives;  
• To facilitate the reconstruction effort and reinforce national development priorities;  
• To enable unity of effort amongst civil actors; and  
• To demonstrate the International Community’s commitment to Afghanistan’s future.  
 
 
The PRTs’ more specific tasks are: 
 
• To improve the security environment for the Afghan people through dialogue with regional 
leaders and confidence building activities and mitigating likely areas of conflict;  
• To monitor, assess, advise on and support SSR activities in close coordination with the 
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), SSR lead-nations and bilat-
eral programmes;  
• To assist the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) in the dissemination of its decisions and 
policies to the regional leaders;  
• To provide a visible presence in assigned Area of Operations (AOO);  
• To monitor and assess the military, political, and civil situations with the AOO;  
                                                 
307 http://nato.int/issues/afghanistan/index.html#missions Accessed 04 mars 2009. 
308 http://nato.int/isaf/topics/recon_dev/prts.html Accessed 04 mars 2009. 
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• To provide information and intelligence to the Commander of ISAF (COMISAF for the 
development of a common operational picture of the assigned AOO;  
• To assist the International Community with the process of reform and strengthening of civil 
administration;  
• To facilitate information sharing between the GOA and civil agencies;  
• To organise and facilitate periodic principals’ meetings to facilitate dialogue and liaison 
between the GOA / UNAMA / and regional leaders;  
• To direct assistance to the civilian element of the PRT in terms of transport support, engi-
neering etc and  
• To be prepared to host and assist international observers assisting in the development of 
civil structures.  
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Major Teemu Nurmela’s GSO thesis   ANNEX 4  1 (2) 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE HUMAN DIMENSION IN AFGHANISTAN 
 STATEMENTS (facts) CONCLUSIONS 
TIME - long duration of the overall campaign 
- there are moments of very high intensity and vio-
lence 
- force rotations are usually only six months long  
1) The temporal dimension favors the insur-
gents.  
2) The deployed forces do not have enough 
time to learn to master their environment. 
SPACE - the AO is vast with very few avenues of approach 
and ways to maneuver on the ground  
-  the terrain is mountainous and at some points totally 
inaccessible 
- the population is concentrated in villages and towns 
- the borders are contested and there is cross-border 
movement of forces and material (especially from 
Pakistan) 
3) It is impossible to dominate the whole AO 
and to control the borders. 
4) The forces have to be deployed primarily 
amongst the people, in urbanized zones.  
FORCES - Western forces are multinational and very diverse  
- national factors of the lead-nations have an influence 
on how the PRTs operate  
- national caveats limit the deployment and employ-
ment of forces  
- two parallel campaigns and missions (ISAF/OEF) 
- multiple sources of opposition: Taliban/AQ,  warri-
ors, warlords, criminals and “accidental guerillas” 
- ANA et ANP alone are ineffective  
- the “neo-Talibans” are growing in strength and 
numbers  
- private actors (PSC, PMC) and intelligence agencies 
add the overall confusion 
5) There is no real unity of effort or command 
amongst the “western” forces. 
6)  A military response alone (increased troop 
strength, more firepower etc.) will not be 
enough to contain the adversaries.  
7) ANA and ANP have to be reinforced and 
supported in order to transfer the responsibility 
for security to them.  
ENVI-
RON-
MENT 
- war is “the norm” in Afghan society since the 1970s 
- the society is tribal and multiethnic 
- the identities of different actors is not always known  
- the people are oriented to the local level and tradi-
tional ways instead of official procedures and authori-
ties 
- illiteracy leads to a dependence on oral information  
- opium poppy eradication creates poverty, unem-
ployment and hunger in most cases 
- Westerners face major cultural and linguistic barriers  
- the comprehensive approach is oriented towards 
Kabul 
- the use of firepower causes a risk of collateral dam-
age and fratricide   
8) The main effort of the comprehensive ap-
proach should be in the provinces instead of 
Kabul. 
9) Direct approaches with short-term objec-
tives (such as to offensive operations, heavy 
use of firepower in defense or destroying the 
opium poppy cultivations) are in fact easily 
exploited by the adversaries. 
10) In addition to a fire support plan, there 
should be a plan to win people’s support. 
Table 1. Statements concerning the tactical land environment of ISAF and significant conclusions on 
operations amongst the people. To be read with Chapters 5 and 6.309 
                                                 
309 PIA-05.401 (2008), p. 30-37. 
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THE TACTICAL CENTER OF GRAVITY OF 
ISAF 
 
The Afghan populations 
 
CRITICAL CAPABILITIES (of the CoG) 
 
- to support the local administrations  
- to support the central government  
- to offer legitimacy and support for the Afghan 
Security Forces (ANA, ANP) 
- to eliminate the sanctuaries and the support for 
the insurgents and criminal networks   
 
CRITICAL VULNERABILITES (ISAF) 
 
- different operating methods of different units 
and forces  
- public opinion and the support of the interna-
tional community  
- interior politics of the troop contributing na-
tions  
- to confuse local adversaries with  al-Qaeda 
and the Taliban 
- collateral damage and fratricide in combat  
- differences of “lifeworlds”, cultural and  lin-
guistic barriers on the ground 
 
CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS (ISAF) 
 
- unity of effort and command 
- to profoundly understand the society and the 
“lifeworlds” of the Afghans 
- to secure urban zones and their people to facili-
tate employment  
- to win the battle of perception 
- to contain the adversaries and to force them to 
negotiate 
- to use force with great restraint and precision 
 
 
TACTICAL EFFECTS TO ACHIEVE 
- To ensure effective intelligence (especially HUMINT) and exchange of information with 
other actors 
- To analyze the human terrain and social networks in order to target kinetic and non-kinetic 
operations 
- To assure continuity and mutual knowledge at the small-unit level despite unit rotations 
- To minimize the cultural and  linguistic barriers with the help of interpreters and cultural 
mediators  
- To assure that the comprehensive approach on the local level has the means to replace or 
compensate the population for inconveniences before taking action (e.g. opium poppy era-
dication)  
- To conduct “storytelling operations” amongst the people with general narratives and spe-
cially targeted messages and audiences according to the situation and events  
- To negotiate with local armed factions to make them participate in  political action instead 
of armed action  
- To reinforce the status and legitimacy of ANA and ANP as well as their attraction as an 
employer at the local level 
- To shift the responsibility of kinetic operations to ANA and ANP in order to lessen the 
Western footprint  
 
Table 2. Analysis of the tactical Center of Gravity of ISAF.  To be read with Chapters 5 and 
6.310 
                                                 
310 PIA-05.401 (2008), p. 30-37. 
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PROVINCIAL OVERVIEW OF THE CASE STUDY 
 
This provincial overview provides key facts on the Afghan provinces concerned:  
• Finnish troops:  Kabul, Balkh, Faryab, Jowzjan, Sar-e-Pol and Samangan 
• French troops: Kabul and Kapisa 
• British troops: Helmand (and Kabul) 
 
The practical evidence collection included the following sources: 
- The Finnish ISAF handbooks 2/06, 2/07, 2/08 and 2/09 
- Websites of Finnish, Swedish and Norwegian Armed forces 
- Finnish government reports concerning operations in Afghanistan 
- The French Ministry of Defense website and its articles on operations in Af-
ghanistan (in French and in English) 
- The UK Ministry of Defence website on operations in Afghanistan 
- Province and overall data provided by the USAID website   
- Province overviews provided by the Afghanistan Investment Support Agency 
(AISA), available for Kabul, Kapisa, Helmand, Balkh, Faryab and Samangan 
provinces 
- U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Program for Culture and Conflict Stud-
ies website offering provincial overviews for Kabul, Kapisa and Helmand 
 
Faryab Province 
- frontiers with Turkmenistan  
- 20 293 km2, 884 000 inhabitants 
- capital Meymaneh (80 000 inhabitants) 
- poor road network 
- the majority of the population are Uzbeks, others Tajiks, Pashtuns, Turkmens  
- support area of General Dostum (Uzbek, Jombesh party) 
- insurgent activity has increased since 2006 
 
  
159
 
 
Map 10. The four provinces of PRT Mazar-e-Sharif AO. The Faryab Province is located just 
west of Jowzjan and Sar-e-Pol.  
(Source: http://www.mil.se/sv/Internationella-insatser/Pagaende-insatser/Afghanistan/?print=1)  
 
 
Balkh Province 
- frontiers with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan 
- 17 249 km2, 1 145 000 inhabitants 
- capital Mazar-e-Sharif (300 000 inhabitants) 
- the majority of the population are Tajiks, others include Uzbeks, Hazaras, Pashtuns, 
Turkmens 
- relatively secure, one of the most developed provinces in Afghanistan  
- Pashtuns live in the south and west; these are more dangerous areas because part of 
their population is supporting insurgents 
- Mohammed Atta as governor (a Tajik, former Northern Alliance commander, Jamiat 
party) 
 
Jowzjan Province 
- frontier with Turkmenistan 
- 11,798 km2, 477 000 inhabitants 
- capital Sheberghan (250 000 inhabitants) 
- Uzbeks, Turkmens, Tajiks, Pashtuns, Nomads, some Arabs 
- support area of General Dostum (Uzbek, Jumbesh party) 
- relatively secure 
 
Samangan Province 
- no national frontiers 
- 11,262 km2, 344000 inhabitants 
- capital Aybak (80-90 000 inhabitants) 
- Uzbeks, Tajiks, Pashtuns, Hazaras  
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- relatively secure 
 
Sar-e-Pol Province 
- no national frontiers 
- 15 999 km2, 497 000 inhabitants 
- capital Sar-e-Pol 
- Uzbeks, Pashtuns, Hazaras, Tajiks 
- restless, insurgent activity increasing 
 
Kabul Province  
- no national frontiers 
- 4 462 km2, 3 450 000 inhabitants 
- capital Kabul (3 000 000 inhabitants) 
- the population is mainly Hazara, Tajik, Pashtun, Kuchi, and Qizilbash (Kabul city 
mixed, Surobi Pashtun dominant)   
- the French Battalion (BATFRA) is located near Kabul 
 
 
Map 11. The Kabul Province tribal map in 2007 (Source: http://www.nps.edu) . The Surobi 
District can be seen in the eastern part of the province. Kapisa Province is its eastern neighbor.  
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Kapisa Province 
- no national frontiers 
- 1 842 km2, 393 000 inhabitants 
- capital Mahmud Raqi 
- Tajiks, Pashtuns, Nuristanis 
- French maneuver unit, GTIA Kapisa 
- U.S.-led PRT 
- many U.S. troops, ISAF and OEF 
 
 
Map 12. Kapisa Province tribal map (Source: http://www.nps.edu)  
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Helmand Province 
- frontier with Pakistan 
- 58 584 km2, 822 000 inhabitants 
- capital Lashkar Gah 
- primarily Pashtun with a Baluchi minority 
- UK maneuver unit, Helmand TF (a brigade-sized unit) 
- UK-led PRT 
- reinforced by a brigade of U.S. Marines in the summer of 2009 
 
 
Map 13. The tribal map of the Helmand Province (Source: http://www.nps.edu)   
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EXECUTION OF THE INTERVIEWS 
 
A semi-structured interview was selected as an additional method to improve the quality of 
practical evidence. The use of military officers as experts can also be seen as an important step 
in improving the validity and the reliability of the research results. A thematic semi-structured 
interview seemed to be the best approach, as the research questions were easy to divide into two 
separate units of analysis. An open interview would not have produced comparable or measur-
able information. On the other hand, a structured interview would have limited the respondents 
and would have damaged the qualitative approach.311 The main groups of interest were the stu-
dent officers in the Finnish General Staff Officers’ Course and in the French Joint Staff College. 
The respondents were selected based on participation in operations in Afghanistan. Experience 
from Battlegroup, PRT or Regional Command level was prioritized. For practical reasons, the 
interviews were conducted via e-mail with a specially designed questionnaire form (see Annex 
7). This type of evidence collection suits qualitative research as it imitates the structures of a 
semi-structured interview.312  
 
Finding the best and the most willing mix of respondents required some e-mail traffic and tele-
phone calls. From Finland, the group of respondents included two officers on the GSO course 
level, two other senior officers and two captains not yet at the GSO level. Three of the respon-
dents had previously contributed to the author’s earlier research work. To provide further know-
ledge on the Regional Command (North) and Kabul area of operations, two Swedish and one 
Norwegian respondent were added. One of these was found from the CID and two others 
through Finnish colleagues studying in the Swedish and Norwegian Staff Colleges. The French 
and British respondents were more difficult to find despite the fact that the author studies in 
France. From a relatively large group of officers with operational experience in Afghanistan, 
only five volunteered to participate and only three finally responded despite several reminders 
sent via e-mails. One response had to be ignored, as it was not fully completed. One French 
respondent with experience from Kapisa was found with the help of a fellow student at the CID. 
On the British side, one officer was available in the French Joint Staff College and two others 
were located with his help and with the help of a Finnish student at the UK Joint Services 
Command and Staff College.   
 
The questionnaire form was designed according to the two units of analysis: the actors of the 
human terrain and the interaction between ISAF and the other actors. These were split into two 
main question groups. The format was tested with a single respondent at the CID, which re-
sulted only in minor changes and reformulations of some questions.313 The final forms were sent 
to respondents by e-mail with a letter of presentation. This included an introduction and a sum-
mary of the author’s earlier research on the concept of battlespace. This stage of the research 
process was launched in early November 2008 and the last questionnaire form was received in 
June 2009. The target number of respondents - six Finnish and three other Nordic officers, three 
French and three British officers - was reached. The respondents had an opportunity to view, 
comment and correct the final draft of this thesis in August 2009. 
 
                                                 
311 Hirsjärvi – Hurme, (1993), pp. 24–38. 
312 Hirsjärvi – Remes – Sajavaara (2005), pp. 182–193; Flick (2006), pp. 257-259.  
313 Hirsjärvi – Hurme, (1993), pp. 40–45. 
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The questionnaire data was analyzed using theoretical coding as the selected content analysis 
method.314 Each question was analyzed using “open coding”, i.e. finding individual key words 
or phrases from the responses. This was done with the help of individual Excel tables used for 
each question, where key words were listed as rows and the respondents were listed as columns. 
Analysis was done one question at a time, and the questionnaire forms were always read in the 
same order. Every new finding produced a new line, and every time an exact wording was 
found, this added another “hit” on the same line. As the work progressed, the lines were 
grouped according to similar findings. This resulted in tables with thematic groups of rows, 
each of which had a single or several “hits” according to the number of respondents referring to 
the same thing. The final step was to summarize the key content by question as can be seen 
from Annex 7.   
 
The validity and reliability of this method is to be considered in relation to the overall method of 
the case study. These questionnaire-based semi-structured e-mail interviews were only compli-
mentary contributions to the overall cross-case analysis. The quantitative analysis of “this and 
this element mentioned by so many respondents” is unimportant. Forming a comprehensive idea 
of the experiences of the respondents was far more important. As the units of analysis are rather 
generic, the system of open coding method applies well. It is important to remember that all the 
responses are subjective views based on the time and place of service. All the questionnaire 
forms and tables used in their analysis are held by the author. All the respondents were treated 
anonymously, though only some of them wished to remain anonymous in this report.  
 
 
Rank Country Regions Time Task 
LTC FIN RC(N), Mazar-e-Sharif 2005 Deputy commander, PRT HQ 
CPT FIN RC(N), Meymaneh 2005-
2006 
MOT commander 
CPT FIN Kabul 
RC(N), Mazar-e-Sharif 
2004-
2005 
2008 
Intelligence officer, KMNB 
MOT commander 
LCDR FIN RC(N), Mazar-e-Sharif 2007-
2008 
Operations Officer, PRT HQ  
LTC FIN Kabul 
RC(N), Mazar-e-Sharif 
2003-
2004 
2008 
CIMIC unit commander 
Operations Officer, PRT HQ 
CPT FIN Kabul 2003 Intelligence officer, KMNB 
MAJ SWE Kabul, ISAF AOR 2002 Reconnaissance unit com-
mander 
MAJ SWE RC(N), Mazar-e-Sharif 2007 Intelligence officer, RC(N) HQ 
MAJ NOR RC(N), Meymaneh 2007-
2008 
COS, PRT HQ 
                                                 
314 Flick (2006), p. 296-307. Flick describes the process of theoretical coding, a process which was cus-
tomized to suit this particular research.  
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MAJ UK RC(S), Helmand 2006-
2007 
Staff officer & Company com-
mander, 42 CMDO RM  
MAJ UK RC(S), Helmand 2006 CIMIC officer,  3 PARA 
MAJ UK RC(S), Helmand 2006-
2007 
Staff officer & Company com-
mander, 3 CMDO BDE RM 
MAJ FRA RC(C), Kabul 2007 Intelligence officer, RC(C) HQ 
MAJ FRA RC(C), Kabul 2004 Staff officer, BATFRA 
COL FRA RC(E), Kapisa 2008 Chief of Staff, 8RPIMa 
Table 3. The respondents of the questionnaire.  
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ANALYSIS AND A SUMMARY OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
PART I / THE STRUCTURES OF HUMAN TERRAIN 
(HUMAN TERRAIN = “The aggregate of people present at a specific temporal, geo-spatial 
point.”) 
 
Respond from the viewpoint of your battalion – regiment scale unit and its area of opera-
tions, such as a PRT (Provincial Reconstruction Team), a Battalion, a Battlegroup or a 
GTIA (French). If you served in a Regional Command HQ or a Brigade HQ, then describe 
the subunits of your region in general or with examples.  
 
The questions may first seem long and complicated. The underlined part is always the 
focus. The other parts of the question are additional guidance to help you find an angle of 
view. Do not consider them as limiting factors, but as conversational remarks of an inter-
view. 
 
What international security forces (police, military or private contractors) did your PRT 
(or Battalion / Battlegroup / GTIA) interact with in Afghanistan? Did you operate with 
units from other countries? What was the lowest level of force mixture (battalion / com-
pany / platoon)? What practical effects did this multinationality have on operations? 
Actors: 
- command posts/headquarters of different levels 
- ISAF troops from different countries 
- a variety of ISAF static and maneuver units 
- OEF units operating in the same AO 
- special forces and national intelligence services 
- private security companies 
- international police, police trainers 
Interaction: 
- force mixture sometimes down to the squad level  
- co-patrolling and information sharing between units 
Problems in interaction: 
- different language (English) skills and some doctrinal issues  
- national caveats, different levels of cultural awareness  
- OEF/ISAF mixture in the same AO  
 
What other international actors (international organizations, non-governmental organiza-
tions, national agencies etc.) did your PRT (or Battalion / Battlegroup / GTIA) interact 
with in Afghanistan? Did the sub-units have regular interaction with these actors? De-
scribe the practical “daily business” of this civil-military relationship. 
Actors: 
- UNAMA and affiliated international bodies 
- national organizations (such as USAID and UK FCO) 
- a wide range of NGOs  
- private contractors and specialized advisors 
Interaction: 
- participating in and sharing development and reconstruction projects 
- information sharing, regular meetings, HUMINT contacts 
- maneuver units had less interaction than the PRTs (British and French respondents) 
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Problems in interaction: 
- NGOs sometimes unwilling to operate with ISAF 
- one-way information sharing (ISAF information classified) 
- volatile security situation in some parts of the country 
- need to de-conflict projects and actions 
 
What local, regional or Afghan national authorities did your PRT (or Battalion / Battle-
group / GTIA) interact with in Afghanistan? Did the sub-units have regular interaction 
with these actors? Describe the practical “daily business” as well as the cultural and lan-
guage barriers that were discovered. 
Actors: 
- official central government, province and district level authorities 
- other public sphere contacts (political, media, education, business etc.) 
- local, tribal and religious leaders (maliks, mullahs, landowners, elders) 
Interaction: 
- information sharing, regular meetings, participation in shuras, HUMINT contacts 
- CIMIC projects, humanitarian assistance, local acquisitions when possible 
- horizontal contact arrangements (example: PRT – Province governor, MOTs – District 
governor) 
Problems in interaction: 
- interpreters limiting the quality of interaction (delays and inaccurate translations) 
- locals having high expectations  
 
What local legitimate armed forces or local security forces did your PRT (or Battalion / 
Battlegroup / GTIA) interact with in Afghanistan? What was the lowest level of force mix-
ture (battalion / company / platoon)? Describe the practical “daily business” as well as the 
cultural and language barriers that were discovered.  
Actors: 
- ANA 
- ANP with its special and local branches  
Interaction: 
- information sharing, regular meetings 
- co-location of units 
- joint/mixed patrolling and operations, training activities, monitoring and mentoring 
- focus in populated areas, trying to promote the status of the ANA/ANP 
- medical training and support (casualty evacuation), material support (fuel, food, water), 
EOD support and training, prisoner handling coordination 
- OMLTs (ISAF) and ETTs (OEF) in an important role in practical liaison 
Problems in interaction 
- local people’s distrust of ANP 
- police corruption, possible “dicking” (watching and reporting ISAF movement) 
- language and cultural barriers (e.g. ANA/ANP homosexual activities) 
- ANA/ANP poor level of competence  
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What other armed groups (guerillas, insurgents, terrorists, criminals etc.) did your PRT 
(or Battalion / Battlegroup / GTIA) interact with in Afghanistan? Did your unit or its sub-
units negotiate or conduct liaison with them? Did the groups communicate with your unit 
or its subunits before an attack / engagement or after such an event? 
Actors: 
- criminal networks  
-  “hardliners” (Taliban, al Qaeda, insurgents, terrorists) 
- warlords and armed factions 
- “accidental guerillas” (locals) 
Interaction: 
- some HUMINT contacts 
- mainly split opinions (some claimed to have had interaction with these groups, some in-
sisted not having any direct dialogue, some said it was impossible to know who were 
who) 
- information operations executed by both sides 
- ISAF targeted by armed action (rocket attacks, IEDs, suicide bombers, riots etc.) 
- ISAF engaging these groups through kinetic operations (British and French respondents 
only) 
Problems in interaction: 
- same people may have dual roles (officials with criminal activities, villager becomes an 
insurgent by night etc.) 
- blurring of roles between political parties and armed groups, warlords and politicians 
- unarmed insurgents present in shuras, impossible to identify 
- suffering casualties  
 
What kind of media (international, national, regional and local) did your PRT (or Battal-
ion / Battlegroup / GTIA) interact with in Afghanistan? Did the sub-units have regular 
interaction with these actors? Describe the practical “daily business” as well as the cul-
tural and language barriers that were discovered.  
Actors: 
- commercial media (local, regional, international) 
- commercial and armed forces media of the troop-contributing countries 
- ISAF media operations (media teams, ISAF and NATO journalists) 
- embedded journalists (especially with the British forces) 
Interaction: 
- meetings with mullahs, elders and in shuras  => information operations 
- using info ops tools (leaflets, loudspeakers, radio and TV broadcasts) 
- supporting and financing local media 
- PR campaigns, interviewing soldiers and publishing stories on operations 
- local media people as HUMINT contacts 
Problems in interaction: 
- international media interest only at the operational level  
- local and regional authorities as well as the insurgents use information ops 
 
Describe the problematic of identifying non-combatants and combatants in your opera-
tional area(s). What practical lessons were learned in daily operations? 
Usually they are impossible to identify on sight. Possible indicators include: 
- possession of weapons (although not a definitive identifying factor) or IED parts 
- posture and attitude, so-called “combat indicators” (e.g. firing towards ISAF troops, 
children running away etc.) 
- age, clothing, physical condition and capabilities (fighting age) 
- situation/context/environment of the encounter 
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- social network analysis, who inhabitants associate with, official and unofficial status 
- biometric devices and measures (photographs, eye iris and fingerprint identification) 
improve force protection and help in long-term in a country without proper ID papers 
Observations: 
- Calm areas may be safe havens for combatants. Cities are more problematic than vil-
lages, as even local inhabitants have difficulties identifying the strangers.  
- Insurgents are well-aware of the ROEs and know how to exploit them. “Dicking” is 
common - there is a need to alternate patterns and operating methods. Leaving the base 
is the most vulnerable point, as exits are limited.  
- Same people and areas usually connected with all sorts of trouble.  
- Checkpoints are necessary to limit the freedom of movement of the insurgents. 
- Insurgents use local weapons caches to be able to travel unarmed.  
 
Describe the public environment of your PRT’s (or Battalion / Battlegroup / GTIA) area 
of operations. This should include where the people met and discussed; how and where 
they got their daily and other information; with what means did they communicate with 
each other? 
Official sphere: 
- provincial and district offices 
- police and military bases and headquarters 
Public sphere: 
- marketplaces, bazaars, village squares 
- shuras 
- mosques, religious meetings 
- streets, alleyways, yards 
- checkpoints 
Private sphere – homes. 
Observations: 
- Word of mouth information is crucial for the locals. This includes rumors, meetings, 
news given at prayers, the use of mobile phones etc. This information exchange should 
not be underestimated, as word spreads very fast indeed. 
- Radio is more important than written information, as illiteracy is very high. 
 
Describe the effects of news, rumors and hearsay, of local or outside origin, on the local 
population. How did your PRT (or Battalion / Battlegroup / GTIA) learn to know this 
information? How did your unit try to tell the “ISAF version” of the story? Were you able 
to win the “storytelling contest” and to be “first with the truth”? 
Observations: 
- This is everyday business. Afghans like stories and rumors are often considered as truth 
by the locals.  
- The need for official approval slows down ISAF “master messages”, whereas other par-
ties are not required to stick to the truth. ISAF also invests a lot of effort in correcting 
false information. 
- Constant Taliban presence, the superiority of religious networks as information provid-
ers and mistrust for anything foreign creates disadvantage for ISAF. 
- Storytelling can be won by building confidence in the long run. This only works with 
the people you know and work with. You can only lose face once in Afghanistan.  
- In rural areas, information ops are not possible through the media. It has to be done in 
meetings and by patrols.  
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PART II / INTERACTION OF A TACTICAL UNIT AND OTHER ACTORS 
 
What permanent static deployment options were used? Was your PRT (or Battalion / Bat-
tlegroup / GTIA) deployed centrally on a big secure base or were the subunits living in 
their own areas of operation? Were the subunits rotated in these smaller bases? If yes, 
how long did these rotations usually last? 
Deployment options: 
- static bases (RC, PRT or TF main bases, national support bases) 
- forward operating bases (FOBs), provincial offices and safe houses 
- permanent observation posts and checkpoints 
Observations: 
- many countries use six-month troop rotations in general 
- sub-units were either rotated in FOBs (British 2-month rotations) from the main bases 
or they were deployed there permanently (French and Finnish systems)  
- R&R policies vary from nation to nation 
  
What maneuver options were used? Describe the patrolling or other measures to provide a 
safe and secure environment. Did the subunits deploy in temporary short-term patrol 
bases, observation posts or checkpoints? What was the usual duration of operations (out-
side the base)? 
Non-kinetic stability operations (referred to by all respondents): 
- patrolling (observation, liaison, presence patrolling, urban patrolling)  
- some patrols last several days – patrols build temporary LUPs at night 
- co-patrolling and training exercises with ANA/ANP 
- other framework security operations (temporary OPs and CPs) 
- CIMIC operations 
Defensive operations: 
- base security 
- fire support plans and air support 
- close patrolling around bases 
- SIGINT/ELINT measures 
Offensive operations (only British and French Kapisa Province respondents): 
- ambushes 
- offensive reconnaissance 
- targeting and striking enemy concentrations and areas of threat 
 
How did these deployment and maneuver options affect your interaction with the local 
people or the other actors within the PRT (or Battalion / Battlegroup / GTIA)? Did you 
feel accepted and welcome? If not, describe the situations, when the actions of your unit or 
its subunits were not accepted by other actors. 
On the personal level, most respondents felt that ISAF was accepted and welcomed by locals. 
Some areas were considered more easygoing, some more difficult. The British respondents were 
not this positive. They emphasized problems and limitations to interaction (Taliban pressure on 
locals, ISAF-Taliban fighting, poppy farming etc.).  
Coming in undetected or staying too long was mentioned as making people nervous. Children’s 
reactions were a good initial indicator of the general feeling. Own action (such as dress code, 
display of weapons, playing with children, being on foot rather than in vehicles, combining 
CIMIC and medical action with other functions) may also have a strong influence.  
Money flow and ongoing aid projects normally provide a better atmosphere locally. “Black 
operations” or operations of “outside units” cause more friction.  
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How well did your troops learn to know the local population and other actors, Afghan or 
international? Were they able to establish regular personal contacts for information gath-
ering? What were the major cultural difficulties or limiting factors when establishing 
these contacts? 
The Nordic respondents were very positive about this. Combat unit commanders from the UK 
described their contacts as very limited, and shuras and intelligence sources seemed to be im-
portant for them.  
National procedures, training, cultural awareness, rotation length and other differences were 
mentioned as factors influencing networking locally.  
The motivation of contacts and their carefulness about future consequences were mentioned as 
limiting factors. Contact handover due to rotations is tricky. Not being able to speak with wom-
en is another culture related limitation.  
 
Did your PRT (or Battalion / Battlegroup / GTIA) actively search for the enemy to engage 
it? In what kind of combat engagements was your unit involved? What was the usual level 
of actual firefights (battalion / company / platoon)? Was your unit attacked or ambushed 
by armed groups? In your opinion, why did these attacks happen? 
Purely offensive action was only mentioned by the British and by the French (Kapisa Province). 
Active intelligence/info gathering and search operations were more commonly known. All units, 
whether mobile or static, prepare for defensive action. 
Commonly shared experiences included rocket and mortar attacks, small arms and RPG fire 
against mobile call signs, IED incidents and riots. Only the Nordic respondents speculated rea-
sons for these. The most typical view was that ISAF was targeted when deploying in a wrong 
area or interfering in someone’s business. 
 
Describe the effects on your troops when changing from social action into combat action 
and back. How quickly did they have to adjust to these changes? Were some missions 
purely combat missions? Were your bases secure enough for rest and recovery from op-
erations?  
(Social action = peaceful, non-violent interaction and communication)  
(Combat action = participating in combat / being under fire or a direct threat of attack).   
The key thing seems to be - regardless of the current task - being prepared for combat. Cumulat-
ing stress and after-action procedures were mentioned. Opinions on base security levels were 
largely divided. Welfare, R&R and rotation lengths are issues to consider.  
ISAF maneuver units, such as 42 Commando Group, 3 Para Battlegroup and 8RPIMa, were 
more oriented in kinetic operations than the PRTs, who were more stability oriented. 
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PART III / OTHER INFORMATION 
 
How “culturally aware” was your national unit in general? What kind of theater rotation 
system was used (changes of personnel, tour lengths etc.)? How long was the mission spe-
cific training before deploying to Afghanistan? Was the preparatory training educative 
enough? What were the major shortcomings and strengths in terms of cultural aware-
ness? 
Although some of the opinions were divided, most of the respondents – in hindsight - felt that 
the cultural awareness level was good. Some very critical individual opinions were expressed.   
Finnish respondents had received the shortest mission specific training, lasting only from two-
six weeks. Other countries, including Norway and Sweden, had used three-six months of pre-
deployment training. The outcome again divided opinions, except for the French and the British, 
who were unilaterally happy with their training.  
Six-seven month long rotations were most commonly mentioned. The Finns had the possibility 
to extend their tour for another six months.  
Previous experience is a booster for cultural awareness, as the individuals or the whole unit has 
become used to dealing with different cultures.  
 
Describe the use and skills of your interpreters or language assistants. Were they locally 
employed or organic to your national unit (deployed with the unit as specialists)? Did you 
use local security or military forces as scouts, translators or cultural advisors?  
All respondents had experience with locally hired interpreters. Most also mentioned military 
language specialists. Although the locals were often high quality (young people with high edu-
cation and good English skills), they also faced criticism (“dicking”, security risks, homosexual-
ity). These locals were also considered the best sources of cultural awareness; they served as 
indicators for danger or tensions and also as “door openers” at meetings. 
The French reported more difficulties than others with interpreters, as their sub-unit leaders had 
poor levels of English, and most of the locally hired interpreters did not speak French. 
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